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Abstract
The present work attempts to establish a theory of
reference from a linguistic — rather than philosophical
— point of view.
PART Is The Preliminaries (pp. lo-113) surveys various
linguistic and philosophical problems associated with ref¬
erence; it argues against predicational analysis as a vi¬
able framework for dealing with reference; and it estab¬
lishes the field of referentiality as the domain divided
between deixis (spatio-temporal location) and denotation
(categorial location).
PART II: The Theory (pp. 114-233) begins by drawing a
fundamental distinction (based on Frege) between syntac-
tico-semantic (SS) and referential-semantic (RS) analysis,
and by setting up the notion "referential potential" as a
property of linguistic items. The common — metaphysical
— basis for the calculus of classes and the referential
theory is demonstrated, and the formal framework developed.
Four RS-categories are recognized, associated with "all",
"kind" (i.e. genus), "some", and "one". These categories
are considered to be the 'heads' in referential phrases,
each one of which consists of one of the functional (deic¬
tic) categories and one lexical (denotative) category. The
referential phrases are ordered hierarchically in a ref¬
erential branch under which NP is generated.
Two different serialization-types (appositive and de-
limitative) are considered referentially significant. A
transformational component is introduced to account for
serialization within the NP; three transformational pro¬
cesses are recognized.
After a number of data from languages other than Eng¬
lish has been adduced in support of various aspects of
the theory, PART IIIi The Application (pp. 234-413) be¬
gins by establishing the (closed) class of referential
functives in English. These fall into four subclasses:
quantifiers, E-classifiers, determinatives, and pronouns.
These subclasses are established distributionally on the
basis of the serialization-types they may enter.
The remainder of PART III applies the theory to English
NP's which contain a referential functive.
Finally, a number of other areas are briefly mentioned
for which RS-analysis is likely to prove insightful.
, how can that be false, which every tongue
Of every mortal man affirms for true?
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Introduction.
The present work is intended as a modest contribution
towards the clarification of one of the problems with
which man has preoccupied himself at all times, the rel¬
ationship between words and things. It is not a philosoph¬
ical work although the problem is often considered to be,
primarily, a philosophical problem. But the problem has
many aspects; some of these are philosophical, some are
pragmatical, some are sociological — and some are ling¬
uistic. It is the latter aspects that will be treated
here, although some notice will be taken of what phil¬
osophers have had to say on the question.
The assumptions on which the work is written can be
summed up as follows. Language is one of the terms in
the relation in which we are interested. It is therefore
reasonable to suppose that there is a specifically ling¬
uistic approach to the problem. Furthermore, language
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can — by common consent — be used in such a way that
the linguistic elements employed on a given occasion are
understood to relate with particular things. It is there¬
fore reasonable to assume that a meaningful inquiry can
be made after particular aspects of linguistic structure
which will account for this.
On these assumptions it is natural to begin by assess¬
ing what possibilities linguistic practice might offer
towards the clarification of the problem, in particular
as to the viability of current analytical methods for deal¬
ing with it at all. A central notion in this connection is
the notion of a sentence.
PART I: The Preliminaries
lo
Chapter 1
The Linguistic Preliminaries: Predications
1.1 The sentence.
Recent linguistic literature may be subdivided and
classified on various bases among the least scholastic
of which would be one according to which one class is
constituted by works that, explicitly or implicitly, re¬
gard the sentence as the maximum unit of linguistic de¬
scription and analysis, and one by works that explicit¬
ly attempt to transcend the sentence in the description-
al and analytical procedures propounded by them. The
former class would be the more numerous, the latter more
conscious of the sentence, or so one should imagine at
the outset. Let us therefore begin our investigation by
looking at some of the works in the latter class.
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1.11 1Textllnguistlk1.
Squarely within its bounds we find the bulk of Conti¬
nental *textlinguistics', notably works by German and
Dutch linguists, continuing and reputedly refining work
not only by earlier Continentals like Hjelmslev and Ma-
thesius, but also by post-Bloomfieldian American struc¬
turalists like Harris, Pike, and Fries.
Two works loom large in this context, Roland Harweg's
Pronomina und Textkonstltution (1968) and Wolfgang Rai-
ble's Satz und Text (1972), and not only for their vol-
uminosity. Indeed, Harweg's book is the only example of
a coherent and reasonably successful textlinguistics in
its own right so far (if we disregard Harris' discourse
analysis, if only for the reasons stated by Bar-Hillel
(1967ai532-4)).
Before we look at Harweg's and R&ible's treatments of
the sentence, however, let us take a brief glimpse at
the sentence seen through two articles that purport to
present a bird's eye view of the field of textlinguistics
as a (sub)discipline of linguistics, viz. Hartmann,
'Texte als linguistisches Objefkt' (1971) , and Brinker,
'Aufgaben und Methoden der Textlinguistik' (1971), in
particular at the arguments they employ to justify their
transcendence of the sentence as the maximum unit of ling¬
uistic analysis.
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Die bisherige Llnguistik habe den Satz als hochste
sprachliche Einhelt betrachtet und sich ausschliess-
lich auf die Analyse und Deskrlptlon der Struktur
des Satzes, vox allem auf die Segmentierung und Klas-
slflkatlon sprachlicher Elnhelten unterhalb der Satz-
ebene beschrankt.
• •••••
Demgegemiber wlrd ... als neue Erkenntnls scharf
herausgestellt, dass „dle oberste und unabh&hgigste
sprachliche Einhelt nlcht der Satz, sondern der Text"
sel. Sprache komme prim&r In Form von Texten vor; der
Text sel somit „das linguistlsch signifikante Origi-
naifzeichen der Sprache", das vor aller linguistischen
Forschung unmlttelbar Qegebene, wVhrend die anderen
sprachllchen Elnhelten (Sub-Einheiten) erst rait Hllfe
der linguistischen Analyse aus den Texten herauszuar-
belten selen. Deshalb kbnne der Satz nlcht die bavor-
zugte Stellung innerhalb der linguistischen Forschung
behalten wie blsher; Llngulstlk sel endllch konsequent
als Textllngulstlk zu konstltuleren (mlt Telldlszlpllnen
wle Textsemantlk und Textsyntax).
(Brinker, 1971:217)
Wenn die Sprachwlssenschaft In elner objektgerechten
Brelte und Differenziertheit ausgelibt und entwickelt
werden soil, hat sle von der tatsKchlichen Objektlage
im Bereich der Sprachwirkllchkeit auszugehen. Ausgangs-
punkt einer PhMnomenologle dee linguistischen Objekts
1st die Texthaftigkeit des originXren sprachllchen
Zeichens.
(Hartmann, 1971:12)
Cf. also Hartmann's discussion of this, his second
thesis, op. cit. p.p. 12-15.
There are two points in these formulations that merit
not a little attention; (a) the appeal to the status of
the text as the for linguistic research immediately given ,
and (b) the appeal to the notion of independence. These
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two points have implications of vastly different scope,
the former relating to the scientific status of ling¬
uistics, the latter to the nature of criteria employed
in linguistic research.
On the assumption that Brinker and Hartmann subscribe
to the usual definition of linguistics as the scientific
study of language, it follows from the implication of
Brinker's first point and the explication of Hartmann's
second thesis that they entertain an inductivist outlook
the feasibility of which was disproved already by Hume
himself (cf. Popper, 1963:54-55, and, particularly, 1972:
•
1-31), according to which theories are supposed to be in¬
ferred from observable data. Such a view links textling-
uistics to Bloomfieldian structuralism (cf. Katz and
Bever, 1974), and in fact implies a reversal to a posi¬
tion from which many textlinguists dissociate themselves
(e.g. Harweg, 1968:9 ff).
The second point, according to which the sentence is
deprived of its usual status as the independent unit of
linguistic analysis in favour of the text, is less far
-reaching yet more central to our present purposes than
the general question of what kind of science linguistics
is. In addition to the passage already quoted from Brinker,
the following contains a claim that is of direct relevance
here:
14
Die eeit kurzem innerhalb der Linguistik immer starker
erhobene Forderung, eine Textlinguistik zu konstitu-
ieren, 1st wissenschaftsgeschichtlich zu verstehen als
Korrektiv zu bestimmten strukturellen Richtungen der
Linguistik (vor allem der generativen Transformations-
grammatik) , fur die eine (letztlich willkurliche) Be-
schrankung der Grammatiktheorie auf die Eomane des
Satzes kennzeichnend ist.
(Brinker, 1971:233; my emphasis)
A similar view is expressed by Sanders (1969) and
Delisle (1973).
The discussion of the second point, consequently,
will take the form of an investigation of the two quest¬
ions 'What is the meaning of "independent" in a defini¬
tion of the sentence as "an independent unit"?', and,
pending the outcome of this, 'In what sense is the stat¬
us of the sentence as the maximum unit of linguistite
description "arbitrary"?'.
1.12 The "independence" of the sentence.
Among the 14o sentence-definitions listed in Ries
(1931), eleven include a criterion which can be inter¬
preted as independence in some sense, viz. the defini¬
tions by Biihler, Delbriick, Dionysios Thrax, Jespersen,
Los, Meillet, Meyer, Michaelis, E. G. 0. Muller, Neckel,
and Sievers. But four different kinds of independence
must be distinguished: grammatical, semantical, intonation-
al, and unspecified ('psychological'), which last is the
15
most productive. By way of example of each kind I quote
the definitions by
Jespersen (1924:3o7) (example of unspecified independence)
A sentence is a (relatively) complete and independent
human utterance - the completeness and independence
being shown by its standing alone or its capability
of standing alone, i.e. of being uttered by itself
Biihler (1918:18) (example of semantical independence)
Satze sind die einfachen selbstandigen, in sich ab-
« geschlossenen Leistungseinheiten Oder kurz die Sinn-
einheiten der Rede
Delbriick (quoted from Ries, 1931:21o) (example of
Intonational independence)
(Der Satz ist) von seiten seiner Form betrachtet: das-
jenige, was von zwei Pausen eingeschlossen ist, oder
positiv gesprochem eine aus artikulierter Rede besteh-
ende Exspirationseinheit (breath group bei Sweet), in-
nerhalb deren, sobald sie eine gewisse Ausdehnung er-
reicht, ein Wechsel zwischen hoherer (starkerer) urd
tieferer (schwacherer) Betonung stattfindet.
Meillet (quoted from Ries, 1931:217) (example, in¬
cidentally the only ex., of grammatical independence)
(La phrase est) un ensemble d*articulations liees entre
elles par certains rapports grammaticaux et qui ne de¬
pendant grammaticalement d'aucun autre ensemble se suf-
fisent a elles-memes.
Even if the various labels attached to the notion of
independence are somewhat vague and unprecise, some dis¬
crimination is clearly called for in trying to explicate
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it. It is a multi-ambiguous notion. If we regard the
kind of independence appealed to by Meillet (grammatical
independence) as both different from the other types and
as basic to the purely grammatical compartment of ling¬
uistics — assuming that such there is — this kind of
independence must be determined on the basis of what
grammatical relations we choose to work with. Bloomfield,
whose definition of the sentence is a direct continuation
of Meillet's, operates, as well known, within a structural¬
ist constituency framework, the grammatical relations being
endo- and exo-centricity, but in addition he regards sub¬
stitution as "a meaningful grammatical arrangement" (1933:
194 ff; 247 ff; my emphasis), which I interpret as willing¬
ness on his part to accept the relation (paradigmatic or
syntagmatic, as it may be) between substitute and ante¬
cedent as a grammatical relation. Within Bloomfield's
theory, then, all linguistic forms that are not included
in any other linguistic form by any meaningful grammatical
arrangement are sentences1.
On a general plane this means that "a sentence" (and
1
Among the reasons why no universally accepted definition of the
sentence has appeared not the least important is what might be
called the *I-know-better" intuition. Cf. for example Kasher
(1972:313)
"These definitions (i.e. of "a sentence") may be evaluated by
trying to apply them as a criterion for determining when what
might appear to be two sentences are in fact one sentence."
(My emphasis). How does he know?
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all other grammatical meta-signs) cannot be defined in
isolation from a grammatical theory. On a more specific,
and for our purposes more relevant plane it means that,
on Bloomfield's theory, e.g.
(1:1) he did it
— is a sentence because, although each of the elements
in (1:1) may contract a grammatical relation (of substi¬
tution) with a previously mentioned item, it is not in¬
cluded as a whole by any grammatical arrangement in any
other form. Yet from the viewpoint of unspecified or sem¬
antical independence (1:1) is not "independent". It is on
the basis of these latter types of independence that the
textlinguists apparently argue.
1.13 The "arbitrariness" of sentence-domain grammar.
The second notion to be investigated was that of arbi¬
trariness. Let us assume for the moment that we are working
with a set of grammatical relations not dissimilar to that
of Bloomfield, but refined into the system we find in S0-
rensen (1958).
SjzJrensen (1963:59) explicitly regards linguistics as a
non-empirical science, constituting — with logic and math¬
ematics — the 'linguistic' disciplines. On this belief,
and on axiomatic acceptance of the Saussuro-Hjelmslev-
ian (biplane) sign, he sets up a theory of grammatical,
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semantical, and referential description. The key-concepts
in the grammatical theory are classes and relations, with
each class being determined by a meta-sign. There are
three kinds of classes, derivate, co-ordinate, and one
which is neither. Co-ordinate classes are established on
the basis of unilateral relation signs, of which "presup¬
poses" is one, derivate classes are established on the
basis of bilateral relation signs, like "removability
-removability" (S0rensen, 1958:ch. V). We are mainly in¬
terested in the sentence here:
The metasign "a sentence" does not determine a derivate
class. Nor does it determine a co-ordinate class. The
meta-sign we start from must necessarily determine a
class which is neither a derivate class nor a co-ordin¬
ate class.
(Sjrfrensen, 1958:98; my emphasis)
It is not so much the necessity expressed in this pas¬
sage that interests us, but rather the question why "a
sentence" is the meta-sign we start from, and in parti¬
cular whether the decision to start from "a sentence" is
arbitrary.
Arbitrariness in this connection must mean that no mat¬
ter which level we took as a starting-point for the gram¬
matical analysis, the analysis would be exhaustive and ad¬
equate by application of the conceptual apparatus which is
regarded as grammatically relevant to the material under
investigation. Starting at "junctional"-level (or phrase
-level), the application of S^rensen's apparatus would
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clearly not yield an exhaustive result. The same applies
to any level below the sentence. Could we then begin from
a higher level? Let us try. If we took "a text" as our in¬
itial meta-sign then "a sentence" would be a meta-sign
which determined a derivate class (SjzJrensen, 1958:60).
This in turn would mean that the definiens of "a sentence"
would have to include a bilateral relation sign (id., p.
66). But none of the bilateral relation signs which are
capable of, and sufficient to, establishing the derivate
classes elsewhere in the theory, would yield a satisfac¬
tory definition of "a sentence". SjzSrensen, of course, is
aware of this. On the only occasion where he 'divides' a
text containing more than one sentence, therefore, he is
forced to coin the 'relation' "binary removability-irre¬
movability" (id., p. loo). But even this nonce-formation
would be incapable of yielding a satisfactory definieus
of "a sentence", because the definition
"a sentence" « "a sign which can appear from a divi¬
sion of a text on the basis of binary removability
-irremovability"
— which would be a formulation congruent with his usual
formulations of this kind — would force us to register
conjunctions and sentences as members of the same derivate
class (because essentially the same definition would apply
to "a conjunction"), which is hardly a satisfactory result.
Another — inherently contradictory — possibility is to
regard sentences and conjunctions as co-ordinate classes
2o
within the same derivate class. The inherent contradiction
then manifest* itself in the fact that no single unilateral
relation will be sufficient to distinguish these two co¬
ordinate classes from each other.
Since S^rensen's conceptual apparatus is capable of
yielding an adequate and exhaustive grammatical analysis
(description) provided that we start from the sentence
but not if we start from a text, it follows that, relative
to Sjirensen's theory, the sentence is not an arbitrary
startingpoint.
This is not to say, however, that we could not devise
a strategy which would yield an exhaustive result even if
we started from a text. But it is to say that the devices
designed to account for supra-sentential entities would
be irrelevant for the description of sub-sentential en¬
tities, and vice versa.
As we saw, Brinker was especially concerned with the
provision of an alternative to, or expansion of, trans¬
formational generative grammar, which he accuses of ar¬
bitrariness in the present respect. Is Chomsky's (1965)
grammar arbitrary in this respect?
Again, arbitrariness would mean that if we started
from the initial category symbol T(ext) rather than S,
the conceptual apparatus provided would yield an adequate
and exhaustive descriptive result, because this is the
conceptual apparatus considered adequate for an exhaustive
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syntactical description. But such a procedure would be
arbitrary, although in a different sense. Since Chomsky's
model is neutral with respect to the distinction between
analysis and synthesis of sentences, we should expect the
revised model to be neutral with respect to the distinc¬
tion between analysis and synthesis of texts. This, clear¬
ly, cannot be the case. A text is infinite in a sense in
which a sentence is not. A text can always be continued.
The notion of recursion, already incorporated in the S
-model, where its occurrence is clearly defined relative
to the recurrence of S within a derivation, would have to
be extended beyond a point where it loses all significance.
It would be a potential the actualization of which could
never be predicted in any rigorous way relative to any¬
thing but the subjective and somewhat vague notion of
'wanting to go on with the story'.1
This does not mean that I consider Chomsky's (1965)
model to be capable of yielding an exhaustive analysis
of language. What is more, Chomsky's own (197o; 1972a)
discussion leading to the "extended standard theory" is
sufficient indication of his own awareness of this fact.
1 No more subtle argument than this is needed to make one sceptical
about the very basis on which linguists like Petofi (1971) have
attempted to establish a 'generative text-theory'. As far as I am
able to determine, this phrase is a contradiction in terms.
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But it means that the notion of the sentence as the max¬
imum unit of grammatical description is not arbitrary.
Let us now look at Harweg's treatment of the sentence.
On the very first page of his book, Harweg (1968:9) ex¬
plicitly dissociates himself from Bloomfield on account
of the letter's attitude to the sentence. He then goes
on to establish a linguistic theory of which the key-con¬
cept is "substitution". Substitution is possible along two
axes, the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic. Of these, the
former is the allrimportant. He coins the terms "syntag¬
matic substituendum" (antecedent) and "syntagmatic sub-
stituens" (substitute), and the main classifications he
gives are on the basis of the capability of a given en¬
tity to function as substituendum, substituens, both, or
neither. The most important class of functors for the ap¬
plication of his theory is the class of "two-dimensional
substituentia" among which we find personal pronouns and
definite noun phrases. He begs not a few questions, not
only of substitution but also of semantics during his ex¬
pository pages (pp. 9-87), of which only one need concern
us here.
One of the criticisms he directs at Bloomfield is the
latter*s concept of substitution as essentially a paradig¬
matic relation (pp. 22; 39). In a nutshell, this criticism
is concerned with Bloomfield's claim that substitution
holds between "this/the man" and "he", whereas, for Har¬
weg, it holds between "a man" and "this/the man/he". Cf.
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also Crymes (1968s34). For Harweg, "this/the man" is
a twodimensional substituens, like "he". The recogni¬
tion of definite noun phrases as 3ubstituentia depends
on their morphological non-identity with their substi-
tuenda ("a man"), combined with the fact that they can
be substitutes for any one of a paradigmatically related
set of such phrases.
We should now be equipped to look at Harweg's defini¬
tion of the sentence:
Satze (sind) die kleinsten Texteinheiten Oder voraus-
setzungsloserj die kleinsten Textabschnitte, die nur
indirekt (und nicht auch direkt) syntagmatisch substi-
tuiert werden konnen.
(Harweg, 1968:83)
What this means appears to be this: The syntagmatic
substituens which has a sentence (i.e. a main sentence)
as its substituendum, does not have the same syntactic
properties as its substituendum. He gives as an example
"Das Haus brennt. Das Haus brennt". The second occurrence
of "Das Haus brennt" can be paradigmatically substituted
by "Das ist so". In this latter sequence, however, it is
only "das" which substitutes for "Das Haus brennt". But
this "das" is itself paradigmatically substitutable by
"dass das Haus brennt", which does not have the same syn¬
tactic properties as "Das Haus brennt".1
1 He claims that "Das ist so" can be interpreted as a direct two
-dimensional substituens for "Das Haus brennt" as well. In that
case the definition does not hold. In order to save it he argues
(not very convincingly) for a different interpretation of "dass
das Haus brennt, ist so" as against "dass das Haus brennt, be-
trubt mfch", depending on an interpretation of "so" as semantical-
24
There are two points to make with respect to the di¬
rect/indirect distinction. One of the commonest types of
substitution holds between an indefinite noun phrase with
specific interpretation and a definite NP, as in
(1:2) a man sat on a seat. The man/he was tall.
Is this a matter of direct or indirect substitution?
The answer depends on the precise definition of Harweg's
term "syntaktische Gleichwertigkeit" (p. 78). As far as
grammatical function is concerned (and this might be the
domain of "syntaktische Gleichwertigkeit" since this term
is considered to be the generalization of case-relations
(loc. cit.))# substituens and substituendum are equivalent.
But so they are in "Das Haus brennt. Das ist so" and "dass
das Haus brennt# ist so". However# the reason why "Das" is
considered to be an indirect substituens seems to be the
fact that "Das Haus brennt" and "dass das Haus brennt" are
morphologically non-identical. But this difference derives
from paradigmatic characteristics. It is the paradigmatic
relation between "Das" and "dass das Haus brennt" which is
behind the indirectness of sentence-substitution.
If we now return to the tall man on the seat we see
that precisely the same holds here. We cannot have# on
his own admission (p. 71), "A man is tall" if the NP is
interpreted as specific. In this respect, substituens and
ly empty. In other Instances "so" ■ "wahr", in which case it enters
indirect substituentia.
25
substituendum in sentences of the type
(1:3) spec, indef. substituendum:def. substituens + cop + pred.
— can never be 1syntaktisch gleichwertig1. There is no
principled difference between
(1:4)(a)
the house is burning :•
that the house is burning is true
that is true
(b)
the man was tall
a man sat on a seat :
.he was tall
— as far as the need goes to formally modify the substi-
tuenda before they can paradigmatically substitute their
substituentia. Therefore, either "a man" is a sentence, or
the definition of the sentence must be modified. For crit¬
icism of Ilarweg's sentence-definition on grounds of circul¬
arity, cf. Raible (1972:22-23, and fn 48).
The second point I wish to make concerning Harweg's
sentence-definition is connected with Bloomfield's defini¬
tion as well as with Bloomfield's concept of substitution
as a grammatical relation. Harweg's definition in fact
states what Bloomfield's definition implies, for the fol¬
lowing reasons:
To say (as Bloomfield does) that a sentence is a form
which cannot be included in any larger form by virtue of
any grammatical construction is to say (from a marginally
shifted viewpoint) that a sentence cannot be substituted
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syntagmatically. The marginally shifted viewpoint in¬
cludes giving precedence to syntagmatic substitution as
a procedural factor. If we accept substitution as a gram¬
matical relation (as both Harweg and Bloomfield do), and
if we accept a fundamental interrelation between syntag¬
matic and paradigmatic substitution (as Bloomfield/ but
not Harweg, does) it follows that, if a sentence were syn¬
tagmatically substituted (i.e. had a substituens in a dif¬
ferent, subsequent sentence), we should expect the sub¬
stituted sentence to be capable of insertion in unaltered
form in place of its substituens. This is impossible on
Bloomfield's theory, in virtue of his definition of a sen¬
tence. And, as we have seen, it is impossible in Harweg's
theory, in virtue of his definition of a sentence. The two
definitions have the same implications in terms of gram¬
matical, or structural, independence.
We now cast a glance at Sjrfrensen's definition, which
says
"A sentence" » "A sign which does not presuppose any sign
and which does not contain two or more signs which do not
presuppose any sign."
(S0rensen, 1958:97)
The implication of this definition is the same as that
of Harweg's and Bloomfield's. If a sign is absolutely un-
presupposing it is a sentence. And if a sentence is a sign
which is absolutely unpresupposing, then it is a sign which
is independent in virtue of its grammatical structure.
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In other words, the implications of three entirely di¬
stinct definitions of the sentence centre on one and only
one issue, the grammatical, or structural,independence of
the unit in question relative to its surroundings. Formul¬
ated differently and more pertinently: three distinct the¬
ories of linguistic description have all found it necessary
to operate with a category of which the most important
characteristic is its structural independence, even Har-
weg's which is explicitly trying to surpass the tradition¬
al sentence as the largest unit of linguistic description.
In contrast both to what we might call the definitator-
ial view of the sentence briefly surveyed in the preceding
paragraphs and to what might be called the unquestioned
axiomatic approach to the sentence which characterizes the
main body of transformational-generative grammar, Raible
represents a consciously axiomatic approach. Rather than
giving a definition of the sentence, he provides the fol¬
lowing sentence-axiom:
Satze sind dadurch charakterlsiert, dass ihre funk-
tionellen Telle mit Hilfe des flnlten Verbs und ent-
sprechender Leerstellen (Frageworter) zu erfragen
sind. Daraus folgt sogleich, dass der konstituierende
Faktor elnes Satzes das finite Verb 1st.
(Raible, 1972:6? cf. id. pp. 242-3)
By regarding the finite verb as the sentence-constitut¬
ing factor, Raible associates his sentence-axiom with the
V(erb)-centred definitions of the sentence which have com¬
peted with the S(ubject)-P(redicate)-structured definitions
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since the beginning of the 19th century1. Whether V
-centred or S-P-structured, such considerations are
unqualified as a basis for sentence-definitions since
they are concerned with the internal make-up of sentences
(cf. Ries, 1931:6-7; Allerton, 1969:29), but not as a
basis for sentence-axioms.
Since we shall be concerned exclusively with the
referential properties of noun phrases I shall adopt
Raible's axiom of V-centricity — if not the part about
"Leerstelien" — which has the advantage from our point
of view that it does not impose priority in any form on
a particular NP in the sentence. There is an implicit
tendency to accord primacy in some sense to the NP which
turns up as surface subject on the S-P-structured view.
See further below, § 1.23.
1.2 Some contemporary assumptions.
The issues discussed in the preceding sections are
not only of general interest. They serve as a natural
background for many of the more specific issues to be
gone into in the course of the present work. Many of
1 Reference to the 14o definitions in Ries (1931) reveals that,
since 1782, twenty-three definitions have been V-centred and
twenty-three S-P-struetured. The three definitions from before
1782 to incorporate such a criterion (viz. by Apollonios Dys-
kolos, Priscianus, and Petrus Helias) are all S-P-structured.
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these pose a threat to what is normally known as gram¬
matical analysis in various ways. Moreover, they nearly
all of them invite a distinction between two kinds of
linguistic description. I have therefore found it advis¬
able to go into the claims and assumptions of textling-
uistics since 'Textlinguistik' a priori would appear to
concern itself with most of the phenomena with which we
shall be concerned here and thus might appear to provide
a framework for the referential analysis.
However, as the discussion in the preceding sections
was supposed to make clear, I am somewhat sceptical about
the fundamental tenets of textlinguistics. Furthermore,
I am sceptical about the capability of textlinguistics
and textlinguistic models even of such merit as Harweg's
to come to grips with what (to me) appears to be the funda
mental aspects of the data it deals with. The reason for
this scepticism will become clearer in the next section.
In the remainder of this chapter we shall therefore
broaden the outlook somewhat and go into some contemporary
assumptions underlying the analysis of the data in which
we are interested. Although it is difficult to indicate a
clearly delimited field at the outset, three general areas
will be discussed under the headings "pronom&nalization",
"linguistic relations", and "predicational analysis and
explanatory adequacy". However, some overlap between these
areas is in evidence.
3o
1.21 Pronomlnall2ation.
There are two fundamental aspects involved in the lin¬
guistic analysis of pronouns. Although they are interrel¬
ated they call for a distinction which is not always clear¬
ly drawn. One aspect is concerned with the internal anal¬
ysis of pronouns, one aspect is concerned with the func¬
tion of the pronouns in linguistic utterances. Moreover,
it is not immediately obvious what the relationship be¬
tween these two aspects is in inferential terms: can the
internal make-up of pronouns be inferred from a considera¬
tion of the functions they (may) perform, or is the range
of functions performed by a given pronoun dependent in
some way upon its internal make-up? In the present section
we shall inquire into these questions on the basis of a
number of more or less recent treatments of the pronoun in
the linguistic literature.
It would appear to be the case that within each aspect
three different views are in contention. Thus within the
functional aspect we can distinguish 'co-reference' (I),
'substitution' (II), and 'indication' (III); and within
the aspect of internal composition 'NP' (A), 'non-derived'
(B), and 'syncretism/segmentalization' (C). These may not
be absolutely clear-cut distinctions, particularly with re¬
spect to (A) and (C), and they may not cover the whole
field of pronominalization. Yet if we simplify the issue
somewhat and regard the personal pronouns as constituting
the paradigmatic instances of pronominalization on the
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basis of which the distinctions are drawn, they at least
are not misleading. The following table shows how a num¬
ber of studies pertaining to pronouns and pronominaliza-




























The placement of Postal (1971) is perhaps questionable
since it does not concern Itself with the internal struc¬
ture of pronouns, yet in connection with his earlier work
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it may be seen as a 'functional* extension.
The position AI, I suppose, is what could be called
the classical transformational position, most ably de¬
fended by Karttunen (1971) against the rival position
BI, the two holders of which differ among themselves in
matters which need not concern us at present.
What is of immediate interest about the classical pos¬
ition (AI) is that it is reached from the point of view
of the functional aspect. Since (personal) pronouns may
be used instead of a 'full' NP, the implication drawn is
that the internal structure of a (personal) pronoun can
be assessed on the basis of the internal structure of
NP's. This inference relies on what since Chomsky (19S5:
145 ff) has been known as the referential index convention:
deep structure NP's are assigned a referential index of
some form.
However, a further requirement is imposed on pronominal-
ization. Not only should the referential indices on two
(or more) NP's be identical for pronominalization to occur,
the NP's should also be lexically identical. If both condi¬
tions are met we have what Chomsky calls "strictly ident¬
ical Nouns". Pronominalization is held to depend on strict
identity in this sense.
On the assumption that 'co-reference* has something to
do with the notion of reference as this has been developed
by linguists and philosophers since Strawson (195o), the
requirement of lexical identity is strange. Not only does
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it contravene the basic principle of reference, viz. that
a great variety of linguistic forms may be used to refer
to the same entity salve verltate (cf. also Sampson, 1969:
18), it also creates problems for the analysis of 'co-ref¬
erential epithets' in which the noun is not the same as the
noun in the antecedent NP. This point is mentioned by
Jackendoff (1972a:llo), and it constitutes one of the
major reasons for Lakoff's abandonment of the referential
index approach (cf. G. Lakoff, 1968a:16 ff; also 1968b).
Jackendoff and Lakoff thus seek to establish TG-paral-
lels to Harweg (1968) in which this principle is of cru¬
cial importance. Consequently, both lay themselves open
to criticisms of arbitrarily delimiting the domain of
grammatical description to the sentence (cf. Delisle,
1973), since such a view in order to be consistent must
acknowledge that it is essentially the same processes
that operate across sentence boundaries as within.
The referential index convention itself, i.e. divorced
from the condition of lexical identity, is the formulation
of the assumption that the internal structure of pro-
forms can be assessed on the basis of the internal struc¬
ture of NP's. Yet here, too, there are difficulties. It
is, for example, not always clear which determiner is in¬
volved in (one or both of) the two NP's between which rel-
ativization is supposed to hold. Cf. in this connection
Kuroda (1971:184 fn 6) where this point is dismissed as
not constituting a "serious drawback" for the argument
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advanced (in support of Karttunen (1971))# because the
apparent violation of the constraint on backwards pronom-
inalization (disallowed when two indefinite HP's are in¬
volved) is avoided since "eventually (the trigger of back¬
wards pronominalization) is replaced by a relative pro¬
noun, which one can reasonably assume to be definite".
(My emphasis). In other words# a deep structurally indef¬
inite NP is 'replaced' by something which is assumed to be
definite. Moreover# it is not even clear that this 're¬
placement' can occur since# presumably, it presupposes
the application of a process which, however, is blocked
by the presence of two indefiniteness markers.
Disregarding such difficulties# the classical position
rests on the assumption that there is a relation (of ref¬
erence) between words and things# to put it informally
and somewhat simplistically. If this relation holds be¬
tween two words (in the same sentence) and only one thing#
then a secondary# parasitic relation (of co-reference) is
said to hold between the two words.
In order to be able to state these matters in a slight¬
ly more sophisticated manner, let us establish a distinc¬
tion between entities of various levels. We shall say
that an entity of level zero is a non-linguistic entity
(a thing, a person# a thought# an emotion# etc.), and
that an entity of level one is a linguistic entity (a
word# a sentence, a NP# a VP# etc.). See S^rensen (1958:
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17 ff) for a more detailed discussion of the notion of
"level" in this connection. Dependent on this distinc¬
tion we shall say that an inter-level relation is a rel¬
ation holding between entities of different levels, where-
as an intra-level relation holds between entities of the
same level.
With these points in mind we can now reformulate the
classical position. In order to account for pronomlnal-
ization, advocates of position AI assume the existence
of an inter-level relation (of reference). If two entities
of level one contract an inter-level relation with the
same entity of level zero, then an intra-level relation
(of co-reference) is inferred between the two level one
entities in question. Schematically the situation is as
follows!
(1:5) the dog chased its tail
Investigation into co-reference is to be conducted
within the syntactical and/or the semantical framework.
Therefore the inferred (intra-) relation is promoted tjs
primary status, and the inter-relations are left for
philosophers and logicians to explore.
In contrast, the advocates of position B — and parti¬
cularly of BII — are engaged in describing a 'purely*
linguistic relationship. The diagram which reflects this




(1:6) level one: the dogi its
Substitution is an intra-level relation which holds
between entities of level one, and no consideration is
given to what possible inter-level relations entities of
level one may contract. Such a view is in many ways at¬
tractive, and the results it gives rise to are both power¬
ful and interesting. Yet it fails to account exhaustively
for many aspects of pronominal usage. To mention but one
point, it cannot account for first and second person per¬
sonal pronouns. If we want to give an account of the func¬
tions of pronouns we must take note of the inter-level rel
ations contracted by them.
This, precisely, is what Collinson does in his largely
neglected study of "indicators" in various languages. In
this respect it can be seen as the complement to Crymes'
and Harweg's studies with which it shares the deficiency
of not attempting to explicate the relationship between
pronominal function and internal composition.
The problems of pronominalization and the various con¬
comitant phenomena behind the tabulation of approaches
above are highlighted by Stockwell et al., (1973:ch. 4)
1 This is not quite correct as far as Harweg is concerned, as will
have appeared. To him "the dog" would be a pronoun, or a two-dim¬
ensional syntagmatic substituens. Substitution holds between "a
dog" and "the dog", as well as between "a dog" and "its". This
imprecision does not affect the point being made, however.
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partly by the fact that their treatment of pronouns
would fall within almost every compartment of Table 1,
dependent as it is not only on Postal's segmentalization
theory, but also on co-reference (reflexives) and sub¬
stitution (their anaphora) (simple pronouns)1, pafctly
in a more explicit form:
It seems, then, that our attempt to push the L(ees)
K(lima) approach to pronominalization to its limits,
while not entirely successful, has uncovered some
interesting and non-trivial problems which have
counterparts in the referential indexing approach.
Solution to these problems does not appear to be
imminent, since the conditions do not appear to
be syntactic in amy familiar sense of the word.
(Stockwell et al., 1973:184; my emphasis)
Although the sentiment expressed in this passage is
often implicit, it is rarely found so explicitly stated
as here. I take it to be an expression of the authors'
awareness of the limitations of syntactic analysis as
currently enforced, and at the same time as an invitation
to explore what other possibilities there might be for
coming to grips with the problems of pronouns and pronom-
inalization.
1
They regard the part of their approach which is based on sub¬
stitution as a continuation of the Lees ft Klima position which
is here considered to be co-referential — rather than substit¬
utional —because, to me, it seems rather to be a precursor of
the referential indexing approach than an alternative to it.
It just so happens that the referential index had not yet been
introduced in discussions of these phenomena when their paper
was written. Cf. this with the parallelism between the two ap¬
proaches commented upon in the quoted passage above.
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1.22 Linguistic relations.
In pre-Chomskyan, structuralist linguistics — by
which I intend linguistics as pursued by the Copenhagen
School and the American Structuralists in particular —
it was common to recognize three basic linguistic rel¬
ations, interdependence, determination, and constella¬
tion, to employ Hjelmslev's (1943:23 f; also 1939) ter¬
minology for the relations when considered to be neutral
with respect to his distinction between "system" and
"process". Cf. also Diderichsen (1952) and SjzJrensen
(1958:ch. 5) for particularly valuable discussions of
the traditional relations. These correlate with Bloom-
field's — perhaps rather better known — terms "exo-
centricity", "subordination", and "coordination", the
latter two being subsumed under the term "endocentricity"
(Bloomfield, 1933:194 f).
Furthermore, appeal was frequently made to the terms
"predication", "attribution", and "apposition", the latter
two subsumed by Sweet (19oo:17-19) under the term "assump¬
tion" , and some confusion between the two sets of terms
is in evidence (cf. e.g. Diderichsen*s (1952:9o) report
on Hammerich's usage). However, it seems that we have
two more or less clearly distinct sets of terms used in
the description of linguistic phenomena:
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Of these, the terms in (a) are by common consent the
names of the basic grammatical relations.
It turns out, however, that the parallelism suggested
in (Is7) is only partial. The situation can be displayed







The most obvious feature of (1:8) is that there is
no term in the right-hand column that corresponds to
apposition and no term in the left-hand column to cor¬
respond with coordination. We return to this point below,
in particular in § 4.43.
Whether or not the assymmetry in (1:8) resulting from
these gaps reflects a true state of affairs, it should
be pointed out that it is strictly speaking wrong to
4o
equate the terras as suggested in (1:8). Whereas a predi¬
cation is exocentric and an attribution is subordinative,
the reverse does not necessarily hold. The relation be¬
tween a preposition and a noun, for example, is tradition¬
ally exocentric, and that between an adverb and an adjec¬
tive is subordinative. Thus if for the moment we regard
the terms involved in (1:8) as the names of classes of
constructions, the classes denoted by the left-hand terms
are not isomorphic with those denoted by the terms on the
right, but are rather included in them.
In Choraskyan grammar — by which I mean not only the
position of Chomsky himself and the group of linguists
explicitly following his version of TG-grammar, but also
the rival group(s) around Lakoff, McCawley, et al., the
determining factor being their common appeal to phrase
structure, constituency grammar, which is not one of the
points of disagreement (cf. Seuren, 1974:1-27) — much of
the justification for the terminological distinctions in
(1:7) has disappeared. In particular, the notion of sub¬
ordination has been jettisoned.
It might be thought that subordination forms part of
Langacker's (1966:167) relation of command, and that it
has thus been re-introduced by the back door. This is not
the case. As the command-relation is formulated it would
seem that both NP^ comands VP^ and VP^ commands NP^^ in
any strictly Chomskyan phrase marker. This may perhaps
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not be unreasonable, but if it is correct then NP2 and
S2 will also command each other in the phrase marker
underlying "the beautiful girl came", while at the same
time NP2 will command NP^ and VP2, which will also com¬
mand each other, etc. Surely this is an unstable state of
affairs. More importantly, it does not correlate in any
obvious way with the traditional relation of subordination.
It is on this background safe to conclude that of the
traditional three grammatical relations, only two are ex¬
ploited in Chomskyan grammar, one corresponding to the
traditional relation of exocentricity, and one correspond¬
ing to the traditional relation of coordination. Super¬
ficially endocentric constructions are explained as de¬
riving from a coordination1 of underlying exocentric
structures. The nature of the transformations involved
in a particular derivation determines the superficial
1
I am here following Thomson (1971) in regarding those relatives
(at least) that are not demonstrably derived by stacking (cf.
Sussex, 1974; Anderson, 1975<a:ch. 4) as originating in a con¬
junct in an underlying coordination — not because I agree with
her presuppositional views of the distinction between restrict¬
ive and non-restrictive relative clauses, but because it seems
natural to suppose that underlying sentential structures eventual¬
ly to appear as a relative-clause sentence are related in under¬
lying structure in a less arbitrary manner them suggested e.g. by
Smith (1964) and Jacobs & Rosenbaum (1968:ch. 25). Sussex' (1974)
category of "broken" (vs. "unbroken", or stacked) attributive ad¬
jectives is characterized, in particular, by the presence in sur¬
face structure of either an intonational reflex of a connective
element, or of the connector itself. Those who disagree with Thomson
may read instead:"... deriving from a combination of exocentric
structures between which the same relation holds as that which holds
between eventually coordinated structures". Cf. also Traill (1973)
for arguments against coordination as a source of relative clauses.
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status of a construction as either subordinative or co-
ordinative, the two most central transformation complex¬
es being Relative Clause Reduction and Adjective Movement
for subordination, Conjunction Reduction for coordination.
Furthermore, the underlying exocentric constructions in¬
volved differ among themselves. Whereas eventually sub¬
ordinative constructions are generally considered to de¬
rive from reductions of copulative exocentric construc¬
tions — though cf. Sussex (1974s125) — this is not (nec¬
essarily) the case for eventually coordinative construc¬
tions.
Problems adhere to both of these transformation complex¬
es. The Relative Clause Reduction transformation and the
Adjective Movement transformation fail to account for a
large number of cases involving attributive adjectives.
This is a generally accepted on these rules
(cf. e.g. Bach, 1968:lo2 ff; Levi, 1973; Bolinger, 1967).
In certain instances, notably when the adjective involved
is inherently graded (Lyons, 1968;§ lo.4.4), they violate
the assumption that transformations preserve meaning.
"Old Sam" does not necessarily imply that Sam is old.
Finally, the two transformations fail entirely to take
note of the question of order within a string of attrib¬
utive adjectives (Sussex, 1974). Since there are rules
that govern appropriate serialization within such strings,
we would like to account for attributive adjectives within
a framework which at least allows reference to serialization.
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The original, strict version of the Conjunction Re¬
duction Hypothesis (Chomsky, 1957:35-7), which derives
all superficially coordinated structures from two or
more deep structure exocentric constructions, is inad¬
equate to account for certain instances of nominal co¬
ordination, especially when a reciprocal predicate is
involved, like "meet", "mix", etc. Subsequent accounts
of coordination (e.g. Lakoff & Peters, 1966; Smith, 1969;
Dougherty, 197©; McCawley, 1972; Anderson, 1974b) —
though not subscribing to identical derivations — all
recognize two different sources of superficial HP and NP:
(a) similar to Chomsky (1957); and (b) only one under¬
lying sentential structure with coordinated NP. The
former is known as sentential conjunction, the latter
as phrasal conjunction. McCawley (1972:526) is, I be¬
lieve, the first to have pointed out that phrasal con¬
junction can only occur with "and".
The inability of Chomskyan (rewrite) grammar to ac¬
count for the traditional relation of subordination is
pointed out by Lyons (1968:§§ 6.3.7 and 6.4.3) and Hays
(1964), both in discussions of the relationship between
phrase structure grammar and dependency grammar.
In dependency grammar — as Anderson (1971a; 1971b;
1973a; 1975a) — only the relation of subordination sur¬
vives. Exocentricity is explained in terms of obligatory
dependence, subordination in terms of optional dependence,
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and coordination as a non-dependency relation holding
between two or more elements which both (all) depend on
the same element (cf. in particular Anderson, 1971b:34
fn 5; 1975a:ch. 1; Hjelraslev, 1939).
Anderson (1974a:1) operates with three adnominal cases,
nom(inative), loc(ative), and abl(ative), so that, under¬
lying (1:9) are the representations in (l:lo):
(1:9)(a) the name (of) Fred
(b) the leg of the table
(c) some of the cheese




The first of these is called the apposltive relation
(1974a:l; 1973a:61), the third is called a partitive
phrase (1975a:97). It is this latter one that is ex¬
ploited in his account of attributive adjectives (1975a:
ch. 4) and of quantifiers (1974a). It is important to
realize that he regards these three representations as
non-basic, deriving from a reduction of a — possibly
untensed — relative construction (1974a:1 fn 1? 1975a:
97 f), even though this does not play any major part in
his analysis of quantification and attribution (cf. the
discussion in the next section). Thus the subordinative
nature of a superficially attributive adjective is capt-
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ured deep-structurally by the optionality of the rule
which allows N (and not only V) to govern abl.
The phenomena cursorily surveyed in the present sec¬
tion have one thing in common. They all suggest that an
exhaustive analysis of NP involves more than a purely
predicational derivation. A number of superficially endo-
centric constructions (subordinative as well as coordinat-
ive) in fact cannot be explained on the basis of a predica¬
tional derivation. Furthermore, as evidenced by Anderson,
the fact that some NP's can be analyzed on the basis of
a predicational derivation is essentially irrelevant for
what might be called the •real' analysis of them. By rel¬
ating these findings to the outcome of the discussion in
the preceding section — which, it will be recalled, was
that a proper account of pronouns and pronominalization
cannot afford to ignore level zero entities and the inter
-level relationships — and by reflecting on the implica¬
tions of the following footnote from Anderson (1971a:31):
Within the dependency framework outlined here,
verbs (or 'predicators') and nouns are 'basic"
with regard to different aspects of the semantic
representation. Verbs aura central relationally:
they govern the case functions contracted by
nouns. Nouns are primary referentially (and per¬
haps selectionally - but cf. Seuren, 1969s§ 3.2.2);
they terminate (non-recursive) dependency trees.
— we establish as our main thesis to be investigated in
the present work the following:
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In order to give an exhaustive character¬
ization of the functions performed by HP's
in linguistic utterances it is necessary
to inquire into the linguistic properties
which ensure that NP's may contract inter
-level relations with entities of level zero.
Since there is no a priori reason to believe that the
means developed to account for intra-level relationships
(between linguistic entities) should be identical to the
means by which the inter-level relationships can be most
profitably analyzed, there is no a priori reason to be¬
lieve that what is generally called grammatical, or syn¬
tactical, analysis provides the best approach to the in¬
vestigation of inter-level relationships. In fact, since
the application of syntactical procedures to what must
be considered to be inter-level phenomena has led to none
too exhaustive and satisfactory results, there are rather
reasons to believe that some essentially different ap¬
proach must be taken.
1.23 Predicational analysis and explanatory adequacy.
One of the most sweeping trends in the recent develop¬
ments in linguistic analysis has been the adoption of what
I called the V-centred view of the sentence. Such an ap-
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proach to linguistics can be compared to — and is in
many instances directly inspired by — the predicate cal¬
culus of logistics. It has superseded the earlier, S-P
-structured view held by Chomsky and many others, which
bears a resemblance to classical subject-predicate logic.
Even explicit followers of Chomsky, like Jackendoff (1972a)
have abandoned the latter strategy in favour of the former.
One of the reasons for the recent predominance of V
-centricity is the contention that lexical selection
based on primacy of the selection of nouns may have awk¬
ward consequences for the eventual choice of verb, where¬
as the reverse does not hold — at least not if modifica¬
tion is made of Chomsky's general ideas about lexical in¬
sertion, as suggested by Seuren (1969:§ 3.2, particularly
pp. 64-66). Furthermore, the abandonment of the notion of
deep-structure subject — as proposed by Fillmore (1968)
and Anderson (1971a) — solves many of the problems en¬
visaged by Chomsky if verbs were selected independently
of nouns since his arguments for independent noun-selection
involve reference to the notions of subject and object
(Chomsky, 1965:§ 2.3.4, esp. pp, 92 f). Cf. on this point
also Chafe (197oa:95 ff) .
This trend has in turn led to considerable uniformity
in the analyses proposed for a number of more or less dis¬
parate syntagius: almost all linguistic data, from straight¬
forward sentence (or clause) constructions and down to mat¬
ters of quantification, negation, interrogation, etc. are
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being viewed in terms of a hierarchy of predications, all
of which are to be interrelated, embedded, pruned, and re¬
duced — indeed, even annulled — in a great variety of
ways, some of them quite arbitrary. 1
The catch-phrase behind this uniformity is "explanatory
adequacy". The emphasis is not so much on giving a mere¬
ly descriptively adequate analysis of linguistic data as
on specifying a principled way in which a particular de¬
scriptively adequate analysis may be chosen against others.
Consider, for example, Lakoff's underlying structure for
(one interpretation of) "loo soldiers shot two students"




The basis for this analysis is the intuitive semantic
affinity between one member of a given construction-type,
BA, and one member of a different construction-type, A is
B. But instead of regarding these two construction-types
as equipollent, derivational directionality has been im¬
posed on the formula BA » A is B, turning it into A is B
BA. I shall attempt to clarify the reasons for this and
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enquire as to whether they are justifiable reasons.
A natural starting-point for this enquiry is an assess¬
ment of the notion of explanatory adequacy and, in parti¬
cular, its relationship with analytical strategy.
The originator of the phrase "explanatory adequacy"
is Chomsky (esp. 1964). There three levels of adequacy
for linguistic description are introduced and discussed,
observational adequacy, descriptive adequacy, and explan¬
atory adequacy. Ve disregard the former here.
The level of success attained by a descriptively ad¬
equate analysis is measured by the degree to which it ac¬
counts for the native speaker's Intuitions concerning ob¬
servational linguistic data. A great number of different
analyses are descriptively adequate in this sense.
The level of success attained by an explanatorily ad¬
equate theory is measured by the degree to which it pro¬
vides a (well-motivated and) principled basis for select¬
ing one particular descriptively adequate analytic frame¬
work against (all) others.
There is a certain amount of indeterminacy in the ap¬
plication of these two terms. To see this, let us operate
with the following vocabulary which, I trust, does not mis¬
represent Chomsky's (1964) account.
(1:12)(a) "the grammar" « "the analytic framework designed
to describe (observational) linguistic data"?
(b) "the theory" * "the theoretical framework that
serves as a basis for the grammar in sense (a)".
5o
To Chomsky, "the theory" would be based on the creative
aspect of language; it would not distinguish essentially
between the capacity to produce and the capacity to under¬
stand linguistic utterances; and it would be an ontogenetic
— rather than phylogenetic — theory.
"The grammar" would be transformational-generative; it
would be neutral with respect to the distinction between
analysis and synthesis of sentences; and it would be com¬
partmentalized, comprising a syntactic (generative), and
two interpretive (semantical and phonological) components.
The question I wish to ask is now simply this: Which of
the two terms, "the grammar" and "the theory", can be in¬
serted in place of the variables x and y in
(1:13)(a) x is descriptively adequate
(b) y is explanatorily adequate
Whereas the question is fairly easily and obviously
answerable for (1:13 a) — "the grammar" — it is not
for (1:13 b). Let me quote a few lines from Chomsky (1964):
"... a linguistic theory that aims for explanatory adequacy
..." (p. 29); "The grammar with its associated linguistic
theory would achieve the still higher level of explanatory
adequacy ..." (p.32). Judging by the first quote, "the
theory" can be inserted for ;y (Is 13 b); judging by the
second quote, so can"the grammar". On the assumption that
the definition of "the grammar" provided above is not mis-
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representative, this means that some of the principled
reasons for choosing a particular grammar are built into
that grammar itself. This would not necessarily be a fault,
however, if the form of the grammar was uniquely deter¬
mined by the underlying theory; which in this case it is
not.
In order to see that it is not — at least not exhaust¬
ively — we set up the Chomskyan characteristics of the
theory and the grammar , respectively:




Quite obviously there is no logical relationship be¬
tween the characteristics of the theory and the grammar's
property of being compartmentalized. This is the main
reason for the generative semanticist rebellion, the pro¬
tagonists of which can discard Chomsky's idea of a spec¬
ific compartmentalization without therefore having to
abandon any of the theoretical characteristics.
However, there is a logical relationship between, in
particular, "neutral" and "generative" on the one hand,
and between "creative" and "transformational" on the other.
More explicitly, the requirement on the grammar that it
should be neutral as between analysis and synthesis of
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sentences is a direct reflection of the theoretical char¬
acteristic of neutrality (between production and under¬
standing of utterances), and this requirement is, among
other things, manifest in the generative power of the gram¬
mar. Likewise, the creative principle of the theory is con¬
cerned with our ability to produce and understand utter¬
ances never heard or seen by us before. This capability
is reflected by the transformational power of the gram¬
mar, in the sense that this power makes explicit the rel¬
ationship between "the boy broke the window" and "the win¬
dow was broken by the boy".
For our main purpose, however, we now have to look
into Chomsky's discussion of this general area in Aspects
(1965:24 ff). There the issue is considerably more complex,
for two reasons. Firstly, the distinction between "the
grammar" and "the theory" is no longer obvious ("A grammar
can be regarded as a theory of a language", p. 24). In¬
stead we get a distinction between "a (general) linguist¬
ic theory" and "a (language-specific) theory" (p. 25).
Secondly, a further distinction between "formal" and
"substantive" — as distinct from "substantial" (cf.
Lyons, 1968:§ 4.1.5) — is brought to bear on the main
issue in the form of a search for universale, formal and
substantive, which is now seen as a pursuit of explanat¬
ory adequacy (p. 36).
In the course of his discussion, Chomsky explicitly
seeks to establish the ontogenetic principle of the theory
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as the basis for the TG format of the grammar, in the
sense that it is supposed to reflect the language-ac¬
quisition capacity of man (pp. 25-6). Derwing (1973)
may be read as a careful and comprehensive attempt to
refute this view.
The crucial point for our purposes, hiswever, is the
relationship between explanatory adequacy and the form
of language. The explanation involved is supposed to be
an explanation of the "inner form of language" (in a
Humboldtian sense), to verify a given assumption about
the form of language (pp. 26-7; cf. also the passages
quoted by Derwing (1973:61) from Chomsky & Halle, 'Some
controversial questions in phonological theory', JL, 1,,
pp. 97-138 (1965)).
It follows from this that the formal properties of the
grammar is supposed to reflect, in greater or less detail,
the formal structure of language. Consequently, when one
of the formal properties of the grammar is to analyze
certain superficially non-predicational structures in
terms of underlying predications, it would seem to suggest
that the inner form of language is structured more or less
uniformly in terms of predications, or at least that pred-
icational structure is basic in some sense.
This, of course, is a fallacy. The starting-point was
a given assumption about linguistic form. Any demonstra¬
tion of the validity of this assumption on the basis of
formal properties growing out of it is therefore (malig-
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nantly — cf. Bar-Hillel, 1953) circular.
Furthermore, there is no requirement on the grammar
to the effect that it should operate on the basis of pred
icational analysis which is imposed by the theoretical
characteristics. That it should do so em a number of
occasions is obvious, but the basis for the recognition
of this fact lies within the scope of descriptional (and
observational) adequacy.
One more factor is relevant to the present topic. A
theoretical principle of some historical standing ap¬
pears both to include and also in some sense to oppose
Chomsky's principle of creativity. I am thinking of
Hjelmslev's principle of translatabillty (1943:97),
Searle's principle of expressibility (1969:19 ff), and
Katz' principle of effability (1972:18 ff), the origin
of which is traced by Katz to Frege (Katz, 1972:19). Let
me first try to show what I mean by saying that Chomsky's
principle of creativity is included in (what I shall call
following Searle) the principle of expressibility:
The hypothesis that the speech act is the basic unit
of communication, taken together with the principle
of expressibility, suggests that there Eire a series
of analytic connections between the notion of speech
act, what the speE&er means, what the sentence (or
other linguistic element) uttered means, what the
speaker intends, what the hearer understands, and
what the rules governing the linguistic elements are.
(Searle, 1969:21)
In so far as the principle of creativity is the theor-
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etical basis for the transformational capacity of the
grammar, it is included among the various notions between
which "a series of analytic connections" holds, in parti¬
cular in the last one of those listed. Obviously, linguist¬
ic rules — and among them transformational rules — con¬
stitute an important factor in the availability of ling¬
uistic material for the expression of a particular mean¬
ing, and thus in the performance of a speech act. But
they are — equally obviously — not the only deciding
factor. The point is made more explicitly by Katz in his
demonstration of the inadmissibility of formulating the
principle of expressibility (his effability) on the basis
of the principle of creativity (Katz, 1972:22), especial¬
ly by reference to the fact that creativity is a feature
of the (recursive nature of the) rule system which governs
a language, artificial as well as natural, rather than of
the language.
This observation at the same time constitutes what
amounts to what I called the opposition between the two
principles of expressibility and creativity. Whereas the
principle of expressibility is a characteristic of natural
language — cf. in this connection Hjelmslev's (1943:97)
definition of 'everyday language' as the semiotic into
which all other semiotics can be translated — the prin¬
ciple of creativity is a characteristic of the rules
that govern language use, and only some of the rules at
that.
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We can illustrate this difference by reference to
an example not dissimilar to the one quoted from Lakoff
above:
(1:15)(a) many soldiers will have die& in vain
(b) the soldiers who will have died in vain _?_ many
If it were the case that (a) and (b) are two trans¬
formationally distinct derivations of the same underly¬
ing structure, then there ought not be any problems of
assigning a temporal specification to the copula in (b).
It seems to me that there are such problems. Although it
might possibly be argued that (a) and (b) have the same
cognitive content, they do not have the same referential
potential (see below, § 3.3).
What Lakoff does in his discussion of examples such
as these is to avail himself of the principle of expres-
sibility — the fact that natural language provides a
precise expression for a given content — but pretends
that it is the principle of creativity. In this way a
transformational connection is posited between pairs of
sentences whose cognitive similarities are due to the
principle of expressibility with which the transformation¬
al component is not connected in any inferential manner.
As appears from (1:15), the dissimilarities glossed over
by this procedure are very often of a referential nature.
The point I have been trying to make can perhaps be
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made in the following more direct manner. Due to Chom¬
sky's demand for explanation in linguistic theory, a
la*-Te amount of attention has been devoted to analyzing
observable linguistic data in as uniform a way as pos¬
sible; and since predicational analysis is needed anyway
in a grammar that purports to be descriptively adequate
it has come to play an increasingly important rdle in
the analysis of syntagms that are not superficially
predicational. By the interrelation between explanatory
adequacy and linguistic form, the stage seems to have
been reached where 'explanation' is considered to be
tantamount to demonstrating a — more or less plausible
— predicational source for non-predicational syntagms.
An inferential link has been assumed between the explan¬
atory adequacy of the theory and the predicational struc¬
ture of the descriptive framework. This link is spurious
on two counts. Firstly because it rests on an assumption
which it cannot itself verify (or falsify); secondly be¬
cause it rests on an unjustifiable equation of the two
distinct principles of expressibility and creativity.
1.3 The alternative.
The disinclination to accept as valid the link between
explanatory adequacy and predicational analysis which char¬
acterizes much current linguistic practice enables us to
«
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deprive the predication of any special status it may be
considered to have as a derivational source, and to dis¬
qualify predicational analysis of superficially non-pred-
icational construction-types. Consequently we have to pro¬
vide an alternative. We do this by returning to the com¬
parison between linguistic analytic procedures and logical
calculi mentioned above. The alternative I shall offer in
the present thesis lends itself to comparison, not with
the predicate calculus nor with traditional subject-pred¬
icate logic, but with the calculus of classes.
Two points need clearing up at this early stage. Al¬
though Loglca and Grammatica are twin sisters they are
not identical twins. When we desclbe one we do not de¬
scribe the other at the same time. The one we are de¬
scribing in the present work is Grammatica, and although
she bears a certain resemblance to her sister, they should
not be confused. But, to press the metaphor to the brink,
when we describe their parental origin we are, when de¬
scribing the parents of one, necessarily describing the
parents of the other. Cf. § 4.2 for elucidation on this
point.
The second matter is somewhat similar. There is an
obvious relationship between the two calculi of functions
and of classes. It is not only possible but often desirable
to translate a well-formed (one-place) formula from one
calculus into a well-formed formula of the other, and
Reichenbach (1947:192 f), although conceding the conveni-
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ence of class-calculus analysis, in fact holds that
"classes can be dispensed with", since all its formulae
can be expressed in predicate-calculus terms. To say
that one formula of one calculus can be translated into
one formula of the other, however, is not to say that it
is the same formula. It is rather to express the logical
equivalent of the principle of expressibility of natural
language. The basic difference, of course, is that where¬
as a well-formed formula from the calculus of functions
expresses a proposition, this is not necessarily the case
of a well-formed formula from the calculus of classes.
When it comes to the analysis of natural language we
find quite often, in fact, that a 'translation* is not
possible for some reason or other. Not all 'class-formulae'
are translatable into (one-place) predications. Witness
"the silver bowl" vs. "*the bowl is silver". Instead we
have "the bowl is of silver", where the function-sign
"to be of silver" still retains its natural class-inter¬
pretation, morphologically marked by "of".
The main argument advanced by the present thesis is
that certain linguistic data, although capable of anal¬
ysis within a predicational framework — in virtue of
the principle of expressibility — are in fact more
readily available to a different kind of analysis, the
nearest parallel to which outside linguistics is the cal¬
culus of classes in logic. What is presented here is an
alternative analysis of certain kinds of linguistic data
to the (by now almost standard) predicational analysis
6o
that they have received. The spirit in which this altern¬
ative is presented owes much to the following formulation
Examples that lie beyond the scope of a grammar
are quite innocuous unless they show the super¬
iority of some alternative grammar. Thsy do not
show that the grammar as already formulated is
incorrect. Examples that contradict the prin¬
ciples formulated in some general theory show
that, to at least this extent, the theory is
incorrect and needs revision. Such examples be¬
come important if they can be shown to have some





The Philosophical Preliminaries: Referentiality
2.1 Introductory remarks.
The subject-matter here subsumed under the general
term "referentiality" is highly diversified. Furthermore,
discussions of it have a long historical standing. It
comprises in fact some of the central problems in the
tradition of Western philosophy, and for that reason
alone the account in the present chapter can only be
the merest sketch. It is my hope, however, firstly that
even a mere sketch may be justified as an attempt to
bring together certain idiosyncratic notions under a com¬
mon head, secondly that, by presenting such a sketch, I
shall be able to delimit the subject-matter proper of
the present thesis. It is in the nature of things, there¬
fore, that this chapter should be analytical and critical
rather than inventive and constructive.
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2,2 The field of referentlallty.
In the Aristotelian account of the categorial system
the major distinction is between ouafa and auuBe$n<5/,
between substance and accidence. It is of fundamental
importance to our concern that the categories of space
and time should be found among the accidental categories.
Before we come to that, however, it is also important to
realize that the categorial system itself is referential.
The categories, conceived of as forming a stable, perdur-
ing frame of reference to which entities can be ascribed,
are built into language itself, for without language the
(negative) proof of the law of excluded middle, this "the
most certain of all principles", cannot be established:
Even in the case of this law (of excluded middle),
however, we can demonstrate the impossibility by
refutation, if only our opponent makes some statement.
"civ ydvov ti X€yp o ay<j>ia0nTwv
(Metaphysics loo6 a 13)
Since the law of excluded middle also presupposes the
categorial distinction between substance and accidence, it
follows that this distinction is concomitant with the mak¬
ing of a statement; that is, it is inherent in languor--
(cf. Bertelsen, 1974:68-7o, and for a different argument¬
ation for the central involvement of the law of excluded
middle with the notion of referentiality — "correspond¬
ence" in his terms — Russell, 194o:chs. 2o-21).
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The categorial system thus meets the requirement for
a referential system. It is a system of linguistic prop¬
erties relative to which non-linguistic entities are seen.
Substances are characterized as having 'being' in some
sense; indeed that is what makes them substances. But sub¬
stances may also be ascribed to the accidental categories
of space and time, or — differently formulated — being
at a particular place at a particular time may be predicat¬
ed of (primary) substances. Although in this way there ap¬
pears to be a distinction between 'existence' on the one
hand, 'location' (spatio-temporal) on the other, the slog¬
an "Whatever is, is somewhere" indicates some sort of inter¬
dependence between the two. This slogan can in fact be in¬
terpreted as a gnomic formulation of the distinction be¬
tween a pseudo-referential description and a referential
description (SjzJrensen, 1958:5o).
This distinction, in barest outline, is as follows:
If we have given a semantic description of a sign, x,
that is to say, if we have established x as the defini-
endum and a phrase,zyw, as the definiens of x in a formula
of the form "x" ■ "zyw", then we have established the mean¬
ing ( in more recent parlance, the sense) of x. The phrase
zyw is ultimately constituted by semantic components, or
features, or primitives, and these, in turn, can b< re¬
garded as a set of conditions which anything in the non
-linguistic world must satisfy in order to be said to be
properly denoted by x. Let x be "a father", zyw "a male
parent". Anything in the world of non-linguistic entities
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that satisfies the conditions of being male and a parent
is properly denoted by Ha father" (cf. also SjzJrensen, 1967) .
The procedure of establishing the denotative conditions,
however, is secondary. It depends on the primary, semantic,
description. Turning a semantic description into a denotat¬
ive description is what S^rensen calls a pseudo-referential
description.
A genuine referential description, in contrast, is a
demonstrative description. It depends on egocentric par¬
ticulars like "here", "there", "this", etc., some of which
may, of course, be explained in terms of others.
In order to avoid identification of either of these two
types of description with my cover-all term "referential-
ity", I shall refer to the former type as a denotative
description, or analysis, to the latter as a deictic de¬
scription or analysis. These two types are regarded as
being mutually exclusive, and together they exhaust the
field of referentiality. A problem of referentiality is
consequently to be approached by and solved in terms of
either a denotative or a deictic analysis, or both.
The appropriateness of bringing in the Aristotelian
categories at the beginning of this chapter can now be
appreciated:
A denotative analysis is centrally, if not exclusively,
concerned with the ontological status of entities and with
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the consequences a particular status of a particular en¬
tity will have for the language in which the entity is
being talked about. This is truly the field of linguistic
philosophy. Its crucial notion is "existence".
A deictic analysis is concerned with the correlation
between language and (spatio-temporally) located entities.
Its crucial notion is "location".
The reference to linguistic philosophy (in Vendler's
sense, 1967:5) indicates that it might plausibly be ar¬
gued that a denotative analysis is not a linguistic anal¬
ysis. This argument would appeal to the fact that a denotat¬
ive analysis is derivative, parasitic upon a semantic
analysis, and the claim that only the semantic analysis
is linguistic in nature. It would be pleasant to be able
to leave the matter at that. Unfortunately, however, we
cannot do that. Much of what has been said on these mat¬
ters in the past is deficient in various respects, the
most important of which is the frequent confusion of
sense and denotation/reference. Yet on the other hand to
dismiss, say, Russell's theory of descriptions on this
count would be not a little presumptuous and arrogant,
and not just because it (via Quine) has entered recent
linguistic discussions (e.g. Bach, 1968; Baker, 1973).
I see it as the task of the present chapter, therefore,
to look into some more or less recent treatments of the
notion of referentiality with a view to establishing a
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field which (predominantly) linguists should be expected
to till. The way I shall go about this task is to analyze
— in greater or less detail — works by people whose
main interest seems to be (or have been):
Denotative analysis (§ 2.21)
Deictic analysis (§ 2.22)
An attempt to annihilate the distinction (§ 2.23)
An assimilation of denotative to deictic analysis
(§ 2.24)
A reconciliation of aeictic and denotative analyses
(§ 2.25)
2.21 Denotative analysis.
If there is anything that could be called the basic
philosophical interest it would be likely to be an inter¬
est in what there is. The twenty-four words forming the
preceding sentence give some sort of indication of the
scope and nature of the complexities involved in the rel¬
ationship between words and things. It takes in a good
deal of the mind-body problem; indeed, some philosophers
regard that problem as a basically linguistic problem.
(Cf. in general Cornman, 1966? in particular Rylu, 194:*).
Since this problem, however, is of no crucial importance
to us, the present section will be limited to a brief out-
67
line of only two theories: the linguistic theory of the
modists, and Russell's 'On Denoting'. Both the modiste
and Russell (in one of his aspects) represent a more
linguistically biased tradition than do most of the phil¬
osophers dealt with by Cornman, with the exception of Ryle.
One of the features that sets Scholastic, and particul¬
arly modistic linguistic theory off from its predecessors
is the firm tripartition of the modes of signifying,
understanding, and being. These are related to the three
factors which most explanatory theories of language have
felt it necessary to operate with, although with varying
degrees of stress and importance attached to each: lang¬
uage, thought, and reality.
In modistic treatises, one of the first questions to
be asked is invariably from what the modes of signifying
are derived or originate. The 'prooemium' is typically
designed to explain the interrelations of the three basic
kinds of mode. Martinus Dacus has it (12707I4)1!
Circa primum sciendum est quod modi significandi
accepti sunt a modis intelligendi sicut a causa
immediate. Quidquid enim contingit intelligere,
contingit et significare. Et a modis essendi ac¬
cepti sunt sicut a causa mediata, quia medianti-
bus tooclis intelligendi. Modi autem essendi sunt
proprietates rei secundum quod res est extra
'The actual date of composition is still in some doubt; cf.
Pinborg (1967:63 ff).
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intellactum. Modi autem intelligendi sunt eaedem
proprietates jfei secundum quod res est in intel-
lectu at ut eaedem propriatates cum re sunt intel-
lectae. Modi autem significandi eaedem proprieta-
tes sunt in nvanero secundum quod res est signifi-
cata per vocem.
He goes on to explain that the three kinds of mode
are the same *in depth' (penitus), but that they differ
by accident in the same way as that in which Socrates
is numerically one and the same although he may accident¬
ally be in a market-place, in a house, or among a festive
crowd. Although Martin's schemata were later to be ex¬
panded in various ways, notably to include a distinction
between active and passive modes of signifying and under¬
standing (see Thomas of Erfurt, 131o?:134 ff), the basis
remains the same.
Martin's choice of exemplification to illustrate the
'underlying' identity of the three kinds of mode, and
their different realizations, at the same time illustrates
his (expected) dependency on the Aristotelian categories.
The notion of 'Socrates being numerically one' is a sep¬
arate notion from 'Socrates being at a particular place
at a particular time'. Existence is separate from accident
al location.
Since the underlying identity of the three raod^u is
ultimately the guiding principle for our ability to speak
and think about non-linguistic entities, existence itself
comes to be seen as a reflex of the interrelation between
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the three modes. The particular brand of idealism ex¬
emplified by modistic theory is an inductivist position
explaining existence in terms of the results yielded by
a particular linguistic analysis. Such an analysis is in¬
herently denotative.
Among the puzzles that Russell envisaged his theory
of descriptions as solving, the third ("How can a non
-entity be the subject of a proposition?") is an onto-
logical puzzle. In order briefly to recapitulate the
positions if A and B differ we can express this fact
by means of "the difference between A and B subsists".
But if they do not differ, and we express this fact in
similar terms, "the difference between A and B does not
subsist", are we then committed to an entity like the dif¬
ference between A and B?
He solves the puzzle by saying that from any proposi¬
tion we can deduce a description. If the original propo¬
sition was true, then there is an entity to which the de¬
rived description refers. If it was false, on the other
hand, no such entity can be assumed.
This argumentation depends on our ability to ascribe
truth and falsity to proposition. If we are unable to do
that we will consequently be unable to determine what en¬
tities exist (or subsist), and which do not.
Whatever the philosophical implications of such a view
might be it clearly follows that we cannot depend on lang-
7o
uage to yield a list of sub&lsting entities. First we
need criteria by which to determine the truth and falsi¬
ty of propositions. These criteria belong within the cor¬
respondence theory of meaning (cf. Russell, 194o:272 ff
and passim), which is a special empiricist concept of sem¬
antics into the details of which we shall not go. Suffice
it to say that it is basically concerned with the question
of existence in an epistemological context.
The general strategy of 'On Denoting', consequently,
which reduces descriptions to expressions containing no
descriptions, depends on the acceptance of the correspond¬
ence theory of meaning, and this is an inherently denotat¬
ive theory.
2.22 Deictic analysis.
Chapter VIII of Linsky (1967) develops a view on ref-
erentiality that places it within the bounds of a deictic
description. His basic contention is that it is not phrase
but speakers that refer, and this, combined with his in¬
sistence that context of utterance plays a part in deter¬
mining what referent a given expression has on a particu¬
lar occasion, is the key-factor in the deictic situation.
Phrases only 'have' reference in a derivative sense. What
is primary is that phrases may be used to refer. In this
way, referentiality becomes a function of certain linguist
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ic items, not a property of them.
This view necessitates a considerable reduction in
the- number of linguistic items traditionally thought to
embody referentialitys "Referring does not have the omni¬
presence accorded to it in the philosophical literature".
(Linsky, 1967:122). The first and heaviest casualty is
the existential question:
But oftan the examples produced in which we axe
supposed to do this (i.e. refer to non-existent
entities) ('Hamlet was a prince of Denmark*, 'Pe¬
gasus was captured by Bellerophon', 'The Golden
Mountain does not exist') are such that the quest¬
ion "To whom (what) are you referring?" simply
cannot sensibly arise in connection with them.
In these cases, anyway, there is nothing to be
explained.
(Linsky, 1967:122)
The "ontological anxiety" that Linsky dimly sees
entering for example Russell's theory of descriptions,
if I read him correctly, is a pseudo-problem in a dis¬
cussion of reference. Reference-acts, and generally, speech
-acts, are held to occur within the scope of special oper¬
ators, like "in-the-movie-operator", "in-the-novel-oper-
ator", etc. Such a doctrine relies significantly on the
prior relegation of the existential question to the realm
of pseudo-problems. But even accepting a certain existent¬
ial status for such 'operators', the doctrine is too easily
reduced to absurdity. What 'operator' do we speak in when
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speaking of in-the-movie-operator? In-the-movie-operator
-operator? A possible reinterpretation of Linsky's pos¬
ition on which the operators are seen as variants of the
'possible-worlds' view leaves us not much better off. Sub¬
stituting the existential problem by the problems of modal¬
ity does not solve it, only restates it in equally prob¬
lematical terms.
Linsky's account represents an extension and particu-
larization of part of Strawson's theory presented in *0n
Referring' (195o) to which we return below. But even as
such it is hardly successful — let alone as an account
of the total field of referentiality.
Its lack of success as a limited account stems from an
important unclarity in it which makes exhaustive evaluation
difficult. It was said above that on Linsky's view phrases
may be used to refer. Yet we are never informed as to pre¬
cisely what kind of phrases may be so used. In effect he
discusses only two construction-types, one of which is
further subdivided into two sub-types:
(a) Proper names: "Tommy Jones"
(b) Definite descriptions
(ii; non-capitalized: "the old man with grey hair"
(ii) capitalized: "The City of the Angels"
With respect to (a) he says
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But surely when I say "Tommy Jones is not the
king of England" I am not claiming that exactly one
person of any circle is named "Tommy Jones". What is
indeed necessary, if I am to make a definite asser¬
tion, is not that one person only be named "Tommy
Jones"; but that I be referring to just one person,
however many others there may be with the same name
as his. It is a mistake to think that the 'referring
expression' itself can secure and guarantee this
uniqueness. This is obvious in the case of proper
names, for here we cannot appeal to meaning. "Tommy
Jones" does not have a meaning, and many people
share it. Proper names are usually (rather) common
names.
(Linsky, 1967:118; my emphasis)
With respect to (b 11) he says,
One can ask, "To what city do<?s the phrase "The
City of the Angels" refer?" The answer is "Los
Angeles". Such expressions are on their way to
becoming names, e.g. "The Beast of Belsen". They
are what a thing or person is called often and
repeatedly, and that is why one can ask to what
they refer.
(op. ext., pp. 12o £; ray emphasis)
There is a strange inconsistency between these two
passages, hinging on the word "name". On the one hand
we are told that there is no one-to-one correspondence
between a proper name and whatever bears that name. On
the other hand, because it is 'on its way to becoming'
a name, there is apparently a one-to-one correspondence
between "The City of the Angels" and Los Angeles.
To put it;as directly and as paradoxically as pos-
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sible: Although "Tommy Jones" is a name, we cannot sen¬
sibly ask "To whom does "Tommy Jones" refer?"; but be¬
cause "The City of the Angels" is almost (?) a name, we
can sensibly ask "To what does "The City of the Angels"
refer?" This paradox is in need of clarification, but
Linsky provides none. As for the linguistic reasons be¬
hind the different referential properties of "Tommy Jones"
— in general, proper names — and "The City of the Angels"
— in general, pseudo-proper names — see below, § 11.36.
The actual limitation to only two construction-types
represents a further limitation of Linsky's account of
referentiality. We are not told whether phrases like "a
man", "some man", etc. could be used to refer under ap¬
propriate (contextual) conditions. Since the entire ac¬
count is limited to the question of unique reference it
would appear, however, that they could not. But even as
an account of unique reference it fails because, as we
have just seen, it fails to clarify the paradox of unique¬
ness.
2.23 Attempts to annihilate the distinction.
The task Russell considered his theory of descriptions
to achieve (viz. to establish the ontologically satisfying
situation in which a one-to-one correspondence held between
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a linguistic entity and an existing entity) is a task
whose attempted achievement has been undertaken from
time to time. The first large-scale attempt (in England)
is that by John Wilkins in his Essay Towards a Real Char¬
acter and a Philosophical Language (1668). The interest¬
ing aspect of that work is its distinction between only
two philosophically relevant word-classes, integrals (nouns,
adjectives, and derived, in the main denominal, adverbs),
and particles (All other traditional word-classes). This
distinction is a referential one: the integrals constitute
the class of words that refer to things, notions, and per¬
sons. The overall assumption behind his theory is this:
As men do generally agree in the same Principle
of Reason, so do they likewise agree in the same
Internal Notion or Apprehension of things.
(Wilkins, 1668:2o)
Both antecedent and consequent in this statement are
false, and shown in great detail to be false, the former
by Lohmann (1965), the latter by Whorf (1956).
But Wilkins goes further than just to set up a list
of one-to-one correspondences between signs and denotata:
But now if these Marks or Notes (i.e. signs, not 'v -di' .
for characteristics of things) could be so contrived,
as to have such a dependence upon, and relation to,
one another, aa might be sutable to the nature of the
things and notions which they represented; and so like¬
wise, if the Names of things could be so ordered as
to contain such a kind of affinity or opposition in
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their letters and sounds, as might be some way
answerable to the nature of the things which
they signified; This would yet be a farther ad¬
vantage superadded, by which, besides the best
way of helping the Memory by natural Method,
the Understanding likewise would be highly im¬
proved; aad we should, by learning the Charac¬
ter and the Names of things, be instructed like¬
wise in their Natures, the knowledge of both
which ought to be conjoyned.
For the accurate effecting of this, it would
be necessary, that the Theory it self, upon
which such a design were to be founded, should
be exactly suted to the nature of things.
(Wilkins, 1668:21)
Although Wilkins in principle follows Aristotl6£s
categorial system in setting up the ontological tables
on which his theory depends (Part II), and thus in a
sense continues the Scholastic tradition, the 'real
character' denotes, not things directly, but indirectly
via the contingent location of the genus, differentiae
and specificae that make up the 'nature' of the thing as
set up in the ontological tables. What we are supposed
to be able to read out of the real character is the na¬
ture of things, their absolute ontological status, as
determined by the tables.
Even if the 'location' conflated with existence here
is not the kind of location with which we are basically
concerned, Wilkins' work nevertheless represents an ex¬
tension of the Scholastic position, interpreting exist¬
ence in terms of absolute ontological location. It thus
tends towards a position of Russell's to which we turn.
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In chapter 24 of An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth
(194o) Russell is concerned with the question whether
propositions stating that something is a part of a whole
are necessary for epistemology and should be regarded as
essential propositions expressed in the primary language.
His approach is indirect, and some strange consequences
follow from the various steps of the analysis.
Our language (i.e. a logical language — a 'real char¬
acter' — especially constructed for the purposes of
the analysis) must, in the first place, contain proper
names for all perceived objects which are perceived as
units. When we perceive a Gestalt without analyzing it,
we must be able to name it - e.g. to say "that is a
swastika".
(Russell, 194o:312)
What Russell appears to be saying is that " (a) swas¬
tika" is a name, and that we, by ascribing the denotatum
of "that" to the class which is constituted by the exten¬
sion of "a swastika", 'name' that denotatum. It is clear
that we,in case we have several figures three of which
are of a shape similar to that of the denotatum of "that"
above, and which we could call A, B, and C, could point
to each of these in turn and say "that is a swastika".
Since A, B, and C, in order to be three figures, must dif¬
fer spatio-temporally (Strawson, 1974:16), it follows that
"a swastika" alone does not denote particular spatio-tem¬
poral properties. It follows therefore that the logical
language must contain a class of words that denote non
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-linguistic entities irrespective of the spatio-temporal
location of their denotata.
Nevertheless, if there is such a thing as a judgement
of analysis, where the analysis is of the sort we have
already considered, i.e. of spatio-temporal whole and
part, it needs a proper name for the whole and other
proper names for the parts. Suppose, for instance, you
want to say, not in general, but in a particular case,
that a certain face consists of its two eyes, its nose,
and its mouth (ignoring other parts), you will have to
proceed as follows: Let us call the face F, the eyes
respectively and E^, the nose N, and the mouth M.
(loc. cit.)
Here we are confronted by another kind of proper name.
Let us look at the example provided by Russell in some de
tail.
The first and very important point is that the face we
perceive is not a 'general' face but a particular one.
So, in the following, we are concerned with a particular
face, a particular pair of eyes, a particular nose, and a
particular mouth. Relative to these particular entities
Russell introduces names, F is the name of the particular
face, E^ is the name of a particular eye, etc.
The point I wish to look into is that which concerns
"particular" in the above. If E^ is the name of a particu
lar eye it means that E1 can never be used as a name for
any other eye (I assume, as did Russell, the validity of
the law of excluded middle). E^ is in one-to-one corres-
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pondence with a non-linguistic entity. It is unlike "a
swastika" in denoting a class that has only one member
(but not in denoting a class).
How does Russell determine that there are two eyes in
his percept, i.e. in the object through direct observation
of which he (or his mind) forms a percept? A first answer
is already given: by direct observation. But it is not as
simple as that. A pair of eyes are often similar in shape
and colour; so what Russell determines (in his usual ter¬
minology) is that he perceives two ocular patches of sim¬
ilar colour. But he can only decide that there are two
patches because they differ spatially. If the physical
object which we call an eye is in fact a complex of qual¬
ities (as Russell maintains) — let us, for simplicity's
sake, say of the four qualities colour, shape, space, and
time — the only way we can decide that a man has two eyes
is very often only that the spatial co-ordinates are dif¬
ferent from one to the other (this becomes even more ob¬
vious if we follow Russell a step further and regard the
denotata of and E2 as equal parts of a horizontal line).
What I am arguing, in brief, is that in order to say
of an eye that it is a particular eye, one has already in¬
voked spatio(-temporal) qualities. This implies that a
statement of the sense of E^ (and F, etc.) must involve
reference to spatio-temporal qualities. This statement
of sense pronounces the absolute spatial location of E^.
What we say when we say that the denotatum of E^ is to
the left of the denotatum of E2 (for example), is derivat-
8o
ive. It can be inferred from the sense of E^.
Let us now turn more explicitly to the temporal qual¬
ity. Russell assumes that one quality of a percept never
recurs. He also assumes a relation of compresence, for
which the non-recurrent quality is the basis. The per¬
cept of the face is compresent with a given temporal
quality, t. As in the case of the spatial quality, t
must be included in a statement of the sense of E^and
F, etc.). This we can now give (in Russell's formula,
p. 313):
Ex - f (6, 0, t)
— which can be read as "E^" is synonymous with "the
ocular patch of colour which is located at the inter¬
section of the horizontal axis, 8, and the vertical axis
0, at time t".
The implication of this is that the logical language
should contain names the sense of which depended on the
accidental spatio-temporal location of the entities they
denote. E^ would no longer be an appropriate name at a
different time, s, for the entity it denoted at t. For
a natural language this would be an impossible situation.
Although Russell eventually decides that the concept
of spatio-temporal whole and part "is too elaborate and
inferential a concept to be of much importance in the
foundations of theory of knowledge" (p. 321), he does not
explicitly denounce the steps that led us to the above con-
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elusions. It would appear, therefore, that in the chapter
we have been discussing, Russell is concerned with the pos
sibility of annihilating the distinction between existence
and location (at least for those entities which are parts
of wholes) as a natural extension of his theory of de¬
scriptions.
2.24 Assimilation of denotative to deictic analysis.
Searle (1969:ch. 4) begins his exposition of reference
by explicitly delimiting the field to categorical, singular,
definite reference. This is essentially the same area as
Linsky was concerned with, but whereas Linsky did not make
this clear, Searle does and states his reasons:
since this field provides us with ample problems, let us
try to solve these before going on to other kinds of
reference. I happen to believe these are bad reasons.
First of all, singular, definite, categorical reference
is one of the most complex forms of reference1. Secondly,
and connected with the first point, there are structural
connections within the field of referentiality, which makes
it difficult to single out one type of reference and anal-
1
In the sense that a feature-specification of an expression perform¬
ing this kind of reference is more complex than the specification
of expressions performing different kinds, and not in the sense of
'evolutionary' complexity (cf. Quine, 196o:ch. 3).
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yze it in isolation from other kinds; and even if it could
be done it would create a false priority within the ling¬
uistic field of referentiality (though not, perhaps, in
the philosophical field).
The first important point to note is that Searle re¬
cognizes referring expressions by some means other than
function: "Not every occurrence of a referring expression
in discourse is a referring occurrence ..." (p. 73). This
allows only one interpretation. 'Referring expression' is
a name given to constructions of a certain type; but for
an expression to be of that type does not ensure that a
given instance of it performs the function of referring.
A referring expression may be used by a speaker either to
refer or not to refer.
Definite referring expressions, we are told, are of
four kinds:
(a) proper names: "Socrates", "Russia".
(b) complex noun phrases in the singular, usual¬
ly, but not invariably, introduced by the def¬
inite article: "the man who called", "the
highest mountain in the world", "France's
present crisis".
(c) pronouns: "this", "that", "I", "he", etc.
(d) titles: "the prime minister", "the pope".
The common feature of these, we must assume, is the
presence in them of a definite-marker — overt in cases
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like "the man who called", covert, but retrievable, in
cases like "Russia" and "I". Since he is explicitly con¬
cerned with only singular definite reference we may further
assume that these are also the kind of phrase he has in
mind when speaking simply of 'referring expressions'.
It would appear then, that Searle continues Russell's
tradition according to which "a phrase is denoting solely
in virtue of its form" (Russell, 19o5:lo3), although de¬
noting form does not ensure denoting function, and although
the relevant form may have to be found, not by direct ob¬
servation, but by analysis of underlying structure (of
some sort). We shall sen later that to call a given ex¬
pression a referring expression implies (to Searle) that
it can be substituted by em identifying description (see
below).
There are two axioms crucial to any theory of reference,
one associated with existence, one with identity. These
have been central to philosophical discussions of the top¬
ic at least since Leibniz, who is credited with the first
formulation of the 'law' or 'principle (Linsky, 1967:9) of
reference' which Searle states as follows:
If a predicate is true of an object it is true of
anything identical with that object regardless of
what expressions are used to refer to that object.
(Searle, 1969:77)
The existential axiom simply says: "Whatever is referred
to must exist", (loc. cit.)
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Searle does not dismiss the question of existence
right away; nor does he, like Linsky, regard it as a
pseudo-problem. He does, however, consider the remain¬
ing problems connected with it in relation to reference
"trivial", after thanking Russell for having done away
with the main problem, viz. the paradox that in order
to deny the existence of something one must in fact state
that it exists. The overall strategy employed by Searle
in dealing with the remaining problems is similar to, if
not identical with, Linsky's. He substitutes for them the
problems of modality connected with the notion of 'pos¬
sible worlds'. We may speak in different "modes" of dis¬
course, such that we both refer aftd make a true statement
in uttering
(2:1) Sherlock Holmes wore a deerstalker hue
Although this formulation is less obviously open to
reductio ad absurdum than was Linsky's (to speak in a
certain mode of discourse is obviously not the same sort
of thing as having one's speech bound by external 'oper¬
ators') there are still difficulties. There are no ob¬
servable linguistic characteristics by which we may det¬
ermine what mode we speak in on a given occasion. This is
an unobliging feature of language which cannot, I believe,
easily be dismissed since it involves one of the defining
properties of language, what Hockett called "the design
feature of prevarication". Even in languages with a well
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-developed subjunctive system (like Latin or German)
Sherlock Holmes would wear a deerstalker in the indic¬
ative, just as De Gaulle would wear a kdpi and MacMillan
a bowler in the indicative, even though De Gaulle no
longer 'exists*. Searle is himself aware of this (I
think) when he says that
I should emphasize that my account of parasitic
forms of discourse does not involve the view that
there are any changes in the meanings of words or
other linguistic elements in fictional discourse.
(Searle, 1969:79)
The issue is precisely that at no point (semantical,
morphological, or syntactical) does language undergo any
change in 'shifting' from one 'mode of discourse* to an¬
other. One of the cleverest exploitations of this fact
in recent fictional (?) writing is Frederick Forsyth's
The Day of the Jackal.
Searle follows Strawson in maintaining that non-ex¬
istence of referent entails failure of reference rather
than falsity of statement. Consequently, when we utter
(2:1), the 'mode of discourse' which we speak in deter¬
mines whether we have referred or not. If we have, the
statement made is meaningful (and true); if we have not
the statement made is still meaningful but neither true
nor false (if we ascribe Strawson's terminology to Searle,
who does not explicitly discuss this point). Since on oc¬
casion we may succeed in referring to Sherlock Holmes and
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in making true statements about him it follows that he
exists — that is, he exists-in-fiction, which is said
not to contradict the statement that Sherlock Holmes does
not exist at all (p. 79). So all that the theory of ref¬
erence requires is that we can operate with referents
that have any kind of existence — physical, fictional,
logical(7), etc. (cf. Reichenbach, 1947:274 ff). This in¬
herent ambiguity in the verb "exist" will be taken up later.
Suffice it here to say that Searle accepts it, and that
the existence referred to in his formulation of the ex¬
istential axiom is inherently ambiguous.
In short, and to sum up, the residual problems of ref¬
erence and existence, be they trivial or not, are not solved
simply by changing the terminology to one of 'possible
worlds' unless some clearer indication is given as to how
this notion is to be explained.
The present section is concerned with views that are
said to subordinate the notion of existence under the no¬
tion of location, but so far this claim remains unsubstan¬
tiated relative to Searle's account. It emerges from his
reformulation of the axiom of existence, however: "There
must exist one and only one object to which the speaker's
utterance of the expression applies", (p. 82).
Whereas the original formulation (above, p. 83) is what
we might call a pure existential statement, the revised
version is not. The original version speaks of existence
as an independent notion. The revised version speaks of
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"one and only one object". Nov;, this can be generalized
from various points in his discussion in such a way that
the revised version is understood to speak of the exist¬
ence of a particular object. And for an object to be a
particular object is for that object to differ at least
spatlo-temporally from all other objects, as was argued
above (pp. 79-80). Since the revised formulation repres¬
ents a departure from the original formulation precisely
to the degree to which it incorporates the notion of loc¬
ation, and since the revised formulation forms the basis
for Searle's own account of reference, it remains to be
shown that the notion of existence is subordinated to
the notion of location.
It may seem inconsistent to regard 'On Denoting' as
the expression of a purely denotative analysis and Slarle's
account as an instance of a subordination-type analysis,
since — or so it appears — the two accounts are identical
as far as their treatment of existence is concerned. The
first part of Russell's formula for analyzing propositions
containing definite descriptions is often given as follows:
(2:2) There is one and only one entity, x, ...
— which seems to correspond fairly closely to the first
half of Searle's revised axiom of existence, except for
Searle's incorporation of necessity. The fact that Searle
should incorporate necessity in his axiom is significant
but before we can show that we need to look at Searle's
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criticism of Russell's formula (pp. 83 ff; cf. also pp.
157-62).
The relevant point is Searle's claim that an analysis
(2:3) the man insulted me
according to the theory of descriptions "would have to be
construed as asserting the existence of only one man in
the universe" (p. 83).
Although the logical formula which Searle derives from
one aspect of the theory of descriptions (p. 157) is not
capable of a translation by the following paraphrase, it
seems to me that the 'spirit' of it is:1
(2:4) there is one and only one entity, x, such that
x both is a man and Insulted me at place p at
time t.
If this is accepted then (2:4) redeems Russell from the
absurd view attributed to him by Searle by asserting the
existence of an entity irrespective of its spatio-temporal
location by predicating a complex of properties of x that
identifies x uniquely.
1 The formula in question is (3 x) fx • (y) (fy x » y) * gx
— where £_ can be read as "is a mam" and £ as "was insulting (to me)".
The reason why (2t4) cannot be a paraphrase of this formula is that
it involves reference to different times, and thus requires expres¬
sion by a formal* from a higher-order tense-logic.
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In contrast, the formula implied by Searle's subsequent
discussion is as follows:
(2:5) there is one and only one entity x that both
is a man and is at place p at time t, such that
x insulted me at place q at time u.
That this is in fact so appears from a consideration
of Searle's discussion of the interrelations between the
two axioms of existence and identification (pp.85 ff).
His starting-point is the splitting-up of the axiom
of existence into two sub-parts:
(2:6) (a) There must exist at least one object to which
the speaker's utterance of the expression applies;
(b) There must exist not more than one object to
which the speaker's utterance of the expres¬
sion applies.
It is the requirements for the satisfaction of (2:6 b)
we are concerned with, and he finds ultimately that what
satisfies condition (2:6 b) is in fact the ability to
satisfy the axiom of identification which, in its re¬
vised form1, appears as
(2:7) The hearer must be given sufficient means to
identify the object from the speaker's utter¬
ance of the expression.
(p. 82)
1 The axiom of identification is Searle's third axiom of reference
and it should not, of course, be confused with the axiom of ident¬
ity. I have not stated the axiom of identification in its original
form, in which it imposes the requirement on the speaker that he
should be able to identify uniquely the object to which he refers
in the utterance of a given expression. For its original formulation,
see P» 79.
9o
The business of accounting for (2:6 b) is thus con¬
verted into the business of accounting for (2:7) , and
to do that involves the attractive idea of a range of
identifying descriptions •underlying* (in a non-tech¬
nical sense) any referring expression. Identifying de¬
scriptions may be
(2:8)(a) purely demonstrative (deictic)
*
(b) purely descriptive
(c) a mixture of (a) and (b)
Among these, (a) is accorded a pre-eminent position:
And it is worth re-eraphasizing here that a limiting
case of saying is saying which involves showing; that
is, a limiting case of satisfying the principle of
Identification and hence the principle of expressibil-
ity is indexical presentation of the object referred to.
(Searle, 1969:88)
SSarle's position, it seems, can then be summed up as
follows: By uttering "the man insulted me" we predicate
•delivering an insult directed at me' of a particular
entity. The particularity of that entity is guaranteed
by the speaker's ability to provide an identifying de¬
scription of it, ultimately a description consisting of
a deictic gesture accompanied by verbal material like
"the one there now", and it is consequently independent
of the predicate "insulted me". From the limiting status
accorded to deictic descriptions it follows that the par¬
ticularity of the entity is equivalent, ultimately, with
91
its spatio-temporal discreteness from all other entities.
If we let t and s symbolize time and space, x an entity,
p the original predicate, e existence, and employ a dash
to divide a — so far, unordered — configuration of
these symbols into two parts, Searle's position can be
stated in the formula
(2:9) x e t s / p
— whereas Russell's conforms to the formula
(2:lo) x e / t s p
The formula attributed to Russell is compatible with
his basic philosophical doctrine that objects are clusters
of properties, that attributed to Searle with his critic¬
ism of that doctrine (p. 164).
For our interpretation of Searle to be justified it
now only remains to show that, within the formula (2:9)
ascribed to him, the symbols are not unordered, but that
there holds an implicational relationship between ts and
e, with ts as implicans, e as implicate. And this is pre¬
cisely what the occurrence of "must" in his reformulation
of the existential axiom suggests. If we read it as the
sign of logical necessity, the last step in our analysis
can be given thus:
Since x is at place s at time t it follows,
with logical necessity, that x exists.
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I have now shown what I wanted to show, viz. that
Searle's concept of referentiality is based on the theor¬
etical assumption that existence, in so far as it is
'predicated' of anything1, is predicated of entities
which are already, and independently, located in space/
time (including 'possible worlds'), and that his account
of reference therefore conforms to the view that exist¬
ence is subordinated to location.
2.25 Reconciliation of denotative and deictic analyses.
In this section we shall be concerned with two versions
of the view that the two types of analysis can be recon¬
ciled without either fusing them in a hyponyrr.i cal rel¬
ationship or annihilating the distinction between them.
Such a view is held, in linguistic philosophy, by
Strawson, in linguistics by Lyons as well as by S^rensen
from whose account I originally established the distinc¬
tion. Bierwisch (1971) is also susceptible of an inter¬
pretation that would place it in this section. We turn
first to Strawson's 'On Referring* (195o).
I am here trying to express a neutral stance on the philosophical¬
ly controversial question as to whether "exist" is a predicate.
Searle says it is not (p.165); nor, he says, is existence a prop¬
erty (p. 78). Cf. Kneale (1936), Moore (1936), Pears (1963),
Thomson (1967), and further discussion in § 2.3. Whether "exist"
is a predicate or not does not affect my analysis of Searle.
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By way of introduction I shall suggest that Strawson,
in 'On Referring', is primarily interested in deictic an¬
alysis, though without losing sight of denotation. Our dis¬
cussion will take the form of an attempt to substantiate
this suggestion.
In Russell's reply to Strawson's criticism of the
theory of descriptions (Russell, 1957), the first and
most important point at which Russell defends himself
(or attacks Strawson) is on the question of the relation
between egocentric particulars and definite descriptions:
The gist of Mr Strawson's argument consists in ident¬
ifying two problems which I have regarded as quite
distinct - namely, the problem of descriptions and
the problem of egocentricity. I have dealt with both
these problems at considerable length, but as I have
considered them to be different problems, I have not
dealt with the one when I was considering the other.
This enables Mr Strawson to pretend that I have over¬
looked the problem of egocentricity.
(Russell, 1973:12o)
Later, and quite unequivocally, Russell says, "I
think Mr Strawson completely mistaken in connecting it
(i.e. the question of egocentricity) with the problem
of descriptions." (id., p. 122).
Linsky (1967:85) suggests that "(w)hat at first looks
like a clash of contradictory views about the same sub¬
ject turns out to be a statement of compatible views
about different subjects" because Russell and Strawson
cover different ground. Russell, according to Linsky
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(loc. cit.), is concerned with an analysis of a certain
class of propositions, whereas Strawson is concerned with
the study of a certain use of words.
The emphasis by Strawson on regarding reference as a
special use to which expressions may be put appears to
be the reason for Russell's embarkation on the egocen-
tricity issue in his defence. Accepting Linsky's summary
at this point as a fair representation of the situation,
it becomes clear that the issue is our issue. Strawson
criticizes the theory of descriptions for being exclu¬
sively denotative, Russell defends himself by maintaining
that it is rightly so because denotation and deixis are
entirely distinct and cannot be reconciled.
In view of this the situation may be re-interpreted
as follows. Russell's endeavour (in 'On Denoting') is
to construct a theory on which there can be predicted to
be a one-to-one relationship between a (logical) subject
and a non-linguistic entity, irrespective of its spatio
-temporal location. It is its existential status he is
after. He wants to establish an ontologist's paradise in
which a correct linguistic analysis automatically results
in a list of the things that are in existence. It is cru¬
cially the possibility of such a paradise Strawson rejects:
It is a part of the significance of expressions
of the kind I am discussing that they can be used,
in an immense variety of contexts, to make unique
references. It is no part of their significance
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to assert that they are being so used or that
the conditions of their being so used are ful¬
filled.
(Strawson, 1971:15-16)
The part of the quotation which I have underlined
amounts to a statement about ontology. The conditions
referred to are not part of the sense of linguistic i-
tems; they are outside language. The relation between
linguistic and non-linguistic entities is not one of
dependency. It is formulated in the general directions
Strawson speaks about (1971:9; see below). This point
is of a higher order of importance than the well-known
criticism of Russell/ first made by Wittgenstein and
later also by Strawson, that the meaning of an expres¬
sion is not a physical entity. But the reason why Russell
said that it was — and he did so very consciously after
first stating the advantages of Frege's distinction be¬
tween sense and reference — was that in the paradise
he wanted it would be.
We can now begin to substantiate the suggestion made
in the introduction to this section. Strawson assumes
that language is situation-bound, that the actual per¬
formance of linguistic acts cannot be isolated from a
situational context. On this assumption it is clear that
the actual employment of a particular expression is dic¬
tated not only by certain features of the situation but
also by the speaker's wish to talk about these features
(for whatever reason). These two factors are what Strawson
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calls the contextual requirement (1971:19), and they are
fairly transparently spatio-temporal factors. Since his
insistence on use is the single pervading feature of his
argument it follows that his argument is primarily con¬
cerned with the spatio-temporal factors, in short that
his main interest is deixis.
If we have to relate Strawson's concept of reference as
a feature of language in use — which, incidentally, is
the part of Strawson's theory taken up and developed by
Unsky (1967:ch. 8) — to a specifically linguistic con¬
ceptual framework, it will be to the notion of performance
as developed by Chomsky (1965 and elsewhere). Since on
the other hand the competence/performance distinction has
come under heavy fire recently (e.g. by Campbell & Wales,
197o; Derwing, 1973:ch. 8) so that its status in Chomsky's
formulation as a viable concept for theoretical linguist¬
ics seems in doubt, I shall prefer to relate it to Hjelm-
slev's "process" as against his "system". This dichotomy
is not open to the most damaging piece of criticism launched
on Chomsky's pair by Derwing (or rather Harris, cf. Der¬
wing, 1973:259 fn; 274 fn 2), which suggests that there
is an inferential gap between competence (or a C-model)
and performance (or a P-model), in the sense that they
are logically incompatible1. On the contrary, Hjelmslev
1 Within the overall reason why Chomsky should be expected naturally
to disagree with Ryle ('Cartesianism'; cf. Chomsky, 1965:8; 1966:ch 1),
a specific reason is that Ryle regards underlying competence as mani¬
festing itself in performance and that performance can meaningfully
be investigated in order to reach an assessment of the underlying
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is explicit in stating that the existence of a system is
a necessary condition for the existence of a process
(Hjelroslev, 1943:36; cf. also pp. lo, 16).
With this dichotomy in mind it seems clear that when
Strawson says —
To give the meaning of an expression (in the sense
in which I am using the word) is to give general
directions for its use to refer or mention parti¬
cular objects or persons; to give the meaning of a
sentence is to give general directions for its use
in making true or false assertions.
(Strawson, 1971:9)
— the "general directions" are systematic rules stating
the appropriate conditions for the use of expressions and
sentences. Some of these rules have non-linguistic denot¬
ata. They specify part of what Derwing labels X and H in
his schema of a performance-model (Derwing, 1973:273),
and perhaps part of the "linguistic intuition" determined
by the competence-component in the same model. But some of
them necessarily have linguistic denotata, namely those
that specify what type of linguistic expression or sen¬
tence (in a broad, Bloomfieldian sense) may be used to
perform particular tasks on particular occasions.
Interpreted in this way, the passage quoted above from
competence. As Harris/Derwing ably demonstrate, Chomsky is highly
ambiguous on this issue, although on the whole tending towards a
position that denies that of Ryle.
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Strawson is an embryonic expression of a truth-dependent
semantics. S^rensen (1967) and more recently Kempson
(1974) argue for such a semantics. In terms of S^rensen's
paper (1967:1884)
The meaning of a sign S is the conditions to be
satisfied by something in order that it may cor¬
rectly be said to be denoted by S.
And in Kempson's (1974:32):
the meaning, or 'sense', of a symbol could be de¬
fined as a statement of the conditions necessary
and sufficient for a relation of reference to hold
in some state of affairs.1
Since a statement of the denotative conditions (S0-
reasem's term) of a sign are specifications for non-ling
uistic entities to fulfill in order for them to be cor¬
rectly denoted by that sign, it follows that we are con¬
cerned with denotation as well as with reference. And
since the passage from Strawson is an embryonic counter¬
part of the positions stated more explicitly by S^rensen
1
We might quibble about three points in this formulation: (a)
meaning, or sense, can only be explained, not defined, in this
way because, as a definition, it would be circular (S^rensen,
1967:1879)j (b) the reference to 'some state of affairs' is a
variant of the 'possible worlds' view and is, as such, super¬
fluous in a semantics like Kempson's» (c) for the formulation
to be meaningful, the "relation of reference" must be inter¬
preted (in my terms) as a relation of referentiality, i.e. as
subsuming both deictic and denotative features.
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and Kerapson, it follows that Strawson does not lose sight
of denotation.
In chapter 7 of his forthcoming book on semantics,
Lyons discusses reference, sense, and denotation. Before
we go into that discussion, however, one important point
concerning "sense" must be clarified. So far in the pres¬
ent exposition,sense has invariably been regarded as an
integral part of the linguistic sign (i.e. a biplane entity
consisting of an expression-component and a content-com¬
ponent) which could be analyzed and expressed in terms of
semantic features. Although Lyons would probably agree
that sense is an integral part of linguistic items, he
would not agree that linguistic items are biplane signs.
Nor would he agree that sense can be expressed in terms
of semantic features, at least not directly. Sense, in
Lyons' writings (1963, 1968, forthcoming) is expressible
in terms of semantic relations, like synonymy, hyponymy,
converseness, inclusion, etc.:
Sense is here defined to hold between the words
or expressions of a single language independent¬
ly of the relationship, if any, which holds be¬
tween those words or expressions and their ref¬
erents or denotata.
(Lyons, forthcoming:2161)
What I have assumed throughout, in brief, is this:
1
Page-references to Lyons, forthcoming, sire to a preliminary, mim¬
eographed version circulated in the Department of Linguistics,
University of Edinburgh, not to/published edition, which has not
yet appeared.
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The sense of a given sign, x, can exhaustively be ex¬
pressed in terms of semantic features, or components, de¬
rived from a semantical analysis of x which establishes
the composite sign zyw with which x is synonymous. These
features, in turn, may be interpreted as a set of denotat¬
ive conditions such that, if a non-linguistic entity e,
meets conditions z'y'w', e is properly denoted by x. This
assumption is behind the so-called 'dictionary' approach
to semantics.
It is by no means a self-evidently true assumption.
Consequently it has been challenged, and no more fiercely
so than by Bar-Hillel (1967b; 1969). Bar-Hillel's critic¬
ism (of the Katz-Fodor theory of semantics in particular,
of the dictionary approach in general) concludes that
such a view fails in principle because it offers no way
of formulating semantic relations (like those in terms of
which Lyons defines sense). The implication is that there
is an inferential gap between sense (in relational terms)
and referentiality (in particular, denotation), which for¬
bids the second step in the dictionary procedure of con¬
verting sense-elements into denotative conditions. The con
sequence of this, in turn, is that in so far as semantics
and semantical statements are concerned with truth, the
truth involved is analytic rather than synthetic.
There are, however, certain basic intuitions that we
can appeal to in order to render this controversial and
difficult distinction relatively harmless, and which are
lol
in fact employed by Kempson (1974:32 ff) for precisely
that purpose. To use one of her examples, if the condi¬
tions hold that ensure the (synthetic) truth of the
statement made by an utterance of
(2:11)(a) John killed an actress last night
— then the same conditions will ensure the (synthetic)
truth of at least the following:
(to) A female person was killed last night
(c) An actress died last night
From the synthetic truth of (a) we can infer that (b)
is true because it is the converse of (a) and because
"actress" is a hyponym of "female person"; and we can
infer that (c) is true because "x killed y" is synonym¬
ous with its converse "y was killed by x", and because
"y was killed" implies "y died". (I am, of course, as¬
suming that the context of utterance is identical for
all three, in particular that they are uttered on the
same day, or at least on what pragmatically counts as
•the same day1).
It is important to recognize the validity of both ax¬
es, as it were, the horizontal one connecting (2:11 a-c)
in an analytical relationship, the vertical one connect¬
ing (2:11 a-c) synthetically with the same set of denotat¬
ive conditions. But that we have not solved the problem
— indeed have not even begun to solve it — appears from
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the fact that
(d) John committed a crime last night
— stands in no analytical relationship with (2s11 a).
That killing actresses is considered a crime in the
western world, and not, say, a religious act, is pure¬
ly a synthetic phenomenon. And yet, if the act of kill¬
ing referred to in (2:11)(a) was premeditated, the same
set of conditions ensuring the truth of (a) would (in
the western world) ensure the truth of (d).
Finally, Lyons himself suggests that sense (in his
usage) is somehow related with synthetic phenomena:
It is because we know the sense of 'unicorn',
that we know what kind of object it would ap¬
ply to, if there were anything in the world
for it to apply to.
(Lyons, forthcoming:222; my emphasis)
The conclusion to this digression on sense is that,
although the dictionary approach may not be exhaustive
as a semantics of natural language, it has (or can be
given) a place within a possibly more comprehensive
semantics in which semantic relations, in particular,
will need special attention.
By the denotation of a lexeme Lyons means "the rel¬
ationship that holds between that lexeme and persons,
things, places, properties, processes and activities
external to the language system." (forthcoming:217).
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Denotation, in this sense, is a permanent relation
between lexemes (i.e. the semantic 'nuclei' that occur
superficially as words and certain (idiomatic) colloca¬
tions) and non-linguistic entities. Thus it is, if not
identical with, at least closely related to the view
under which semantic components are seen as denotative
conditions.
Reference, on the other hand, is explained by Lyons
as "an utterance-bound relation" (forthcoming:219), and
"a context-dependent notion" (loc. cit.). It is not a
property of lexemes; it is rather (following Linsky) a
functional relation.
Reference and denotation are interrelated: "Now the
reference of phrases which contain 'cow' is determined,
in part, by the denotation of 'cow'." (loc. cit.).
The most important point for our present concerns,
however, is the following:
In any event, it is clear that reference and de¬
notation both depend in the same way upon what
has been called the axiom of existence: Whatever
is denoted by a lexeme must exist, just as "what¬
ever is referred to must exist" (Searle, 1969:77).
(Lyons, forthcoming:22o)
This generalization is later modified in such a way
as to bring it directly within the basic dichotomy of
existence and location which we operate with:
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If we consider the applicability of a lexeme with
respect to the question whether it is true of (i.e.
truly predicabla of) the entity to which it is ap¬
plied, we are concerned with its denotation. (If
we consider the applicability of an expression with
respect to the question whether it is intended to
identify some entity or group of entities about
which some thing is being said, or some question
is being asked, etc., on some particular occasion,
we are concerned with its reference.)
(Lyons, forthcomings224; my emphasis)
The main aspect of my analysis of Searle's concept of
reference in the preceding section was to show that it
depends on the assumption that existence is attributed
to independently spatio-temporally located entities.
In the last quotation but one above we find Lyons stating
that denotation, like reference, depends on the axiom of
existence, and that they do so in the same way.
Whereas I would naturally go along with the suggest¬
ion that denotation depends on existence (which is one
of the two basic, equipollent assumptions of the present
account), I would challenge the suggestion that it de¬
pends on existence "in the same way" as reference. Such
a view would refute our second assumption, that reference
depends on location. However, to argue against Lyons'
phrase "in the same way" here would amount to a repeti¬
tion of the major part of the preceding section. I shall
therefore assume that I have argued against it, and then
go on to show why Lyons' account, despite the phrase "in
the same way", is different from Searle's. Cf., however,
§ lo.31.
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There is nothing in Searle's account that corresponds
to Lyons' denotation? and since denotation and reference,
according to Lyons, both depend on the axiom of existence
it would seem that these two notions together are isomor¬
phic with Searle's notion of reference. However, denota¬
tion is considered to be a permanent relation between lex¬
emes and 'things' (in a wide sense). Hence it must be a
relation between lexemes and things which holds irrespect¬
ive of the spatio-temporal location of things. 'Cow* de¬
notes a particular kind of thing, but it does not denote,
or otherwise indicate, where those things are. This point
is emphasized by Lyons' concept of denotation as being
neutral as between extension and intension (forthcoming:
218). And since denotation depends on existence it follows
that Lyons does not subsume existence under location. In
so far as existence is a property of entities it is a prop
erty of them irrespective of where they are. (Nothing
hinges on considering existence a property of entities
here; it is just a matter of convenient formulation.)
The fact that Lyons considers reference and denotation to
be interrelated in the sense that the reference of a given
expression is determined, in part, by the denotation of
the lexemes underlying (some of) the words in the expres¬
sion suggests that he holds rather the opposite view, that
location is 'predicated' of previously existentially det¬
ermined entities. In any event, it is clear from his dis¬
cussion that he considers existence and location to be
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mutually independent, though interrelated notions. That
denotation goes with the former has just been argued for;
and that reference goes with the latter appears from a re
mark in the closing passage of chapter 12, "Deixis, space
and time" (forthcoming:5o6), where he says, "It is argu¬
able, therefore, that reference depends ultimately upon
deixis." For a more detailed account of the implications
of this statement, cf. Lyons (1973).
2.3 Reconsideration.
There are many points raised in the course of the pre¬
ceding sections which would require infinitely more de¬
tailed analysis for us to be justified in claiming that
they had been even adequately discussed, let alone solved.
Yet at the same time it is clear that not all of these
points would be crucial to linguistics. Over the next
few pages I shall therefore attempt to limit the scope
of the discussion to what appears to be linguistically
relevant matters. Even so, it would clearly be presump¬
tuous to say that the problems to be discussed further
here will be solved. My aim is to indicate a particular
view which will provide a fairly simple and, I trust,
common sensical basis for our further investigations into
the referential functions of English noun phrases.
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2.31 Existence and denotation.
One of the points touched upon in the previous para -
graphs was the question as to whether "exist" is a pred¬
icate, or, equivalently, whether existence is a property
of non-linguistic entities.
Intricately connected with the determination of this
question is another point mentioned above, namely the
fact that the verb "exist" is inherently ambiguous. Moore
(1936) and, following him, Pears (1963), though admitting
that "exist" behaves differently from e.g. "growl" in ident¬
ical surroundings ("some tame tigers exist" vs, "some tame
tigers growl"), avails himself of this fact in order to
point out that
(2:12) some tame tigers do not exist
— both is and is not meaningful. If it is meaningful it
is equivalent to "some tame tigers are fictitious tigers".
This inherent ambiguity is of importance to us since
it reflects the basic distinction between existence and
location, in the following sense. What Moore's meaning¬
ful interpretation of (2:12) implies is that some entities
cannot be spatio-temporally located despitd the fact that
they can be called tigers, and that some entities can both
be spatio-temporally located and called tigers.
I shall now say that "tiger" establishes a category,
and further that entities may be ascribed to or located in
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a category. What Moore's meaningful interpretation of
(2:12) implies in these terms is this:
There are entities which are locatable in
the category "tiger", some of which are
further locatable in space/time.
The point I am making can perhaps be better illustrated
if we choose (2:13) as an example:
(2:13) unicorns do not exist
Employing the terminology just established, (2:13)
states:
There are entities which are locatable in
the category "unicorn", none of which are
further locatable in space/time.
In other words, "exist" can — at least in everyday
language — be used to indicate that the entity denoted
by the (lexeme underlying the) subject term in sentences
like "x exists" is further locatab3e in space/time. Let
us call this use of "exist" the predicational use, at
least for the moment (cf. § lo.32).
We are then left with the 'non-predicational' use.
This is also embodied in (2:12-13) where it underlies
the first half of the paraphrases provided. It is this
usage which S^rensen (1959b) subjects to analysis. His
conclusion is that "A exists" is synonymous with ""A" de¬
notes", and that is, as he points out, both a non-startling
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conclusion, a simple one, and one that has common sense
on its side. It is also a conclusion that has nothing to
do with determining what there is. If the linguist can
rest content with stating that "to be is to denote", the
ontologist would have to begin from "to be is to be denoted",
and this statement gives him no clue as to what is denoted.
Cf. Quins's slogan "to be is to be the value of e variable",
and in particular his reasons for discarding this slogan
as a valid starting-point for determining what is a value
of a variable (Quine, 1953:15).
Furthermore, S^rensen's catch-phrase has the awkward
consequence that a in "a exists" has to be changed into
"a" in ""a" denotes". This change from use to mention may
be innocuous as long as wa are concerned with the relation¬
ship between the two sentences. But it certainly does not
follow that "exist" and "denote" are synonyms. What "ex¬
ist" is 'synonymous' with is "" " denotes", and that is
altogether a different story.
"Denotes" in the preceding paragraph is — presumably
— to be interpreted as "denotes actually". Signs may de¬
note potentially. This is the case with "unicorn". So the
distinction between existence and non-existence is reflect¬
ed by the linguistic distinction between actual and potent¬
ial denotation. In addition we can speak of essential and
contingent non-denotation. It is an essential fact about
(the sense of) "a round square", "a married bachelor", etc.
that they cannot denote, even potentially. The same thing
llo
is expressed by saying that round squares and married
bachelors do not have logical existence. On the other
hand, it is a contingent fact (about English) that "quasp"
does not denote anything. It might denote, for it con¬
forms to the rules that determine the phonological 'shape'
of English signs.
The relevant consequence to be drawn from this is
that there is a relationship between "exist" and "denote"
which has nothing to do with spatio-temporal location
and which can be exploited advantageously, provided due
notice is given to the use/mention distinction. On the
other hand, there is a relationship also between exist¬
ence and location, in the sense that existence may be
seen as categorial location.
2.32 Existence as categorial location.
The acceptance of existence as categorial location has
certain consequences for the deixis/ denotative distinction.
We have isolated the two conflicting senses of "exist"
which are manifested in the predlcational vs. the non
-predicational use of the verb, bringing the former into
contact with location, and hence with deixis, whereas the
latter remains in contact with denotation. This distinc¬
tion can be made apparent by means of the following!
Ill
(2:14)(a) To say of an entity x that it is a tiger is to
locate x categorially;
(b) to say of an entity x that it is black is to
locate x categorially;
(c) to say of an entity x that it is on a roof is
to locate x spatio-temporally.




That this must be so follows from the possibility of
saying
(2:16)(a) To say of an entity x that it is a round square
is to locate x categorially;
(b) to say of an entity x that it is a quasp is to
locate x categorially.
(2:16) cannot be disqualified directly; they mast be dis¬
qualified indirectly, by disqualifying (2:17):
(2:17)(a) "round square" denotes
(b) "quasp" denotes
Since both of (2:17) are false — (a) necessarily, (b)
contingently —(2:16) are disqualified in the sense that
no categories are established in which x may be located.
What about (2:14 c)? Do we want to say that "on a roof"
denotes? No. I want to say that "roof" denotes, but that
112
"on a roof" Indicates. I want to do this because "on a
roof" Is a composite sign; it depends itself upon the val¬
idity of'"roof" denotes*, and also upon internal well-
formedness: cf. "*in a roof", ""between a roof", etc.
The situation can be expressed in the following two
formulae, which indicate the similarity as well as the
dissimilarity between spatio-temporal and categorial loc¬
ation:
If " " denotes, then it establishes a categor¬
ial location;
if " " indicates, then it establishes a spatio
-temporal location.
The similarity is exploited in English is innumerable
pairs like "to be angry" vs. "to be in anger", "to be in
business" vs. "to be a businessman", etc., some of which
are synonymous.
In the light of this discussion we shall redefine deic¬
tic and denotative analyses:
"A deictic analysis" = "an analysis which accounts
for the linguistic ascription of entities to loc¬
ations , categorial and spatio-temporal";
"a denotative analysis" = "an analysis that accounts
for the linguistic establishment of locations, cat¬
egorial and spatio-temporal".
From these definitions it follows that we have dismissed
all decisions as to what does exist from the linguistic
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description. The denotative analysis is concerned with
the structure of linguistic entities which denote and
indicate, i.e. with the structure of acceptable signs.
Whether .or not they actually do denote is not the ling¬
uist's concern — or rather, is not primarily the ling¬
uist's concern. The present study is not intended as a
study of actual denotation? it is intended as a studjt
of denotation (and deixis).




3.1 The relationship between predication and referentiality.
The two general areas surveyed in part I, the predica¬
tion and the notion of referentiality, are linked together
in a long historical relationship. Thus, of the twenty-
eight criteria on which are based the 14o sentence-def¬
initions in Ries (1931), the third largest — in the sense
of being invoked in the third-largest number of definitions
— is the criterion of referentiality. Ries1 own defini¬
tion may serve as an example:
Ein Satz 1st ein grammatisch geformte kleinste
Redeeinheit, die ihren Inhalt 1m Hlnblick auf
Bein Verhaltnis zur Wlrkllchkeit sum Ausdruck
bringt.
(Ries, 1931:99? my emphasis)
In so far as the notion of referentiality is devel¬
oped in linguistic discussions since Ries, it is assoc¬
iated with a logical approach to linguistics, in the
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sense that it is seen as a property of the propositional
content of a sentence: ""A fact" can simply be defined as
"the denotatum of a sentence"" (S^rensen, 1958:13). If we
wish to develop the notion of referentiality further we
must do so, consequently, within a framework which en¬
ables us to distinguish the propositional content from
the modality content of a sentence (cf. Sund£n, 1941),
as the frameworks of Fillmore (1968), Seuren (1969), or
Anderson (1971a) allow for1.
On the other hand, the property of referentiality is
only a potential property of language. There is no de¬
pendency relation between words and things, or between
propositions and truth. We are here talking about one of
the defining characteristics of language, Hockett's design
feature of prevarication. This feature can be seen as a
coin, the reverse of which makes language suitable as a
vehicle of lies (cf. WSinreich, 1966), the obverse of
which equips language as the medium of literature ('a-
factual writing'; cf. in particular Frye, 1957:73 ff).
It is the potentiality inherent in the referential
function of language which is the overall principle that
1
The framework I shall develop is more or less a referential counter¬
part to the localistic case-grammar of Anderson (1971a). The reliance
of that theory on spatio-temporal location invites certain parallels
to be drawn with any referential theory. However, I consider a ref¬
erential theory along the lines to be proposed capable of incorpora¬
tion into any syntactical theory that is (a) verb-centred; (b) trans¬
formational-generative; (c) relational.
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determines individual acts of reference (in the sense of
Linsky and Searle). This being so, whatever categories
and other theoretical entities we introduce in connection
with referentiality are clearly distinct from the categories
in terms of which the propositional content is analyzed
by Fillmore, Seuren, and Anderson.
3.2 Syntactlco-semantlc and referential-semantic analyses.
The point made at the end of the last paragraph is not
only a difficult one; it is also extremely important. In
this section we shall discuss it more fully on the basis
of the distinction between entities of different levels
(above, § 1.21) in connection with Frege's ontological
terminology. Non-linguistic entities, it will be re-called,
are held to be level zero entities, whereas linguistic en¬
tities are entities of level one. Applying this distinc¬
tion to the terms in Frege's overall ontological system
— which comprises the term-pairs "object"/"concept",
"argument"/"function", and "proper name"/"predicate" —
we find that objects, concepts, arguments, and functions
are entities of level zero, whereas proper names and pred¬
icates are entities of level one (Frege, 1891; 1892a;
1892b). What is of interest here is the difference (if
any) between objects and arguments, and between concepts
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and functions. He does not give any explicit answer to
this question himself, but by tracing his usage a precise
distinction can be drawn.
This distinction is a functional one. In the three
papers most central to the issue (referred to above),
Prege invariably associates the pair "object"/"concept"
with reference (his "Bedeutung"), whereas arguments and
functions are never spoken of as being references of any¬
thing. These two latter terms are rather u&ed whenever he
wishes to speak about the relations holding between dif¬
ferent kinds of entities of level sezo. Drawing on the
distinction between inter- and intra-level relations, the
situation can be formulated as follows:
Whenever a level-zero entity is considered
to be a term of an intra-relation, it is said
to be either an argument or a function;
whenever a level-zero entity is considered
to be a term of an inter-relation, it is said
to be either an object or a concept.
The assymmetry inherent in Frege's terminology — cre¬
ated by the fact that only one pair of terms denotes level
one entities against two pairs that denote level zero en¬
tities — has no damaging consequences for his theories
because, to Frege, signs of level one were mathematical
symbols and because mathematical operations were incompre-
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hensible if they were considered operations with signs
dissociated from the objects symbolized by those signs
(1891:22). Therefore he could (and did) regard mathemat¬
ical operations as performed with objects, and hence there
was no need to introduce terms for level one entities cor¬
responding to "argument" and "function".
When it comes to the analysis of language signs, how¬
ever, such a pair of terms is called for, as recognized,
for example, by Reichenbach (1947:80-8I), who speaks of
"argument-names" and "function-names" in addition to "sub¬
ject" and "predicate", if only for the following reason:
(3:1)(a) Caesar Gallos vicit
(b) Galli a Caesare victi sunt
Since there obtains a converse relationship between
(a) and (b) in (3:1), the cognitive content in both sen¬
tences is the same: the same relation between the level
zero entities Caesar and the Gauls is expressed by both
sentences. The same converse relationship obtains, for
example, between multiplication and division:
(3:2) (a) 3 • 6 » 18
(b) 18 : 6 - 3
But whereas the converseness between the multiplication
sign and the division sign is reflected by the active/pas¬
sive relationship of the verb in (3:1), something 'more'
has happened to the other signs in (3:1) as compared with
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(3:2) for which there is no non-linguistic reason.
To account for the relationships between the elements
which constitute (3:1)(a) and (b) separately, and for the
relationship between them generally is the traditional
task of syntax and morphology, but two distinct aspects
are involved:
(3:3)(a) A cognitive aspect which is essentially
concerned with the distribution of argu¬
ment-names in relation to a function-name,
in terms of which (3:1)(a) and (b) are
identical;
(b) a formal aspect which is essentially con¬
cerned with the superficial appearance of
the argument-names and function-name.
It is immediately clear from (3:11, however, that there
is no simple one-to-one relationship between these two as¬
pects of the linguistic analysis. In particular, the super¬
ficial form of the linguistic items does not follow from
the cognitive aspect of the analysis since, in that case,
(3:1) (a) and (b) should have been cognitivelf? as well as
formally identical (though not positionally identical).
Let us now return to Frege's terminology. So far we
have disregarded the pair "proper name"/"predicate".
These terms correlate with objects and concepts at level
zero in much the same way as post-Fregean "argument-name"
and "function-name" correlate with his arguments and
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functions. As is by now obvious, the main distinction
between Frege's object and his argument is that whereas
an object can be considered in splendid isolation (rel¬
ative to other level zero entities), an argument only
acquires existence by being considered in relation to
a function. Indeed, I believe we would represent Frege
honestly by saying that an argument is an object seen
in relation to a concept. In this way, what has hitherto
been treated as two distinct entities (of level zero) be¬
comes the same entity, only seen under two different view¬
points.
If we now apply this technique to entities of level
one we see that, for example, "Caesar" in (3:1 a) per¬
forms a dual rdle. From one viewpoint the word "Caesar"
is an argument-name, partaking in the syntactic structure
of (3:1 a); from another it is a proper name — what Frege
called an actual proper name (1892b:58 fn), designating a
particular object. On the basis of these considerations
we can now add another aspect of linguistic analysis to
those already listed in (3:3):
(3:3)(c) a referential aspect which is essentially
concerned with an analysis of those prop¬
erties of linguistic entities which re¬
flect the conditions under which a given
linguistic entity can be said to correlate,
actually or potentially, with a given non
-linguistic entity.
121
I shall refer to a linguistic analysis which is con¬
cerned with aspect (a) as a syntactico-semantic analysis
(SS-analysis), and to a liguistic analysis which is con¬
cerned with aspect (c) as a referential-semantic analysis
(RS-analysis). Furthermore* I shall argue that* in order
to deal satisfactorily with aspect (b) — the formal as¬
pect — one must in fact take account of the results of
the SS-analysis as well as of the RS-analysis.
It is clear that Fillmore* Seuren* and Anderson in the
works referred to in the last section are predominantly*
not to say exclusively* concerned with establishing a
framework and a grammatical metalanguage which will handle
SS-phenomena alone. This is of course not intended as a
criticism* but rather as an explicit statement of what I
take to be conscious limitations imposed on the frameworks
developed, comparable to the explicit limitation Imposed
on his framework by McCawley (1971:223): "... with per¬
haps some additional terms to cover the meaning of the*
which I have ignored."
However* despite notable exceptions like Lyons (1973),
Perlmutter (1969)* Sampson (1969), Thorne (1972), these
limitations are symptomatic of a large body of linguistic
writing, and it would probably be fair to say that the main
stream of current linguistic practice runs within the con¬
fines of SS-analysis. This is made even more clear by the
fact that when linguists approach matters of a clearly ref¬
erential nature, they tend to approach them through the
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framework and the metalanguage established to deal with
SS-phenomena, in particular in regarding them as suscept¬
ible of some form of predicational analysis. Cf. in this
connection Anderson's (1969:3o9) misgivings as to the
possibility of incorporating in a natural way into his
SS-framework matters which are connected with the cat¬
egories of tense and determiner.
My recognition of two equipollent, though distinct,
types of linguistic analysis is due to the analysis of
Frege's terminology outlined above, which leads to the
conclusion drawn. It is therefore gratifying to see it
supported by Jackendoff's (1971; 1972a:§ 1.2) compart-
mentalization of the traditional Chomskyan semantic com¬
ponent into a four-layered hierarchical system. If we
leave out of account his "table of co-reference" —
which, I shall hope to show, is redundant — we are left
with two internally hierarchical structures, the function¬
al structure and the modal structure, plus a (non-struc¬
tured) compartment referred to as the focus and presup¬
position. His definitatorial explanations of these three
compartments make it clear that they correspond quite
closely to the three aspects set up in (3:3), or, re¬
spectively, to the SS-analysis, the RS-analysis, and the
formal aspect.
However, the phenomena handled by Jackendoff's modal
structure almost exclusively concern referential opacity
and transparency, with only a few pages devoted to quant-
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lfiers and generics, all analyzed within a predicational
structure. As will appear presently, a totally different
approach will be taken here, so we leave Jackdndoff aside.
3.3 Referential functions and referential potential.
The design feature of prevarication is considered to
be the defining characteristic of language which entails
that the inter-level relation between entities of levels
one and zero is a potential relation which may on occasion
be actualized.
This being so, we can meaningfully speak of referential
functions and the potentiality of referentiality. A ref¬
erential function is a function performed by a given
linguistic entity on a particular occasion when it is
employed by a speaker to denote, indicate, or refer to
particular things. In other words, when a speaker per¬
forms a speech act of reference (in Searle's sense), he
employs linguistic entities in particular referential func¬
tions.
This formulation is intended to establish a distinction
between the properties of linguistic entities and the use
a speaker may make of these properties. Such a distinc¬
tion, it seems to me, is necessary. As was argued in chap¬
ter 2, the main defect of Linsky's treatment of referenti¬
ality stems from his unwillingness to draw this distinc-
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tion. For example. A noun phrase of a given form, say,
"the man in the brown jacket", may on occasion be uled
by a speaker to refer to a particular man ('refer' in
the sense of Linsky and Searle). To say this is to say
that this noun phrase may be used as a singular, definite,
categorical referring expression. In contrast, a noun
phrase like "some ten men in brown jackets" cannot be
used to refer to a particular man on a given occasion,
at least not without violation of one or more of Grice•s
principles for communicative interaction. A natural way
in which to formulate these facts is to say that a noun
phrase of a given form has a certain referential potential.
Consider now a noun phrase like "the beaver". It can not
only be used to refer to a particular beaver on a particu¬
lar occasion, but has also a so-called generic sense, in
which it may be used to refer to the genus "beaver".
It is the task of the referential theory to account
for the referential potential of linguistic entities.
Since the referential potential of a linguistic entity is
(or can be considered to be) a property of that entity,
and since linguistics is the science that accounts for
the properties of linguistic entities, it follows that
the referential theory is a linguistic theory.
It is not an integral part of the referential theory to
account for the actual referential function performed by
a given expression on a given occasion. This area is an
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area of converging interests, shared by pragmatics, styl-
istics, general semantics, etc. However, in order to test
the results of the analysis of referential potential, ap¬
peal to referential functions must be made. Hence the
title of the present thesis.
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Chapter 4
The Basis of RS-analysis
4.1 Form and function.
The strategy most often followed in dealing with the
relationship between form and referential function is
laid down by Russell: "Thus a phrase is denoting solely
in virtue of its form" (Russell, 19o5:lo3). As the anal¬
yses have been refined, special names have been given to
the various functions subsumed by Russell under the gen¬
eral term "denoting", but always starting from the form.
Thus Donnellan's original contribution (1966) can be seen
as substantiating a claim that a particular form, which
had hitherto been regarded as performing a single rdle,
in fact performs two (but cf. lieringer, 1969; Partee,
197o; Bell, 1972). In a more recent, and linguistically
based, study, Giv6n (1972) also starts from the form of
the nominal prefixes in ChiBemba, arguing in favour of a
morphological distinction between referring phrases in
transparent and opaque contexts.
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A different, Popperean, strategy can be envisaged
which tries to predict what referential functions there
are, and then attempts to associate particular linguist¬
ic forms with each function. If we then also adopt the
principle of recent SS-analysis of expressing functional
categories in terms of extrapolation from subcategoriza-
tion-features (Anderson, 1971a), we would have a frame¬
work which at the same time is empirically verifiable
(or falsifiable) and meets the requirement of precise
formulation.
4.2 Primary features.
4.21 The metaphysical basis of primary features.
The starting-point for the attempt to predict refer¬
ential functions is capable of formulation in the trad¬
itional language of subject/predicate analysis (cf. in
particular Sandmann, 1954), in that it will have to be
based on the discussion in § 3.2, and in particular on
the status of object and concept. We would have to speak
about objects, and we would have to say something about
objects.
On this very general basis the following predictions
can be made?
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(4:1) On some occasion, somebody will want to say
something about —
(a) — all objects
(b) — some objects
(c) — (a) kind(s) of object
(d) — (a) section(s) of objects
(e) — (an) individual object(s)
This is the metaphysical basis of the theory. However,
since we are concerned with language rather than with meta¬
physics, we convert (4:1) into a set of RS-features which






These are the primary RS-features of the theory. I sub¬
mit that (4:2) is exhaustive since such possibilities as
saying something about no object, about two (ten, many,
few, ...) objects all rely on (4:2) plus one or more
secondary features.
4.22 The nature of primary features.
Linguistic features are often, but not always, regarded
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as binary; and the notion of binarism is often, but not
always, associated with the notion of markedness. There
are well-known problems connected with the binary feature,
often referred to as the problems ensuing from the 'Boolean
conditions' on binar.ism (cf. e.g. Lyons, 1973:76). In a
nutshell, if we were to operate with, say, (tuniversal),
where a plusvalue was 'marked', a minusvalue 'unmarked',
we would imply that the 'archifeature (auniversal) was
present no matter which value was chosen. In case the
'archifeature' was not relevant for the description of
the item in question, a further (±)-specification would
be required, thus giving (±(tuniversal)), where the first
(±) indicated whether or not (auniversal) was present1.
It will appear later that secondary features are best
described as binary, despite the concpmitant problems
just mentioned. In the meantime there seems to be no
reason to suppose that primary features are. They are
either present or not present, and this situation can
be captured simply by writing the name of the feature
in question when it is present and by not writing it
when it is absent.
1
See Fudge (1967), Contreres (1969), Chafe (197ob) for various
criticisms of binarism in phonology; and — on binarism in gen¬
eral — Bazell (1953:3-5; lo7-12), S^rensen (1958:95-6), Bar-
Hillel (197o:242-44). For a position similar to that adopted
for primary features here, cf. Chafe (197oei:9o-l), Lehrer (1974:
59-61).
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4.23 Dlsjunctlvltyt the hierarchy of primary features.
I assumed without comment that our capability to speak
about things in the various modes set up in (4:1) is the
metaphysical basis for the set of primary RS-features in
(4:2), which, it was said, are considered to be properties
of linguistic entities. In other words, I assumed that
certain aspects of linguistic structure can be character¬
ized by the features in (4:2), and that these aspects of
linguistic structure reflect the modes in which we speak
about things. I shall now justify this assumption. More¬
over, I shall show that the order in which (4:1) and
(4:2) are stated is not fortuitous.
I begin by referring to the correlation between gram¬
mar and logical calculi commented on in § 1.3, and in
particular to the correlation between the calculus of
classes and the analytical framework to be developed.
The basic relation of the calculus of classes is what
we could call a relation of disjunctivity, drawing on the
etymological meaning of "dis-jungo". When we analyze in
class-calculus terms the proposition expressed by the
sentence "some men are wise", we take from the class of
all men an unspecified number and put them in the class
of wise things; or — alternatively — we establish, with¬
in the class of all men, a subclass the members of which
are not only men but also wise. But by this very process
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we In fact also establish the class of all men. The re¬
cognition of the class of all men depends on the recog¬
nition of the complement of the class of all men. These
two classes, the class of men plus its complement, con¬
stitute the universal class. Therefore we cannot operate
in class-calculus terms without implicit reference to
the universal class, or the class of all things. And there¬
fore a relation of disjunctivity is the basic relation in
the calculus of classes. It follows that whichever 'level'
in (4:1) we are concerned with, at least the notion of
"all" is implicit.
There are other dependencies relevant to class-calcul¬
us analysis among the members of (4:1); they can be shown
schematically as follows:
Whereas to speak about some things is not necessarily
to speak about a kind of thing, the converse holds. There¬
fore "some" and "kind" are not at the same level. Further¬
more, it is a condition upon speaking about a section of
things that a kind has been specified. The same is gen¬
erally, but not necessarily, true about speaking of an





and "individual". Lastly, it is not only possible to
speak about an individual of a section of given kind of
thing; we can also speak about a section of an individ¬
ual. Recognition of this fact is tantamount to recogniz¬
ing the part : whole relationship, the complexities of
which are discussed by Russell, in precisely our context,
in chapter 24 of An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth (cf.
above, § 2.23). Although this relationship is of import¬
ance to the SS-analysis (cf. Fillmore, 1968:61 ff; And¬
erson, 1971a:114-5; Lyons, forthcoming:342 ff), it is not
obviously relevant to RS-analysis. An arm, a branch, and
a roof can be singled out for discourse in the same ways
as can a policeman, a tree, or a house. This point is
borne out by the treatment of "member" in Webster's Dic¬
tionary of Synonyms. It is considered to be semantically
related to words denoting sections (e.g. "part", "portion",
"division", and "section" itself), individuals (e.g. "el¬
ement", "constituent"), and parts of wholes (e.g. "branch",
"limb"), all at the same time. I therefore leave out the
possibility of letting "section" depend on "individual" in
(4:3). More generally, I leave out of the present account
the part : whole relationship.
It is clear from these considerations that (4:1) could
in fact have been set up in any alternative order. There
is no intrinsic ordering in (4:1) as long as we adhere
strictly to what it expresses about our capabilities of
speaking about things. It is only when the network of dis¬
junctive relationships has been imposed upon it that a
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hierarchy emerges among its elements. When the network
of disjunctive relationships is imposed on (4:1), what
emerges is the basic structure of the calculus of class¬
es.
Consider now a question like "What kind of car is
that?" Such a question can only be appropriately an¬
swered by any one of a number of phrases like "a con¬
vertible", "a Rolls Royce", etc., but not by a phrase
like "our new neighbour's". On the other hand, a quest¬
ion like "What car is that?" can be appropriately an¬
swered by each one of the phrases above. The fact that
the only appropriate type of answer to an explicit 'kind'-
question can also be used appropriately in reply to a
question of the second type, reflects the fact that we
speak about kinds of things by means of nouns. This is a
structural property of language (English), which reflects
our ability to talk about things. (Cf. in this connection
Strawson's 'sortal' universale, which are, roughly speaking,
introduced by nouns; Strawson, 1959:167 ff et passim ).
Another example of a structural property of English
which reflects aspects, not only of (4:1) but also, and
more significantly, of (4:3), is the occurrence in what
we might call the register of angry English of utterances
like the following:
(4:4) And what do you think Charles gave me? He gave
me a spanner of all things!
Considerations such as these justify the assumption
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that there are aspects of linguistic structure that re¬
flect (4j1), and, furthermore, that there are aspects of
linguistic structure that rely on the same kind of dis-
junctivity as the calculus of classes.
However, I said in § 1.3 that grammar and logic are
similar though not identical. The similarity is captured
by recognizing a hierarchical structure among the ling¬
uistic features in (4:2) comparable to, and in the main
identical to, that recognized in (4:3). The dissimilarity
is primarily that, due to a number of phenomena related to
the notion of countability, there is no direct dependency
elective
restrictive]
form a pair contrasting with (selective). Furthermore,
between (elective) and (individuative), so that
there is perhaps a more direct link between (universal)/
(selective) and (individuative) than between "all"/"some"
and "individual" — cf. § 11.31 for a discussion of this





The grounds for this particular shape of the hierarchy
of primary features shall occupy us at various stages in
what follows. In the meantime I shall need to make clear
my terminology pertaining to nouns and noun phrases.
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4.3 Nominals, nouns, and noun phrases.
The grammatical category with which we are centrally
concerned is NP, or, to put it slightly more correctly,
the analytical framework to be developed is designed to
account for the linguistic material that may occur under
the node NP in a standard Chomskyan phrase marker.
However, I shall avail myself of three different terms,
N(ominal), N(oun) P(hrase), and (lexical) noun.
Consider a phrase like "the girl upstairs". This is
subject to constituency (phrase-structure rule) analysis,
the result of which is a labelled bracketing:
(4:6) ( ( (the) (girl))(upstairs) )
x y z z v vyu u x
(4:6) is made up of two quite distinct types of cat¬
egory, namely three 'words' on the one hand, and a se¬
quence of parentheses, each pair of which is the bearer
of a particular name, on the other. It is the labelled
bracketing without the 'words' that I refer to as a N.
What actual brackets occur depends on the primary sub-
categorization — i.e. subcategorization by primary feat¬
ures — Of N.
A labelled bracketing plus the 'words' is a NP. We can
speak of NP's of various depths of derivation, deep NP,
shallow NP, surface NP. In contrast, we can speak only of
N. N is the category symbol under which NP is generated.
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NP's are strings of lexical material with some order im¬
posed on them by N. We return to the N/NP distinction in
§ 5.5.
It is clear that my employment of N differs from the
standard (Chomskyan) usage. What is dominated by N in a
Chomskyan phrase marker is what I shall refer to as a
(lexical) noun. In other words, a noun is a lexeme (in
Lyons' sense), which is distributionally defined with
reference to its occurrence under a particular node in
the tree-structure underlying NP's. See further §§ 5.322
and 5.5 below.
With respect to these terminological distinctions it
is clear that it is N that is subcategorized in terms of
the primary features established in the preceding section.
We can now set up the following primary subcategorization
-rules (1 SR)s
(4:7) 1 SR i. N •+ universal





— in which the arrow should be read as "is obligatorily1
subcategorized as", and where the braces indicate an ex-
1
It is possible that some optionality should be allowed for, in par¬
ticular that N should be capable of subcategorization by (universsal,




Application of these rules will yield three different
















Associated with, in the sense of being extrapolated
from, these initial subcategorization-specifications are
two different types of category, to which we now turn.
4.4 Referential phrases,
4.41 Functional and lexical categories: DC and L.
It is an essential fact about language that linguistic
elements (lexemes, morphemes, etc.), although capable of
being isolated for analytical attention, cannot occur in
discourse (excepting metalinguistic discourse) independent¬
ly of certain functions being associated with them. Conse¬
quently, if we want to give an account of language as it
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occurs (or could occur) in natural discourse, attention
must be given to the functions a given item is (capable
of) performing. The functions of linguistic items we are
interested in (primarily) are the referential-semantic
functions.
It was assumed above (chapter 2) that a RS-analysis
is exhaustive if it accounts for both the deictic and
the denotative characteristics of NP (or, generally,
linguistic entities). This distinction is now relevant
since a NP embodies both deictic and denotative charac¬
teristics. We reflect the distinction by recognizing two
types of relevant category: DC and L. DC is the cover-
term for any functional category, and L is the cover-
term for any lexical category. It will emerge that DC
dominates deictic elements, whereas L dominates denotat¬
ive or indicating elements.
It is clear, however, that the status of the two types
of category is not the same. Whereas L presupposes DC,
the reverse does not hold. In other (Hjelmslev*s) words,
DC is a constant, L on the other hand a variable, and the
relation holding between a constant and a variable is
determination. I shall say that DC determine# L and that
L is determined by DC1. Thus, to illustrate, the NP
1
A parallel, and in many ways supporting, analysis of the rel¬
ationship between DC and L is provided by Bierwisch (1971) in
an interesting, though complex and exploratory article, the com¬
plexities of which stem mainly from his attempt to apply pred¬
icate calculus analysis to these phenomena, and the exploratory
(rather than conclusive) nature of which in the main stems from
the complexities unnecessarily introduced in this way. The for
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"all things" can be given the following — simplified
and incomplete — representation:
(4:9)
all things
4.42 The referential phrase.
I shall call a configuration like (4:lo) a referential
phrase:
(4:lo) DC
our purposes main points are these: He distinguishes between de¬
limiting and predicating semantic features (p. 417). The delimit¬
ing features correspond to (the features dominated here by) DC,
the predicating features to (those dominated here by) L. Both
types of feature are originally seen as predicates of a referen¬
tial variable, X^, but their status is not the same. In particular,
a variable, Q — which ranges over (clusters of) delimiting fea¬
tures — combines with X^ to form an operator of the form QX. which
binds the referential variable when this enters a propositional
function with a predicating feature (pp. 422; 425-6). In other
words, the delimiting features are in some sense heuristically
prior to predicating features. This, in brief, is Bierwisch's way
of expressing what I express by saying that DC determines L, at
least if I have read him correctly.
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Since the 'head' in a referential phrase is the func¬
tional category, the number of possible referential
phrases is decided by the number of functional categories.
The functional categories are extrapolations of the prim¬
ary features established in § 4.21, but although there
are five primary features it seems that we need only re¬
cognize four different functional categories. The reasons
for this will be explained below, § 5.322.






A natural starting-point for a discussion of these cat¬
egories is offered by the status of (universal) in (4:7).
Any NP derives from a N which is invariably subcategorized
as (universal), and (universal) invariably occurs at the
same place in the complex symbol. This in turn suggests
that the category extrapolated from (universal) is the
most basic, indeed the referentially most neutral category,
The name I give to this category, pres(entative), has a
certain standing as a more or less clearly defined term in
discussions of referentiality1.
1 "Presentative" is one of the terms employed by Carnoy (1927) in his
discussion of the psychological functions of the Greek articles. Col-
linson (1937:37) reports on Kalepky's distinction between "apper-
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The rules which insert the functional categories will
be referred to as determination rules (DR). Thus we have
a determination rule that inserts pres as a functional
category to the left of N whenever N is subcategorized as
(universal), i.e. always:
(4:12) DR i. a. universal ■* pres// N
The rule that inserts L in the referential phrase is
of the same kind although it differs from DR i. a. in
having a functional category — rather than a primary
feature — as a trigger:
(4:12) DR i. b. pres ■* L//pres
This latter rule should be read "when pres occurs in a
configuration, insert L to the right of it".
The obvious similarity between the formal framework
under development here and that of John Anderson's Gram¬
mar of Case breaks down, however, when we come to the in¬
troduction of the three remaining categories. Whereas
Anderson's categories (the cases) all depend directly on
V, the basic hierarchical principle of the RS-analysis
forbids the other DC's to be determined by N. N is not
ceptive" and "presentative" expressions, of which the latter is
said to be an expression of "indication" (Collinson's tens for
deixis) more 'objective' than mere zero-indication, which is
a characteristic of "apperceptive"expressions.
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the 'centre' of the NP in the same way as V is the centre
of the predication. What we need instead is a set of
rules that will allow us to maintain and formally repres¬
ent the hierarchical principle. Without for the moment
committing ourselves to the nature of the relation that
holds between two referential phrases, we should like to
give a formal representation in which a given referential
phrase is connected — in a non-technical sense — with
hierarchically higher as well as with hierarchically lower
referential phrases. The set of rules we need, therefore,
is something like the following:
(4:12)(continued)
ii. a. elective •+ 9©n//Lpres^
b. gen -*■ I*//gen.
iii. a. selective part//Lpres
b. restrictive -* P«rt//Lgon
c. part L//part







It appears from DR iii. that both selective and re¬
strictive introduce part, so that, as mentioned, only
four categories need be reckoned with — cf. § 5.322.
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The notation to the right of the single stroke in DR iv.
a. expresses the condition that ind is attached to Lpres
only if the N is subcategorized as (universal, individuat¬
ive I , i.e. if part is not introduced (in virtue of N being
specified neither as (selective) nor as (elective, restrict
ive)). Lastly, I have introduced the convention that if we
want to speak about a particular L, e.g. the L determined
by part, this is indicated by subscribing to L the name
of the category in question, thus: Lpart In contrast,
when we want to speak about a particular referential phrase
this is indicated in the following manner: part-L.
Application of the rules (1 SR and DR) so far devel¬























Such structures are what I call N(ominals), as will be
clear from the discussion in § 4.3. The hierarchy of ref¬
erential phrases supplies the names for the brackets in
terms of which NP can be analyzed.
However, we shall need to be able to refer to the hier¬
archy of referential phrases in isolation from the prim¬
arily subcategorized N. The term I shall employ for this
purpose is "referential branch". The need for the notion
of referential branch will be made clear in connection
with the necessary expansion of the framework to embrace
recursive structures. In contrast, I shall refer to a Nom¬
inal as a referential tree when I consider its formal
properties associated with the hierarchy of referential
phrases, rather than its properties of providing labelled
brackets. These two properties are, of course, closely rel¬
ated to each other, and it is only a marginally shifted
viewpoint that is behind the choice of term on a given oc~
145
casion. Thus a referential tree is a subcategorized N
plus at least one referential branch.
•
By recognizing the fact that the referential branch
is made up, not of a finite number of single nodes, but
by a finite number of ordered pairs of nodes (i.e. the
referential phrases), we can now expand the terminology
developed to account for the relationship within the ref¬
erential phrase to cover pairs of referential phrases as
well. I shall say that a given referential phrase deter¬
mines any lower referential phrase, and is determined by
any higher referential phrase in the referential branch.
Furthermore, I shall say that for example pres-L in (4:
13 a) determines directly ind-L, whereas, in (b), it det¬
ermines part-L directly, ind-L indirectly. In general,
contiguous referential phrases are said to stand in a
direct relationship of determination, non-contiguous ref¬
erential phrases in an indirect one.
4.43 Nominal apposition.
4.431 A critical discussion of the term "apposition".
In § 1.22 some doubts were raised about the proper
status of the term "apposition" relative to the other
members of the sets of terms in (1:7), and in particular
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as to whether it could be levelled with "coordination"
in (1:8) in a fashion similar to that in which "attrib¬
ution" was levelled with "subordination", and "predication"
with "exocentricity".
Investigation1 into the traditional treatment of ap¬
position reveals three facts.
Firstly, it is not a precisely defined or delimited
notion. Of the two elements involved in a construction
called appositive — assuming for the moment that only
two elements are involved — it seems to be the case that
one is a noun or noun phrase, whereas the other may be a
noun (phrase), an adjective, or a participle, but even
these restrictions are not always met. Cf. in particular
Diderichsen's (1952:91 fn 4) report of Hammerich's usage
according to which der Scherz/gestern and da/singt es dis¬
play apposition.
Secondly, a distinction is usually drawn between two
kinds of apposition, 'loose* and 'close', reflecting the
usual distinction in noun phrases containing adjectival
modifiers between non-restrictive and restrictive modifi¬
cation. The example of 'close* apposition that holds the
same place in a discussion of these phenomena as do ex¬
amples involving beavers in discussions of genericness
is "the poet Burns". Examples of 'loose' apposition would
1
Based on Callaway (19ol), Curme (1931:3o ff; 88 ff), Jespersen
(1913:386 ff; 1937:13 ff; 35 ff), Lee (1952), Raugen (1953),
Hockett (1955), Sopher (1971), Quirk et al. (1972:ch 9). Also
Thrane (1967:61-94).
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— traditionally, but cf. (4:16) — be "Smith, a farmer",
and "Smith, the farmer".
The third fact seems to be general adherence to the
intuition that apposition is associated with subordina¬
tion in some way, although Jespersen (1937:113) 'feels'
that — at least some instances of — appositive construc¬
tions are coordinate. Note also that Quirk et al.(1972)
treat coordination and apposition in the same chapter,
though without actually going into the implications of
regarding the two types as variants of each other. They
simply state that "apposition resembles co-ordination in
that typically the two or more units in apposition are
constituents of the same level" (§ 9.13o). The variety
of phenomena surveyed by them under this head is a good
indication of the vagueness of the term.
However, if distributional properties alone decide
types of constructions — as they are generally said to
do — then clearly apposition is a subtype of coordina¬
tion. The only difference between a 'clear' instance of
coordination (phrasal conjunction of definite NP's) and
a 'clear' instance of apposition (involving two definite
NP's) is a difference in the number of referents involved.
The classical TG-approach to apposition is represented,
and most thoroughly stated, by Motsch (1965) — cf. also
Lees (196o:92). An appositive NP is held to be the super¬
ficial reflex of an underlying copulative relative clause,
of which either the subject-NP or the predicative NP may
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emerge as the appositive element. In this way apposition
is associated with subordination (the appeal to a copulat
ive source), though he (Motsch) has to concede that not
all instances of apposition can be derived in this way.
In the cases where it cannot be so derived he says that
"eine Art Ko-ordination (vorliegt)" (Motsch, 1965:117).
Thus the vaccillation between subordination and coordin¬
ation as the proper characterization of apposition con¬
tinues.
In the course of his argumentation against the Con¬
junction Reduction Hypothesis, and in favour of what he
calls a Phrase Structure Rule analysis of coordination,
Dougherty (197o) sets up the following rule for NP:
(4:14) NP (Q) NPn (ADV)
(Dougherty, 197o:864)
— where Q is a (optional) distributive quantifier, like
each, and ADV a (optional) distributive adverbial, like
at once.
Dougherty also happens to be one of the co-authors of
one of the two alternative TG-accounts of nominal apposi¬
tion (Delorme & Dougherty, 1972). In the latter work we
find a rule of the following form:
(4:15) NP -► NP (NP)
(Delorme « Dougherty, 1972:9)
It is strange that the obvious similarity between
these two rules has not induced Dougherty to comment on
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the possible connection between apposition and coordina¬
tion. Instead the rule quoted in (4:15) remains arbitrary,
and the work in which it appears carries no more substant¬
ial information thaft that Delorme and Dougherty do not
think that Postal's (1966) analysis of "we", etc., as a
variant of the definite article is correct.
The second alternative to the classical TG-position
(Burton-Roberts, 1975) is of considerably more penetra¬
tion. After first attempting to tighten the application
of the term — which end he(?) achieves, more or less
by definition, by excluding from its denotata all con¬
structions that may derive from an embedded copulative
structure — he is left with a number of constructions
which he calls appositive. They fall into three categories:
(4:16) Apposition
NP1 NP2
Def Def (Manchester United, the Champions)
Indef Def (An upholsterer, Mr. Pontefract)
Indef Indef (A soldier, a man in uniform)
— where Def and Indef reflect the surface distribution
of the definite and indefinite articles (if I may be al¬
lowed to speak about proper names informally in such terms).
He goes to much trouble to give distinct derivational
histories for coordinated NP's and appositive MP's, the
most crucial difference being that whereas coordinated
NP's are co-constituents (daughters) of a superordinate
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NP, this is not the case with appositive NP's. The raain
argument for this difference is based on the notion of
co-reference.
As for the reason why he should want to distinguish
so strictly between coordination and apposition, it ap¬
pears that he would like to be able to argue that appos¬
ition is a grammatical (SS) relation between NP's, dis¬
tinct from yet on a par with coordination.
The notion of co-reference cannot — at least not at
the present state of affairs — bear so much weight. Furth¬
ermore, it is not at all clear that (phrasal) coordina¬
tion embodies a SS-relation (as opposed to a RS-relation).
Of the traditional syntactic relations, coordination is
the one least obviously syntactical.
4.432 Serialization-types: appositive and delimltatlve.
The impetus to the undertaking of the critical invest¬
igation reported on in the last section was Lyons' recent
(1973i68 ff) employment of a process of 'appositivaliza-
tion' in the derivational account of such NP's as "that
dog", possibly in conjunction with some form of adjectiv-
alization process. As will have appeared, certain positive,
though far from clear-cut, results emerge in connection
with the notion of apposition which have a bearing on ref-
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erentiality, especially via the notion of co-reference.
However, since the notion of apposition remains vague,
at least in the sense in which it has been most often
used (viz. as the name of some linguistic relationship
reputedly obtaining between a NP and some other linguistic
item), I shall in the present section suggest a different
approach to the question which at least has the advantage
of somewhat more precise stateability than previous ap¬
proaches.
English NP's can be classified on the basis of a great
many different characteristics, like definiteness, quant¬
ification, restriction, etc. The characteristic I shall
employ has to do with the way in which the members of a
NP are connected, or, as I shall say, serialized. Consider
(4:17)(a) the best man
(b) the best of men
(4:17 a) is an instance of what I shall call appositlve
serialization, whereas (b) is an instance of dellmltative
serialization. In general, a NP which overtly displays
a preposition (most often "of", but frequently also loc¬
ative prepositions like "at", "in", "on", etc., less fre¬
quently directional prepositions like "towards", "against",
etc.) will be considered an instance of delimitative ser¬
ialization, whereas NP's without a preposition in their in¬
ternal structure will be regarded as instances of appos-
itive serialization.
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This is a simple classification which relies entirely
on observational data. Consequently, a NP like "the boy's
mother" will be considered an instance of appositive ser¬
ialization despite the obvious possibility of relating the
genitive with the preposition "of".
The distinction between appositive and delimitative ser¬
ialization provides an important heuristic principle for
the referential theory. Accepting the view that prepos¬
itions are — or at least may be regarded as — superfic¬
ial realizations of underlying cases, it turns out that
the presence of a preposition in the surface structure of
a NP is an indication of recursive derivation of that NP.
The reverse inference does not hold, however. We cannot
conclude from the fact that a given surface NP displays
appositive serialization that it derives from a non-re-
cursive structure.
Furthermore, the distinction between the two types of
serialization provides a basis for the subclassifications






In his critical evaluation of the standard procedure
of lexical insertion in a Chomskyan grammar, Seuren (1969:
i 3.2) demonstrates that the reason why a large number
(possibly the majority) of terminal strings generated by
the base component are disqualified as surface structures,
is that lexical insertion under a given formative, X,
takes place independently of what lexical material is in¬
serted under another formative, Y, thereby greatly re¬
ducing the probability that the condition of lexical ident¬
ity — required by a number of transformations — can be
met. In a recent paper, Miller (1975) has supported Seuren
while at the same time presenting evidence from the gen¬
eral area of relativization in corroboration of Seuren's
misgivings about the standard procedure.
An alternative developed by Seuren is that lexical in¬
sertion is guided by the operation of what he calls an
algorithm that introduces into the base component a form-
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ula. The task of this formula, in particular, is to en¬
sure that the condition of lexical identity is met in
places where it matters (for relativization, Equi-NP-del-
etion, etc.). The details are quite complex but we need
not go into them in order to grasp the basic principle
which is what interests us.
The complexities of incorporating such an algorithm and
its associated formula into a standard Chomskyan grammar
are shown to depend on the fact that lexical insertion
takes place at the end of the operation of the base com¬
ponent. If on the other hand lexical insertion is seen as
taking place from top to bottom instead, most difficulties
will be overcome.
This principle of lexical insertion 'from top to bot^
torn' is particularly attractive here since we operate
with a fairly simple hierarchical system, where a 'top'
and 'bottom* are in clear evidence (in contrast to a
Chomskyan phrase marker, in which more than one dimension
is relevant).
The process of lexical insertion is regarded here to
be the result of what I shall call secondary subcategori-
zation.
Primary subcategorization, it will be recalled, is the
process by which N is subcategorized in terms of the feat¬
ures developed in § 4.2. Its effect is the extrapolation
of functional and lexical categories, resulting in a ref¬
erential branch.
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Secondary subcategorization concerns the categories
DC and L. It is a specification of each category node in
terms of secondary RS-features. These are of two kinds,
reflecting Bierwisch's distinction (1971:417) between
delimiting and predicating features (cf. above, p. 138
fn).
Finally, by Seuren's strategy for lexical insertion,
the process of secondary subcategorization occurs from
the top in the referential branch, beginning with pres.
It will be clear that secondary subcategorization of
L depends on prior acceptance of the possibility of ex¬
pressing sense in terms of a set of denotative features,
for which I argued in chapter 2.
5.2 'Grammatical' and 'lexical* words.
Apart from the parallelism with Bierwisch's two types
of semantic feature, the two basic category symbols DC and
L may be considered reflexes of the traditional distinc¬
tion between 'grammatical' (formal) and 'lexical* (mat¬
erial) meaning (cf. Lyons, 1968:§ 9.5). It is assumed
that DC dominates linguistic material that would (or at
least could) be interpreted as having 'grammatical* —
or, since we are speaking about referentiality, perhaps
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rather •functional' — meaning, such as the articles,
(other) determinatives, quantifiers, and classifiers,
whereas the denotative categories (L) dominate linguist¬
ic material that would be interpreted as having lexical
meaning.
5.3 The secondary features.
It was decided above (§ 4.22) to regard the primary
features as unary: they were either there or not. In con¬
trast, and despite the Boolean problems, the secondary
features are multi-valued: either binary or scalar (for
the latter notion, cf. Bierwisch, 1967). The question
of 'markedness' is much more prominent for the phenomena
which the secondary features account for.
5.31 Functional features.
There are four basic categories associated with NP in
the Indo-European languages, viz. case, gender, countabil-
ity and number. Of these, countability is not usually con¬
sidered to be of the same basic nature as the three others,
the reason for which might be that whereas the three oth¬
ers have quite obvious morphological consequences — at
157
least in the classical languages if not in modern Eng¬
lish — countability leaves no traces which cannot be
associated with the category of number. However, if
either of the two categories of number and countabil¬
ity were to be accorded primacy relative to the other,
it must surely be the latter. The category of number
makes little sense unless it is related, explicitly or
implicitly, to the category of countability. Another
reason might be that countability is the clearest ref-
erentially based category among the four. One quite often
hears about grammatical number, and it would not be un¬
reasonable to explain gender — in certain languages —
as 'grammatical sex'. Thus theae two categories, which
might have been considered to be referentially based,
are brought in line with the safely grammatical category
of case. On the other hand it would be highly unlikely,
I think, to find countability explained as 'grammatical
enumerability' or the like.
Yet countability is a linguistic — rather than meta¬
physical — category, as attested by such opposing pairs
as Danish and English:
(5:1)(a) et stykke leget^j vs. a toy
(b) et mjrfbel vs. a piece of furniture
Even so, the very terms 'mass-words' and 'count-words'
with which countability is often associated, suggest the
referential basis of the linguistic category.
These four basic categories are realized as secondary
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features on the functional nodes pres, part, gen, and ind.
We shall now look into the question as to which is as¬
sociated with which.
5.311 Features on DC.
The referential tree developed in § 4.42 is only a
subpart of the formal representation of the deep-struc¬
tural properties of sentences (or clauses). Since I have
chosen Anderson's grammar as the SS-framework in conjunc¬
tion with which to develop the RS-analysis, this means






Now, it was mentioned above (§ 4.42) that pres is the
referentially most neutral category? and it was mentioned
just now that, of the four categories case, gender, count-
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ability, and number, case was the one least obviously ref-
erentially based. These points, in combination with the
fact that pres will always be there and, moreover, will
always be the referential category 'closest' to the case
that governs N, suggest that pres is the referential node
which carries the information within the nominal as to
which case it is being governed by, nom(inative), erg(a-
tive), loc(ative), or abl(ative)1.
Let us turn to number next. Though a basic category it
was said to rely on countability. The natural way in which
to represent this relationship is to have the node sub-
categorized for number determined by the node subcategor-
ized for countability, such that (tplural) depends on
(+count). Furthermore, the (productive) application of
the number morpheme relies on the recognition of one vs.
more than one referent; and this recognition in turn re¬
lies on individuation (cf. Strawson, 1974:16). It follows
*
These cases are the four cases recognized by Anderson's localistic
version of case-grammar. Whether or not they are exhaustive is of
minor importance to us. However, some support for the claim that
they are exhaustive is provided by reflecting on the cognitive
similarities there are between the cases (SS functional categories)
and the RS functional categories considered here to be exhaustive
in the referential compartment of the grammar. Thus, part and abl,
ind and loc share some fundamental characteristics, as will be
clear later on. Nom shares with gen certain cognitive similarities,
while sharing with pres the status as the neutral, omnipresent
category within their respective compartments. This leaves erg as
a typical SS-category with no RS counterpart — hardly surprising
since it accounts for transitivity, the SS arrangement par excellence.
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that the node subcategorized for number is ind.
In order to establish which of the remaining two cat¬
egories, countability and gender, subcategorizes gen and
which part, consideration must be taken of the nature of
the L determined by each of them. Anticipating matters
somewhat we need to consider the nature of the relation¬
ship between a lexical noun and each of the two categories
of gender and countability.
Consider a German NP like "der Frau". Anyone who knows
German will know that this NP must be either in the gen¬
itive or in the dative (in the traditional case-terms
used for German). They know this because they know that
"Frau" is of the feminine gender. Equivalently, anyone
who knows that "bei" governs the dative in German will
from "bei der Frau" be able to predict that "Frau" is
feminine. That is to say, a noun is of a particular
gender, invariably.
All this is, of course, fairly elementary? but the im¬
plication is of some importance. It is equivalent to say¬
ing (in my terms) that a gender determines a noun. Of the
four categories under consideration it is only of gender
that we can say that it is invariable for a given noun.
The same noun may occur in any one of a number of cases,
and in one of two numbers. As is clear from such English
nouns as "cake", "wood", etc., the same noun may also be
either countable or uncountable. It follows, therefore,
that the lexical node which dominates nouns is the var-
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lable in a referential phrase in which the constant (DC)
is subcategorized for gender.
A similar train of thought leads us to recognize gen-L
as the referential phrase which dominates nouns, and, con
sequently, to recognize gen as the functional category
that is subcategorized for gender. Consider
(5:3) I don't want any dog, thank you very much.
The underlined NP is ambiguous between a countable and
an uncountable reading. To say this is to say that "dog"
is not inherently specified for countability. But it is
also to say that the node dominating "dog" cannot be det¬
ermined, directly or indirectly, by the node subcategor¬
ized for countability. Consequently that node must be lower
in the hierarchy than the L that dominates "dog". Since
there are only two functional nodes to consider, it fol¬
lows that it is part which is subcategorized by the feat¬
ure (±count), and that gen is subcategorized by (n gend),
which — like (n case) on pres — is Dne of the scalar
features1. A different line of argument concerning the
1
Quite possibly the scalar features could be resolved into a number
of binary features. Thus (n gend) is (for German) equivalent to
(±mask, ±fem), where a choice of (+mask) precludes the choice of
(+fem), and vice versa, but where an unmarked specification {-mask
-fem) is allowed. Such a system is implied by a scalar feature where,
say, (1 gend) - (-mask -fem), (2 gend) = (+mask -fem), and (3 gend)
• (-mask +fem). The same applies to (n case). However, since it is
more convenient to use a scalar feature notation even for these
fairly simple instances, and since the notion of scalar feature is
required anyway for the analysis of the sense of adjectives and ad¬
verbs (of degree) within a componential framework, I shall retain
the notion of scalar feature.
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status of the various lexical categories (§ 5.322) will
lead to the same result.
The four categories case, gender, countability, and
number provide the basic secondary functional features.
In addition we shall have to recognize (±negative) and
(±qu<§stion) on pres, and (±specified) (NBl Not equal to
the feature (±specific) sometimes found applied to the
indefinite article) introduced by (+plural) and (icondi-
tional) introduced by (-plural), on ind. The feature
(±specified) is simply considered to indicate whether
(+plural) refers to a specific number greater than "one",
or just to "more than one". The two features (±negative)
and (±question) on pres are in a sense contextual in that
they are related to the illocutionary force indicators
(Searle, 1969:3o ff) of the utterance containing the NP
the structure of which is under analysis.
Furthermore, it is possible to accomodate the distinc¬
tion between first, second, and third order entities1 by
positing a scalar feature (n° entity) on gen, introduced
by a positive value of the basic denotative feature (±en-
tity) on L _ — cf. § 5.321. Such a distinction allows
pj.6S
a more refined treatment than the usual distinction in
terms of (±abstract). Yet it also introduces a consider¬
able number of complications stemming, in the main, from
1 See Lyons (1968:§ 8.1.1o) for first and second order nominals;
third order entities, essentially, are denotata of propositions,
etc., i.e. facts, etc.
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the fact that these orders have rather blurred edges. I
shall therefore not attempt to incorporate the distinc¬
tion in the formal framework although I shall, on occasion,
make use of the terms "first-", "second-", and "third-order
entity".
The secondary subcategorization rules (2 SR) growing






















The notation to the right of the single stroke in
2 SR i. expressed the condition that the choice of case
on pres is predetermined by the case governing N; and
that in 2 SR vii. a. that part must have been specified
as (-fcount) for (±plur) to be available on ind.
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5.312 Lexical reflexes of DC.
The secondary features on DC leave their trace on the
lexical string only after subjunction (chapter 6) has ap¬
plied. However, the DC's themselves have lexical reflexes
which are associated with their metaphysical origin, viz.
"all" (pres), "kind" (gen), "some" (part), and "one" (ind).
I shall regard these as primitives. This is against the
common (logical) view of them. "Kind" is not accorded
operational status in logical systems, and "one" is gen¬
erally subsumed under "some". Of the remaining two, "all"
and "some", one is usually taken as primitive, the other
as derived (from the one taken as primitive plus negation)
— cf. e.g. Reichenbach (1947:91 ff). The fact that it
cannot be decided which of them is the primitive, however,
might suggest that they are equally basic in some sense.
It is in this sense that I take "all", "some", "kind" and
"one" as primitives in the linguistic system. One conse¬
quence of such a view is that it makes us less dependent
upon negation. (Cf. Anderson, 1973b; 1974a; 1975b for an
analysis of the linguistic quantifiers in terms of nega¬
tion) . More specific justification for the position taken
here will be given below (§ 6.3 and chapter 8).
5.32 Denotative features.
The denotative features are, I suppose, the nearest
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equivalent in the present framework to the •classical'
semantic features like (ihuman), (tabstract), etc.
Since the theoretical basis for operating with de¬
notative features at all is the possibility of converting
'classical' semantic features into denotative conditions
on level zero entities (cf. chapter 2), the denotative
features — like the primary features and, to some ex¬
tent at least, the functional features — have a meta¬
physical basis; and just as we could speak of a funda¬
mental primary feature, (universal), we can speak of a
fundamental denotative feature, which I shall call (±en-
tity). Beginning from this feature we can — by definition
and in principle — derive all denotative specifications
by a process of systematically choosing one of the values
on whatever subsequent features we introduce.
5.321 ..... on L
£res.
Seuren's principle of 'top to bottom' for lexical in¬
sertion implies that (tentity) is a feature on The
pr6S •
only other feature on Lpres (in English) is (tperson),
which is introduced by (+entity). Thus the initial frag¬
ment of denotative feature specification is:
(5:5) 2 SR ii. a. ^pres + (ientity)
b. tentity (tperson)
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By saying that the rules in (5:5) are the only rules
applicable to hpres I an in fact saying that these rules
are enough to specify the possible range of lexicaliza-
tion for LThe lexical rules (LR) to which (5:5)
pr6 s •
gives rise are
(5:6) LR ii. a. pentityl _ ,people,L+personJ
b" &rsol] -
c. -entity 'place1
This, I shall argue, is the possible range for lexical-
ization of L in English. L is, in English and, gen-
pres pres
erally, in Indo-European, usually empty. The features in
terms of which it is subcategorized (i.e. (5:5)) are
carried downwards in the hierarchy to L which is theJ
gen
node under which lexical nouns are generated. It seems,
therefore, that we have a clear instance of multiplication
of entities beyond the call of necessity. This is not so.
What is implied is a special status for these three lex¬
emes in English. If we can show that they in fact have a
special status we have gone some way towards justifying
the presence of L
pr6s •
First of all, if they do have a special status it would
correlate with the basic metaphysical distinction between
entities (things and people) and places (cf. Strawson,
1959:36 ff).
Secondly, such a status would explain the availability
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of these three lexemes against all others ("today of all
days" is a reduplication which is not relevant in the
present respect) for the register of angry and surprised
English in exclamations like
(5:7) (a) he gave roe a spanner of all things?
(b) I heard that joke from a priest of all people!
(c) the teapot was in the catbox of all places!
Thirdly, it is the feature-specifications in (5:5)
which are realized as the second component of the pro¬
nominal forms "somebody", "something", "somewhere", etc.,
though not "sometime(s)", "someone", and "somehow", which
all involve L. . and — for "sometimes" — possibly a
recursion. Notice, incidentally, that the 'pronominal'
form of "at all time(s)" involves an etymologlcally spatial
lexeme, "always".
Furthermore, expressions like "that pencil-thing you
optionally (cf. § 7.1).
These various facts have led to the conclusion that the
three lexemes 'people*, 'thing', and 'place' not only cog-
nitively are the most superordinate lexical nouns in Eng¬
lish, but that this superordinate status is in fact re¬
flected in their referential (and syntactic) potential;
and this in turn has led to the conclusion that their
greater referential potential can be accounted for on the
gave me" are explicable on the assumption that
leaves behind a trace on L
pres
which can be lexicalized
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basis of a derivationally special status, viz. as deriving
from L
pres.
Notice finally that possible lexicalizations of Lpreg
occur in French (tout-la-monde), and Danish (allandsens;
a slightly archaic phrase found almost exclusively in the
fixe*'- collocation "maa allandsens ulykker rarame dig" (=
"may all possible misfortunes befall thee"); a translit¬
eration would be "all-the-country's misfortunes"? and
alverdenst less archaic and more productive, it may be
transliterated as "all-the-world's ").
The noteworthy thing about these expressions is their
obvious correlation with 'place', and their setting of
bounds, as it were, for the occurrence of the things de¬
noted by the headnoun. They may quite easily be seen as
establishing a spatial universe of discourse (cf. (5:9)
belowX Tout-le-monde has the peculiarity that it 'refers'
to people although it 'lexicalizes' (-entity).
Both the English, the French, and the Danish expres¬
sions are idiomatic. This correlates well with the sug¬
gestion (mentioned in passing and to be gone into more
specifically in § 7.12) that pres-L, though an integral
part of the referential structure of language, is not
systematically exploited in Indo-European to the extent
to which it is exploited by languages with numeral clas¬
sifiers.
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5.322 on L and L .
— — <?en part,
Although a provisional account of the distinction be¬
tween the two primary features (elective) and (selective)
was given before (§ 4.23) , the main distinction between
them has had to await the general discussion of lexical
insertion for its clarification. Let us approach this
question by explaining the considerations behind the
choice of the term "elective" itself. It has a slight
but indubitable historical link with the problems we are
investigating:
sometimes he (i.e. George Boole) calls the
letters x, y, £, ac., elective symbols,
thinking of thera as symbols which elect
(i.e. select) certain things for attention.
(Kneale & Kneale, 1962t4o7)
Immediately before this quoted passage they comment
on Boole's propensity not to distinguish sharply between
adjectives and class-symbols, and on the fact that his
notation for intersecting classes, xy, in terms of simple
concatenation was influenced by "the way in which we
string adjectives together when we are trying to specify
some narrowly defined class" (Kneale & Kneale, 1962:4o7).
Although Boole apparently — i.e. if the report by
Kneale & Kneale is exhaustive — begs certain questions,
especially concerning the nature of word-classes and the
functional distinction between restrictive and non-restrict-
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ive uses of adjectives, the parallelism between adjectives
and class-symbols is an important one. Ey interpreting
Boole's propensity as an embryonic development of Bach's
(1966) derivation of nouns from underlying predicates
we can turn it to our advantage in a natural way, espec¬
ially if we can avoid the implicit commitment to predica-
tional analysis.
Let us therefore follow Bach's hypothesis of noun de¬
rivation a step further to the refinement given to it by
Anderson (1973a:75). Although the viewpoint is still pred-
icational, Anderson provides a specification that allows
us to disregard the predicational basis. He distinguishes
the three major traditional word-classes from each other
by means of the two features (±substantive) and (istative)
in the following way:
(5:8) nouns adjectives verb3
subst(antive) + - -
stat(ive) + +
Adjectives are further subdivided as either essential
or contingent (loc. cit.).
Disregarding the feature-specification for verbs I
shall say that L is inherently specified by one of Ander¬
son's feature-notations, so that whatever comes to be
dominated by L inherently specified as (+subst +stat) is
a noun and whatever comes to be dominated by L inherently
specified as (-subst +stat) is an adjective. As for the
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status of what jLs coming to be dominated by L at all,
see below, § 5.5.
The immediate problem is now to determine which L is
specified as what and, in particular, whether a given
specification is permanently associated with a particular
L. Among the considerations necessary to solve this prob¬
lem some are of a grammatical nature since some of the
problems sure related to the constituent structure of
surface NP. Disregarding determinatives, quantifiers, and
classifiers — which are all held to be dominated by DC
— the three traditional parts of speech considered to
participate in NP structure are nouns, adjectives, and
adverbs, or, in Jespersen's terminology, primaries, sec¬
ondaries, and tertiaries, which are the names given to
the traditional word-classes as syntactic functors.
The mention of Jespersen here is not fortuitous. In
his explanation of "junction" and "adjuncts" (1924:lo8)
he speaks in metaphorical terms, and although what he
says is somewhat general and intuitive it is certainly
true. What is more, it has a direct bearing on the problem:
the method of attaining a high degree of special¬
ization is analogous to that of reaching the roof
of a building by means of ladders: if one ladder
will not do, you first take the tallest ladder you
have and tie the second tallest to the top of it,
and if that is not enough, you tie on the next in
length, etc. In the same way, if widow is not spec¬
ial enough, you add poor, which is less special
than widow, and yet, if it is added, enables you
to reach farther in specialization; if that does
not suffice you add the subjunct very, which
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in itself is much more general than poor.
Widow is special, poor widow more special
and very poor widow still more special,
but very is less special than poor, and
that again than widow.
(Jespersen, 1924:lo8)
Although Jespersen is supposedly concerned with giving
a grammatical account of the mechanisms of subordination,
junction and adjuncts, he is in fact quite clearly giving
a referential account in the quoted passage. The appeal
to 'specialization* is only intelligible if he is think¬
ing of the relative sizes of the classes whose members
constitute the extension of the words widow, poor widow,
and very poor widow.
Such a progressive specialization is essentially what
is expressed in the hierarchical structure with which we
operate. Viewing the referential branch from this angle
we can interpret the referential phrases which constitute
it in the following way:
(5:9) the extension of pres-L « the universe of discourse;
the extension of gen-L = the class of things whose
members belong to the kind of thing spoken about in
the universe of discourse;
the extension of part-L =» the class of things whose
members belong to a given subclass of the class
whose members belong to the kind of thing spoken
about in the universe of discourse;
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the extension of ind-L « the class of things whose
members are the individuals belonging to (a par¬
ticular subclass of) the kind of thing spoken about
in the universe of discourse.
Taking these things into consideration, the simplest
hypothesis we can formulate is the following:
(5:lo) LgQn is inherently specified as (+subst +stat)
so that what is dominated by appears as a
surface noun; Lpart is inherently specified as
(-subst +stat), so that what is dominated by
Lpar appears as a surface adjective.
L in so far as it is directly lexicalized, domin-
prcs,
ates either 'thing', 'people', or 'place', and is therefore
(presumably) also inherently specified as (tsubst +stat).
Lfna as will appear later, is considered to dominate, what
appears as superficial adverbials, in particular adverbs
of space, time, and degree.
The denotative feature-specification under Lgen will
thus be lexicalized by what was called a lexical noun
(cf. § 4.3), whereas the denotative feature-specifica¬
tion under L will be lexicalized, per analogiam, by
pSlTu
a lexical adjective.
The strategy for lexical insertion now implies that we
can interpret what is generally known as selection re¬
strictions between nouns and adjectives in terms of det-
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ermination between clusters of denotative features, so
that the feature-specification under L^en determines the
feature-specification under L . and is itself determined
part
by the specification on L Consider by way of example
prss •
(5s11) the little boy was quiet
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I leave out for the moment the question of lexicali-
zation of L. , — cf. § 5.323. "DF" is an abbreviation
lna
for "denotative feature". I shall employ this as a var¬
iable rather than attempt to set up a system of actual
denotative features, like (±adult), which might have been
relevant in the specification of L in (5:12). QUAL is
gen
also a variable which ranges over a number of denotative
features which in some «fay or other are connected with
qualities. I shall not go into detail over these in the
present work, but a few remarks concerning them will be
made in the last chapter.
To return to the point at issue. In (5:12) 'boy' is
seen to lexicalize the feature-specification under Lgen
What actual features occur under L . however, is deter-
gen
mined by the occurrence of (+entity tperson) on L „
pr©S •
This specification would prevent a feature-specification
on i»gen which would be lexicalized, for example, by 'house'.
Going further down, the specification of L determines
gen
the specification on L„ . The actual features which sub-
pdixu •
categorize i»part — and which are lexicalizable by 'little'
— are compatible with the actual features occurring on
L A different specification on L . — say, one that
gen. part
was lexicalizable by 'rancid' — will be precluded by the
actual features occurring on L in (5:12). That it is
gen
in fact the specification for nouns that determines the
specification for adjectives is clear from the fact that
"rancid" is understood to apply to butter (and perhaps a
very restricted range of edibles besides). This can only
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be explained on the assumption that the specification for
•butter' is implicit in, or, in my terms, is higher in the
hierarchy than the specification for 'rancid'.
It could perhaps be argued that not only the denotative
features, but also the functional features were involved
in this determination, and so it could well be for gender.
However, it cannot be so for case. Cf. with (5:11),
(5:13) the little house was quiet
Apart from the actual denotative features, the under¬
lying representation of (5:13) differs from (5:12) only
on one point. Instead of Lpres being specified as (+en-
tity +person) as in (5:12), it is specified as (-entity)
in the structure underlying (5:13). It is this difference
that is behind the different ranges of paraphrasability
allowed by (5:11) and (5:13):
(5:14)(a) it was quiet in the little house
(b) *it was quiet in the little boy
Unless some radical reorganization of the SS-component
is contemplated, both "the little boy" and "the little
house" are governed by nom, nom being the only obligatory
case (Anderson, 1971a:37). In order to account for the
assymmetric paraphrases in (5:14) we cannot, therefore,
simply let"the little house" be governed by loc in the
SS-component. Anderson's solution (1971a:96-7) is to con¬
sider a (tentative) notion of 'reflexive locative clause'
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where loc is imposed on nora.
The two different specifications for L suggested
pr6S
here, however, not only account neatly for the para¬
phrases in (5:14) but also highlight an important point
in the distinction between entities and places.
If the choice between (tentity) and (-entity) was det¬
ermined by the case on pres, so that (-entity) depended
on loc (and perhaps aM), whereas (tentity) depended on
nom (and erg), we could not account for the fact that
language exploits the possibility of regarding entities
as locations (and perhaps vice versa: cf. Scotland beat
England). What is needed, and what the present analysis
supplies, is a distinction between an 'extra-nominal' and
an 'intra-nominal* source for locative. The former is
characterized by the presence of loc in the SS-structure,
the latter by (-entity) on L in the RS-structure.
pres
Let me finally point out that not all nominals in
which L is lexicalized by 'house' have L „ specified
gen pres
as (-entity). It would be specified as (+entity -person)
in e.g. "the little house collapsed".
5.323 .... and on l»^nd
So far we have been concerned with denotative features
on L and L___. or, in line with the suggestions
pxr65 f gen f p«r u /
&
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towards the end of chapter 2, with features which estab¬
lish categorial locations. We shall now look into the
features on I»ind which establish spatio-temporal loca¬
tions.
However, since the justification for the position ad¬
opted here presupposes a number of points not yet raised,
I shall only give a general putline here and postpone the
more detailed discussion to the chapter on determinatives,
with which Lind is intimately connected (see § lo.3).
The two central features on ar® (±space) and
(±time). In addition to these, a scalar feature, (n degree),
is required, which, however, may possibly be a scalar var¬
iant of (±space). At least a case could be made for re¬
garding degree as some sort of abstract spatial ordering
along a vertical axis. For the time being, however, I
leave (n degree) out of account.
The rule that introduces the two basic features on
Lind iss
(5:15) 2 SR vili. a. Llna -
Introduced by either (+space) or (+time) is a feature
(iproximate) — cf. Lyons (1973:73 ff)1:
i
It is immediately obvious that this paper by Lyons is the main
source of inspiration for my treatment of these and a good many
other phenomena. As for my reasons for occasionally departing
from Lyons* exposition (e.g. by introducing (ispace) and (±time)
as features in addition to Lyons' (tentity) ), cf. § lo.3.
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(5:16) 2 SR viii. b. j+space)
\+time J (iproximate)
The various combinations allowed by these two rules
give rise to the following lexicalizations:












































The numerals subscripted to "there" and "then" are em¬
ployed by Lyons (1973) (though for "there" only; he does
18o
not consider the temporal adverbs) — following Allan
(1971) who in turn interprets Jespersen's (1949: § 3.1!)
distinction between existential "there" and local "there"
in these terms — to distinguish a weak (1) from a strong
(2) non-proximate deictic adverb. I interpret Lyons' dis¬
tinction as a synchronic parallel to the diachronic dis¬
tinction established by Pilch (1968:176; 197o:22 and § 29)
in the Old English deictic system between "swache Deixis"
and "starke Deixis" over and above the proximity system
"Jenerdeixis" and "Dieserdeixis". Lyons' and Pilch's an¬
alyses thus support each other — in a manner similar to
that in which Christophersen's / Jespersen's diachronic
analysis of "a" is supported by, and supports, Perlmut-
ter's synchronic analysis of "a" — so as to highlight
the appropriateness of working with two deictic axes in
the description of (modern) English.
I shall exploit the possibility which in this way offers
itself as a basis for my account of the two ways in which
individuation may take place(Searle, 1969:86; cf. above,
p. 9o): by description or by ostension. Since in both
cases individuation takes place, ind-L must be present in
the underlying structure of both kinds of individuating
phrase. The difference between them — as yet stated only
in barest outline — is that purely descriptive identifying
phrases involve lexicalization of Lind which do not contain
a strong deictic (spatial or temporal). In effect this
means that only LR viii.a. is involved in purely
181
descriptive identifying phrases, whereas the rest of the
LR's displayed in (5s17) are involved either in the der¬
ivation of purely ostensive identifying phrases, or in
'mixed* (i.e. subsuming both descriptive and ostensive
elements) identifying phrases.
It is clear that purely descriptive identifying phrases
rely on categorial location, whereas ostensive phrases
rely on spatio-temporal location. And since categorial
locations are established by L and L . (and, some-
gen part
times, L „ ), it follows that the weak deictics indicate
pres
that the entity being talked about 'exists' in the sense
that they guarantee that the categorial locations estab¬
lished under L and L . may have entities of level
gen part
zero assigned to them. The weak deictics indicate that
the feature-specifications which determine them are 'cor¬
rect' , i.e. that they specify a meaning that can be lexical-
ized.
This is also inherent in the strong deities. The strong
deictics may therefore be interpreted as encapsulating the
weak deictics plus an element of proximity.
5.4 Summary, statement of rules, and sample derivation.
The basic distinction in the referential theory is be¬
tween deixis and denotation. This distinction is reflected
by the recognition of two types of operational category,
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functional categories (DC) and lexical categories (L).
These occur in ordered pairs, called referential phrases,
with DC determining L. The referential phrases are extra¬
polations from a set of five primary subcategorization
features on N, and are themselves further specified for
lexical insertion by a process of secondary subcategori¬
zation. The basic secondary features on DC account for
the four traditional categories of case, gender, countabil-
ity, and number, and the lexical reflexes of DC are "all",
"kind", "some", and "one".
The secondary features on L are the equivalents of
the 'classical' semantic features (or components). These
are regarded as being lexicalized (by a lexeme, but cf.
S 5.5). In addition, each L is inherently specified for
syntactic function, so that what occurs under L _ comes
gen
out as a noun, whereas that which occurs under L . comes
part
out as an adjective and that under Lind as an adverb.
I recognize three distinct kinds of rule, one of which
is further subdivided into a set of primary and a set of
secondary rules: primary (1 SR) and secondary (2 SR) sub-
categorization rules, determination rules (DR), and lex¬
ical rules (LR). The rules we have been considering in
the preceding pages are displayed in (5:18).
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(5:18)
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On the basis of these rules we can now give a sample




































by all <f> kind girl some pretty five there.
then2
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5.5 N and NP reconsidered.
We shall return to the subsequent history of (5s19) in
the next chapter# which is concerned with the transforma¬
tional part of the theory. In the meantime we shall re¬
consider N and NP on the basis of (5:19). A NP, it was
said (§ 4.3), is a N plus 'the words' inserted under the
nodes which constitute N. I can now be somewhat more ex¬
plicit as to the precise meaning of "'the words'" in this
connection.
The point at issue is in fact the theoretical status
(if any) of the broken lines connecting subcategorized
category symbols and what is inserted under them. So far
I have simply said that this material is dominated by a
category symbol without any indication as to what this
term might cover.
I want to suggest that (5:19) in its entirety is a
formal representation of a sign? more specifically, of a
Saussuro-Hjelmslevian (biplane) sign, in which the broken
lines represent the sign-function (in Hjelmslev's terms),
i.e. the relation between content-plane and expression
-plane. This relation is said (by Hjelmslev, 1943:45) to
be solidarity (i.e. interdependence between functives
(terms) in the language system). On this interpretation
of (5:19) what is at the lower end of the broken lines
should be regarded as the expression-plane, whereas that
which is at the top is the content-plane.
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We see then that the term N(ominal) as employed here
Is a semantic term. It is the term for the part of the
content-form which structures the amorphous n^buleuse
into the content-substance of a NP (for these terms, see
Hjelmslev, 1943:§ 13). NP, on the other hand, is the term
for a sign which is capable of performing specific syn¬
tactic functions.
It is clear that I to some degree contravene the tenet
of solidarity between expression and content, but this is
a situation that is foreseen by Hjelmslev:
It follows that — except by artificial isolation
— there cannot be a content without an expression
or an expression without content
(Hjelmslev, 1943:45; my transl. and emphasis).
In order to arrive at a precise characterization of
the referential properties of NP's I have artificially
isolated their content: the symbol of this artificial
isolation is N.
I can now also be a little more specific about the
status of the material inserted under L. Since L in a
sense is the category that structures the content-plane,
we expect that what is inserted under it structures the
expression-plane, end this, in fact, is the case. I sug¬
gest that what appears under L is a root (in Matthews'
sense — cf. Matthews, 197o, esp. p. lo9? also 1974:4o),
and that L (plus the secondary features on L) enters a
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function (contracts a relation) with the root under it.
This function constitutes a lexeme (in Lyons' and Matthews'
sense) or a semanteme (in Hjelmslev's (1928:198 ff) sense).
A lexeme is a word endowed not only with meaning but also
with the potentiality of syntactic function.
With respect to the formulation of rules in (5:18) we
now see that those LR's which introduce LEXEME are in fact
simplifications. It is the combination of a feature-spec¬
ification and a root that yields a lexeme. However, this
simplification is innocuous since we are mainly interested
in the semantic properties of NP's. I shall therefore say





If (5:19) is a reasonable means for determining the
deep structural properties of "(by) all those five pretty
girls", obviously we need a set of rules that will ensure
that the items constituting the terminal string appear in
correct surface order. Whereas conventional transformation¬
al rules may not only change the order of the categories
referred to in the structural analysis of a given T-rule,
9
but may also add and delete material (not) generated by
the phrase structure rules, the question of sequentiality
for our purposes seems to have top priority, although ob¬
viously some form of deletion is required to account for
"kind" and "some" in (5:19). This matter, however, is
linked with the question of serialization. We recognize
this priority by developing what I shall refer to as a
system of serialization rules.
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The surface order of the elements in an English NP al¬
lows a certain amount of fluctuation within a stable,
basic scheme, a fluctuation which to a large extent is
due to the possibility of a number of adjectival modi¬
fiers occurring with the same noun (cf. e.g. Goyvaerts,
1968; Sussex, 1974), and also to a number of idiosyncrat¬
ic properties of certain quantifiers, notably "all"'.
However, the rules we need in o^der to transform a
terminal string like that in (5:19) into an acceptable
surface string all conform to the basic principle of
subjunction, which is motivated on independent grounds
in other compartments of the grammar1. In addition to
the serialization rules a number of morphophonemic rules
1 Anderson (1971c). Cf. also Hjelmslev's (1943:§ 18) account of syn¬
cretism with which subjunction is at least closely related if not
identical. In particular, whereas the special case of syncretism
which Hjelmslev calls "sammenfald" ("coalescence") — in which all
or none of the functives entering the syncretism are superficially
manifest — seems to correlate with subjunction, the special case
called "implikation" ("implication") — where one or more members
are manifest — correlates with adjunction. However, in adjunction
all functives involved may be superficially realized, entering am
appositive serialization. Furthermore, it is not clear (to me) how
Hjelmslev's distinction between "resoluble" and "irresoluble" syn¬
cretisms should be handled at the content-plane for more complex
cases of syncretism than the fairly simple case of nominative/ac¬
cusative in Latin which he adduces as an example. We shall need
to operate with such more complex cases of subjunction — in par¬
ticular involving the quantifier-'functives'. I therefore re¬
strict myself to pointing out that subjunction and syncretism
are two closely related, though hardly isomorphic, processes.
Cf. also Siertsema (1955:ch. X) who, like me, finds diffi¬
culties in clearly establishing the importance of syncretism
at the content-plane. She concludes that "Syncretism is only
an expression-phenomenon" (p. 191).
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are required; we come to those presently.
6.2 Lexical and RP-subjunction.
Subjunction may affect the referential branch in one of
two ways. Either an L may be subjoined to a DC, or a DC
may be subjoined to a higher DC; in both cases the sub¬
joined element carries its dependents with it. I shall
refer to the first type as lexical subjunction, to the
second as R(eferential) P(hrase)-subjunction. Each type
may be illustrated as follows:
(6:1)
Both types of subjunction may be involved in the der¬
ivation of a given NP. In that case lexical subjunction
precedes RP-subjunction, possibly with one exception (cf.
i lo.22).
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We shall go into the two types of subjunction in some
detail during the discussion in the next part, but in the
meantime a few general points should be made.
The main task for lexical subjunction is pronominali-
zation. Its effect — to subjoin L under DC — is to con¬
vert a 'lexical' word into a functional' word.
Lexical subjunction may be regarded partly as a dia-
chronic, partly as a synchronic process. It is diachronic
in the sense that a number of present day English func¬
tional items can be explained on the basis of a conflation
of DC and L which has occurred in time. Consider for ex¬
ample modern English "each" and "every". The usual etym¬
ology of these is (for "each") a West Germanic phrase,
*aiwo lalikaz, meaning "ever alike" (Onions, Btym.; NED,
art. each). This phrase becomes Old English (West Saxon)
'fcelc" by a number of historical phonological rules. Then,
in Old English, the process repeats itself. " aelg" is mod¬
ified by " asfre" (® "ever"), and the resultant phrase,
" aifre aalc " , develops phonologically into modern English
"every".
However, what is of interest in these developments from
the point of view of subjunction is that in each case a
temporal element is involved, especially when compared to
the in many ways parallel development of Latin "quidam"
( dum > -dam, with temporal meaning; cf. Ernout & Meillet,
Etym., artt. dum, quidam, and guls). I have already indi¬
cated that the place of origin in the referential branch
for such temporal deictic adverbs is Lin(i On this assump¬
tion, therefore, the historical development of "each",
"every", and "quidam" can be regarded as the result of a
lexical sub junction involving plus one or more of
the functional categories, at least from a semantical
viewpoint.
However, although such considerations can have a cer¬
tain amount of interest for a synchronic assessment of,
in this case "each" and "every" (cf. Vendler, 1967:77),
they cannot alone serve as a synchronic account of these
items. Yet it so happens that, from a purely synchronic
viewpoint, the differences between "each" and "every" can
be accounted for on the basis of (lexical) subjunction
(cf. chs. 9 and lo) .
RP-subjunction is a natural consequence of the second¬
ary subcategorization-specification on DC. It was argued
above that pres is the node that 'preserves' the case
which governs N, that gen is subcategorized for gender,
part for countability, and ind for number. Now it is ob¬
vious that, in the Indo-European languages at least, these
categories are not only relevant for the L that they det¬
ermine or which determines them — for arguments in favour
of regarding adjectives as countable and uncountable, cf.
Plank (1976:26) —but for the NP in general. This is of
course especially apparent in case languages like German
and Latin, and in gender languages like German, French,
Danish, and Latin. Consider by way of illustration the NP
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In a Ciceronean sentence like
(6:3) Primum enim numero definieram genera ciuitatum
trla probabilia, ... (De Re Publica II xxxix 65)
Disregarding for the moment the adnominal genitive
("ciuitatum"), the derivation of this NP is considered to
occur in the following stages (employing the traditional
case labels for Latin):
(6:4) (a) .
(I have simplified the representation in a number of
respects not central to the issue).
There is contextual evidence to suggest that the NP at
hand is definite. How the question of definiteness is to
be solved for Latin I do not know; for English, however,







4 4 geno-4 probabil- tr- gl
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within the referential phrase ind-L, L is subjoined to
ind). I shall therefore assume that the same applies to
Latin. No other pronominalizations are involved, so no
further lexical subjunctions apply. The outcome of RP-sub-
junction then yields
(6:4)(b)
The form given to the lexical reflexes is a — possibly
misguided — attempt to capture the ablaut-peculiarities
of the roots involved; thus a diachronic element is in¬
troduced into what should perhaps rather be regarded as
a strictly synchronic representation. This point, however,
is of minor importance to us, but cf. Matthews (197o:lo4 f).
6.3 The morphophonemic carriage.
acc
ind L
(tr-) (probabil-) (geno-) (ff)
The derived string in (6:4 b) can be regarded as a
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string of lexemes inserted in a string of brackets labelled
by the category-nodes that dominate them, as indicated.
These labelled brackets are part of the nominal structure.
However, they are associated with what I shall refer to
as a morphophonemlc carriage. This is a compartment into
which the secondary functional features are inserted dur¬
ing RP-subjunction. Furthermore, this compartment is bi¬
partite. It contains two case-entries, one inserted di¬
rectly from the case-node that governs N, and one from
pres. Initially these will be the same, of course, but
subsequent developments will make it clear that the entry
from the case-node is constant (positionally), whereas
the case-entry from pres may be moved, due to subjunc¬
tions of subordinate structures. That is to say, due to
subjunction, what starts out as a superordinate may, from
a case-viewpoint, end up as a subordinate, and vice versa.
We return to this and related points throughout part III.
The morphophonemic carriage may be represented as a
complex symbol, that is — relative to the NP at hand —










> (tr-) (probabil-) (geno-) (<rf)
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The morphophonemic rules can now be seen as instruc¬
tions to move the morphophonemic carriage through the
lexical string, imposing the subcategorial features con¬
tained in it on the lexical items as appropriate. With the
distinction between roots and lexemes in mind we then see
that the function of the morphophonemic carriage is to
convert lexemes into word-forms, i.e. to convert the ex¬
pression of a potential syntactic functor into an actual
syntactic functor.
All the information contained in the morphophonemic
carriage in (6;4 c) is relevant for each of the roots
of the NP under discussion. The internal order of elements
in a Latin NP is therefore governed by subsequent — pre¬
sumably stylistically and rhetorically determined — rules.
Let us now return to (5:19) to see what effect the two
subjunction processes have on that. The first noteworthy
point is that B(by) all those five pretty girls" — of
which (5:19) purports to be the underlying representation
— contains an element of definiteness: "those" is a def¬
inite determinative (or demonstrative).
There are two opposing views on the status of definite¬
ness (at least), one — represented by Robbins (1968:86-7)
and Thorne (1972) — according to which definiteness is
a non-basic notion; the definite article is transforma¬
tionally derived. And one — represented by Perlmutter
(1969), Postal (1966), S^rensen (1963:97) — according
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to which definiteness is a primitive notion; the definite
article cannot be analyzed away.
It has already been implied that I consider definiteness
to be non-primitive. It derives — in the present frame¬
work — from a lexical subjunction of ind-L (see §§ lo.3-4
for more detailed discussion and justification). Therefore
the first step in the subjunction process is a lexical
subjunction of ind-L. No further lexical subjunctions ap¬












Relative to this structure — which is already better
than (5:19) from the point of view of serialization — it
should be noticed that the contents correlated with the ex¬
pressions 'all', 'kind1, 'some', 'five',1there^', and 'then2*
2oo
have been conflated into one complex node. There is a
tendency towards what we might call — borrowing a term
from Pilch (1968:166) — 'monomorphemic' structure of
the expression, especially of functional signs (I remind
the reader of the reconsideration of N and NP in § 5.5).
That is to say, meaning-elements often and consistently
conflated will — in time — be expressed by morphologic¬
ally less and less complex forms, the limiting case being
a form consisting of only one morpheme (cf. the diachronic
development of "each" and "every" outlined above). The es¬
sence of subjunction is precisely to account for this
fact. Consider in this connection the discussion of the
semantic representations of "John gave me (his) help"
vs. "John helped me", where the latter displays subjunc¬
tion of a case-phrase, nom-N, under V, in Anderson (1971c:
1-4). Furthermore, it is one of the principles behind
Porzig's (1934) theory of syntagmatic sense relations.
With this in mind we can rearrange the string under
the subjoined DC's in (6:5) as indicated in (6:6):
(6:6)
kind




— where 'those' is the expression-element that is cor¬
related with the meaning of "kind", "some", "there1" and
"then2".
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6.4 The Mirror-Image Convention.
As it stands, (6:6) is completely arbitrary. We need to
show that some principles are involved in the serializa¬
tion of expression elements when they come to be domin¬
ated by the same (complex) node. The principle involved
is — with a term borrowed from Leech (1969) — the Mir¬
ror-Image (MI)- convention.
Note first that 'five' is required superficially. That
is, the meaning carried by ind is formally expressed in
the NP under discussion. Notice secondly that this need
not be the case. The NP "all those pretty girls" can in
appropriate circumstances be understood to mean "all those
five pretty girls". The requirement of formal expression
of ind will eventually run counter to the tendency towards
monomorphemic expression of complex nodes. What happens,











This is the parallel within the functional compartment
2o2
to the effect of subjunction on the lexical compartment,
which is to reverse the order of L's.
The two next steps in the RP-subjunction — which ap¬
plies cyclically, from the bottom upwards — will not










We then come to the last step, that involving pres-L.
If the Mi-convention is correctly stated, then clearly it
is not in operation here, since 'all' appears to the left
of the other expression elements associated with the fune
tional nodes in the surface string. The situation before









That is to say, the issue is between pres-L on the one
hand and the rest of the structure on the other. Observa¬







pretty girl all ^
This structure, it will be appreciated, is precisely the
2o4
structure underlying the variant of our NP, (6:11);
(6:11) those five pretty girls all (jilted John)
But how are we to account for our original NP, the one
that does not observe the Mi-convention? An approach to
this question is offered by an (in this connection) ex¬
tremely interesting footnote in Carden (1973:92 fn 2).
There Carden says that David Perlmutter has informed him
(by word of mouth) that there are dialects of (American)
English in which only (6:12 a) is acceptable, not (6:12 b):
(6:12)(a) the guests all began to arrive
(b) all the guests began to arrive
Carden therefore tentatively queries the basic status
normally accorded to structures like (6:12 b) in discus¬
sions of quantifier serialization.
What Carden's footnote implies (in my terms) is that
certain dialects of (American) English have obligatory
application of the full cycle of RP-subjunctions. Since
there is no monomorphemic functional item in English that
is analyzable into "all" + "the", the Mi-convention ap¬
plies at the last step, yielding (6:12 a). The corollary
of this is that in most dialects of English — at least
all of those with which I am familiar — subjunction of
a structure under pres is optional. If it applies, the
sense of "all" is either embodied in a monomorphemic ex¬
pression, or it is moved behind the subjoined structure
2o5
by the Mi-convention. If it does not apply, 'all' remains
at the front of the NP.
6.5 Adjunction.
However, the representation (6:lo) suggests that we
have missed out a step in the process of RP-subjunction,
a step which turns out to be required for the proper an¬
alysis of a large variety of phenomena.
From a certain viewpoint the L in a referential phrase
can be said to be adjoined to DC, and the referential
branch is itself a string of nodes, each one adjoined to
the one above it. Consequently, lexical subjunction is a
process by which an adjoined node, L, is moved from ad¬
junct position to subjunct position. It is this concept
of adjunction which we have missed out from the account
of RP-subjunction. We therefore revise that account by
saying that RP-subjunction is the last step in a two-step
process in which the first step adjoins a DC (plus its de¬
pendents) to another, higher, DC:
(6:13) v \
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The standard English dialects that allow "all the guests"
do not apply the second — subjoining — step to this struc¬
ture, whereas the dialects allowing only "the guests all"
must apply subjunction.
Although we in this way accomodate Carden's footnote
in a quite satisfactory manner, certain problems are still
manifest. Notice that the subjoining step applied to (6:9')
in combination with the Mi-convention will generate a de¬
rived string in which 'all' precedes the (usually zero)
reflex of L This implies that a NP like "those five
pres.
pencil all things" should be acceptable, which it obviously
is not. In contrast, "those five pencil-things all disap¬
peared" , although odd, does not violate the structure of
English NP's in the same way. We shall therefore explore
a possible alternative to the Mi-convention as a source
for "the guests all" in § 8.42.
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6.6 Preliminary comments on recursion.
The Cicerone&n NP employed to illustrate the operations
of subjunction and the associated morphophonemic rules in
(6:3) contains an adnominal case-phrase, superficially
realized as "ciuitatum". That is to say, "ciuitatum"
realizes a N which is subordinate to another N. The whole
NP in (6:3) is the realization of a referential tree with
two branches. These are what I shall call complex struc¬
tures. The derivation of complex structures involves re¬
cursion of the rules established throughout part II.
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trla probabilia genera 4 4 4 ciuitat- 4 4 4 4
Again I have simplified the structure in many respects.
Both types of subjunction apply to (6:15) and struc¬
tures like it, recursively and from the bottom up. How¬
ever, a number of niceties are involved in the derivation
of complex structures in English, mainly stemming from the
fact that the subordinate branch may be adjoined and sub¬
joined to a particular DC or L in the superordinate, thus
generating a string that is not necessarily delimitative.
Moreover, two different types of subordinate branch need
to be recognized. These points are too intricate to go in¬
to at the present stage. They will bo fully discussed at
appropriate junctures in part III, which is devoted to the
application of the theory.
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Chapter 7
Relevant Data from Other Languages
7.1 Languages with numeral classifiers.
Perhaps one of the most serious objections that can
be raised against the framework developed in the preced¬
ing sections concerns the status of the uppermost refer¬
ential phrase pres-L, even though there are phenomena of
English that are explicable on the assumption that it is
there (cf. § 5.321). What unnaturalness inheres in the
phrases whose analysis relies on lexicalization of L
prgs
stems from the fact that English usually leaves this node
empty, at least if L is lexicalized.
gen
However, if we leave English — and Indo-European in
general — and turn to languages which incorporate numer¬
al classifiers we will find ample support for pres-L1.
1
As a matter of historical fact I should like to point out that it
was not until after the framework above had been developed to ac¬
count for English NP's that I became aware of its applicability
to classifier-languages. My awareness of this point — as of in¬
numerable others — was awakened during a discussion with profes¬
sor John Lyons on the basic framework.
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7.11 The nature and functions of numeral classifiers.
A large number of languages1 display formally what
are generally called numeral classifiers, or simply clas¬
sifiers , for example Thai2, Burmese, Vietnamese, Tzeltal,
and Tarascan, from all of which examples will be drawn in
the following account.
Classifiers indicate to what semantic domain — in the
sense developed by Berlin (1968) — a given noun belongs.
Yet there is no one-to-one correlation between a noun and
a given classifier. The employment of a particular clas¬
sifier with a particular noun indicates rather the 'de¬
notative viewpoint' — to coin a hopefully intelligible
phrase — the denotatum of that noun is seen under on a
particular occasion, and all manner of stylistic, moral,
ironic and other delicacies may result from various de¬
grees of 'abnormal' use of a given classifier with a given
noun (apart from the downright unacceptable uses).
The use of classifiers is in some languages restricted
to instances of specific and non-specific enumeration, e.g.
in Burmese (cf. Burling, 197o:58? Okell, 1969:73) and
Tzeltal (Berlin, 1968:22-3), but not in Vietnamese and
Thai, where classifiers are also used with nouns modified
1 For good surveys cf. Friedrich (197o:4oo ff) and Greenberg (1972:2 fn 5).
2
I am indebted to Miss Napha Bhodtipaksa (a native speaker of Thai)
and Mr A. G. Smith for the Thai data.
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by 'indefinite determinatives' corresponding to English
"some", and demonstrative particles, or 'numerators',
corresponding to English "this", "that", etc. (cf., for
Vietnamese, Emeneau, 1951:84; for Thai, Haas, 1942). The
examples in (7:1) instantiate paradigm cases of classified
NP's in their respective languages:
(7:1) Burmese: kwei hna kaun (Burling, 197o:59)
• 'dog''two' C
Vietnamese: m§t con ch6 (Thompson, 1965:193)
'one' C 'dog'
Thai: maa song tua (informant)
* dog' 'two' C
Tzeltal: /2o§ - koht *5'12/ (Berlin, 1968:23)
'three' C 'dog'
The element 'glossed* as C is in each case the normal
classifier for animals in the four languages, sometimes
given the more explicit gloss 'animal-class'. The normal
English equivalent of these four phrases would be "one
(twor three) dog(s)".
Two matters are of immediate interest to us relative
to (7:1), viz. the question of number in connection with
(what I shall refer to as) the head noun (HN), i.e. kw£l,
ch6, maa, and /£* 12./, and the question of order.
We approach the first question by stating the hypothesis
formulated by Mary Sanches:
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(7:2) If a language includes in its basic mode of forming
quantitative expressions numeral classifiers, then
it will also have facultative expressions of the
plural. In other words it will not have obligatory
marking of the plural of nouns.
(Quoted from Greenberg, 1972:9)
Greenberg himself (loc. cit.) suggests a natural and
plausible alteration of a further point made by Sanches
— viz. that the classified noun is singular — accord¬
ing to which classified nouns (head nouns) are rather un¬
marked for the number distinction.
The head nouns involved in (7:1) all comply with this
hypothesis1. On the basis of Sanches' hypothesis and
1
Unfortunately, Berlin (1968) is not very explicit on this question.
Furthermore, his paraphrases are somewhat conflicting; cf. e.g. pp.
llo-l, where he gives these two examples with translations:
a. /hk'am laso/ 'one coiled rope'
b. /3a2&ahp laso/ 'two rope3 in coiled position'
/laso/ is the head noun, and it is obviously (?) the same form that oc¬
curs in both a. and b. To make matters worse, there is apparently at
least one plural morpheme in Tzeltal, /-ik/ (cf. p.176), which is ap¬
plicable not only to head nouns (e.g. p. 56 /winiketik/ 'men') but
also to what he calls an *attributivized temporary state classifier',
like /k'asemik/ 'broken objects^' (< trans, vb. /k'as/ 'to break by
hand' + /-em/ (attributive suffix) + /-ik/ (plural)) (p. 176).
It is in fact interesting that temporary state classifiers should
involve the number morpheme (it is not seen applied to any of the
classifiers which he calls 'inherent state classifiers') since this
correlates with the state of affairs in Tarascan (cf. (7:8)) in the
sense that the three Tarascan classifiers appear to denote contingent
— rather than essential — properties of the denotata of their head
nouns and the head noun there is 'counted' (i.e. morphologically
specified as plural).
However, as a. and b. above suggest, the head noun in Tzeltal is
not morphologically specified as plural, not even after 'temporary
state classifiers' like those involved in the quoted phrases. The
situation is therefore not entirely the same in the two languages.
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Greenberg's modification I set up the following, some¬
what more general thesis;
(7:3) If a construction x in language L is a
true classifying construction, then there
is no construction y in L that contrasts
semantically with x only by displaying
the opposite value of the feature (tplural)
on the head noun to that displayed by x.
Two slightly different situations are pertinent to an
evaluation of (7:3). It may be the case that a language
allows as grammatical the same classifying construction
with either a formally singular or formally plural head
noun. Then (7:3) predicts that the two constructions are
synonymous or, at least, referentially identical.
On this criterion we might then suggest that the Eng¬
lish NP's in (7:4) are "true1 classifying constructions:
(7:4) (a) a shoal of herrings
(b) a shoal of herring
It may also be the case that a given classifying con¬
struction allows only one number-specification on the
head noun. In that case there is no opposition. On this
criterion I then suggest that (7:5) contains a 'true'
classifying construction:
(7:5)(a) a kind of rose
(b) *a kind of roses
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Also on the first criterion will "kind of"-construc¬
tions be 'true' classifying constructions. There is no
semantic opposition between
(7:6)(a) some kinds of rose
(b) some kinds of roses
The point at issue is this. If a numeral is inserted
in a true classifying construction, what is being counted
is the denotata of the classifying element. If a numeral
is inserted in a construction which is not a true clas¬
sifying construction, what is being counted is the de¬
notata of the head noun. Thus there is a semantic (ref^
erential) opposition between the pairs in (7:7)
(7:7) (i) (a) one shoal of herring
(b) two shoals of herring
(ii)(a) one kind of rose
(b) four kinds of rose
But these oppositions concern "shoal" and "kind" rather
than "herring" and "rose".
If (7:3) is true as it stands then we note an interest¬
ing point relative to Tarascan. Friedrich (197o:382) pro¬
vides the following example and transliteration:
(7:8) jdim£-ni ica - ku hiwd-e - ca - ni
two 'longish' NOM 'coyote' plural objective
MORPH " case
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Here we have what is described by Friedrich as a num¬
eral classifier (ica-ku), consisting of the root ica-
and the nominalizing morpheme -ku. Yet we have the head
noun morphologically marked for plural as well, and
his discussion suggests that (7:8) is in genuine oppos¬
ition to the same example with hiw& (the lexeme meaning
"coyote") marked for singular and the numeral for "one"
inserted instead of ^img-nl. Cf. in particular his
Table 1 (p. 384) and his explanatory remarks to it. What
is being counted is the denotata of the head noun.
In consequence of this we have two options. We can
either regard Sanches' hypothesis as too strong, or we
can — in view of (7:3) — consider what possibilities
there are for not counting (7:8) among the true clas¬
sifying constructions. One such possibility will be
raised — tentatively — in the next section.
Greenberg (1972:14 f) is also relevant for the dis¬
cussion of the question of order in the classified NP.
He has found that of the six possible orders of Num(eral)
— Greenberg's Quantifier — C(lassifier) and H(ead)
N(oun), only four are actually realized in the languages
he has investigated. If we regard HN as the 'centre' of
the classified NP the various arrangements may be shown




















Surface order in classified NP.
1 The second line indicates that the numeral "one" ("nyng") may
either precede or succeed the classifier in Thai. Haas (1942:2o4)
relates this option to the quantifier/article distinction (which
I also apply to English — cf. ch. lo), so that "maa nyng tua" =
"one dog" , whereas "maa tua nyng" ™ "a dog".
2 This order is due to Burling (197o:59) and Okell (1969s2o9); Green-
berg (1963a:lo8) gives for Burmese Num-C-HN.
3
According to Greenberg (1963a:lo8).
% Berlin (1968:23)
s
Greenberg (1972:14); the specification given may, in fact, be in¬
correct since Greenberg does not state the order of HN relative
to the two possible orders of Num-C. Of these, the upper one is
due to influence from Assamese, again according to Greenberg.
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It is implicit in my attempt to derive support for
the structure developed to account for the referential
properties of English NP's by appealing to genetically
unrelated languages like Thai and Vietnamese that I sug¬
gest that this structure has some sort of universal ap¬
plicability. I would like to be able to show that the
structure accounts for the referential properties of
language, rather than of a language.
If this is at all a justifiable ambition, at least one
condition has to be met. I must be able to show that the
underlying order of the referential phrases is not fortu¬
itous. Now it could be asked why a universal base should
be ordered sequentially. My answer to this question is
that at least this 'universal base' has to be ordered
sequentially. The reason is this. Although the structure
developed to account for referential properties of NP's
is a theoretical, abstract construct, it is not an isolat¬
ed abstract construct. Its form and structure grows out
of the metaphysical basis which reflects the ways in
which we see things and speak about them. The order in
which the referential phrases occur in the referential
branch is imposed on them in a principled way by the meta¬
physical basis1. Rather than being open to criticisms of
1
The order which I have stated is one of two possible orders: the
mirror-image order would also be possible, provided we took the
possibility to speak about individuals as the superordinate notion.
However, such an order would have to account for the implicit pres¬
ence of "all" as the ultimate background group whether we speak
about individuals, sections, or kinds of things, in what to me
seems necessarily to be an ad hoc fashion.
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conceptualism — as is for example Hjelmslev's referential
theory (1943:§ 13) — the present theory lays itself open
to criticsims of perceptual!sm. It relies on the assump¬
tion — as yet not falsified, as far as I am aware —
that we can all perceive spatio-temporally discrete ob¬
jects against backgrounds: entities and places. Even Whorf
(1956:161-2) concedes this.
There is, however, no known way in which we can glean
a basic order from the variety of serializations dis¬
played in Table 2. On the other hand, we can let the
theory decide the question of underlying order and then
confront it with the empirical data in Table 2. Therefore
we now have to specify what the theory states concerning
classified structures.
I shall argue that all of (7:1) are accomodated by the
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In other words, I shall argue that the numeral clas¬
sifiers in the examples in (7:1) are lexicalizations of
pres-L, that the head nouns are lexicalizations of gen-L,
and that the numerals are lexicalizations of ind-L, draw¬
ing attention to the fact that I deliberately gloss over
what deictic/denotative distinctions these items may em¬
body; this is a harmless simplification for our present
purposes.
It is immediately apparent that the underlying order
predicted by this approach is in stark contrast to Table
2. It establishes the order C-HN-Num, which is one of the
two orders never realized superficially in any language,
according to Greanberg1.
However, Greenberg's account of surface order is not
exhaustive. Whereas it may be the case that only four
orders are realized when the element Num is a true num¬
eral ("one", "two", etc.), it is not the case that the
order predicted by the theory does not occur when Num is
a demonstrative element. It appears in Vietnamese; and,
what is more, if the head noun is modified by an attrib¬
utive element — corresponding to an English adjective-—
the surface order of the elements in a demonstrative NP
in Vietnamese reflects precisely the order of the phrases
1 The other, non-occurring order is Num-HN-C, and Greenberg suggests
by way of explanation of this that HN cannot intervene between the
members of what Okell (1969:2o9) calls the 'numeral compound* be¬
cause the relation between these two elements (i.e. Num and C) is
'stronger* than that between HN and either of them.
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The example, Vietnamese c£l cong g8 kia («= "that wooden
gate") is a slightly revised version of the example given
by Emeneau (1951:84): c&i c%ng g5 l6h kia (= "that big
wooden gate"). The second attributive element 16n (="to
be big") is excluded. As it stands in Emeneau, the example
probably involves a recursive structure, amalgamating the
Vietnamese equivalents of "that big gate" and "that wooden
gate". Note relative to the original example that if it
reflects the only acceptable order of the two attributive
elements, this, too, correlates with the order of the el¬
ements "big" and "wooden" in English (which is, of course,
the mirror-image of that of Vietnamese).
This obliging feature of Vietnamese structure leads nat¬
urally to a discussion of the referential r61e played by
numeral classifiers.
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One of the notions to which most importance is at¬
tached in discussions of numeral classifiers is the notion
of individuation (thus, e.g. Greenberg, 1972). I said
above that there are two ways in which to achieve indi¬
viduation, one which involves lexicalization of by
at least one strong deictic — what we might call spatio
-temporal individuation — and one involving lexicaliza¬
tion of only be weak deictics plus lexicalization of
L
„ and L . — what we could call categorial individua-
gen part
tion. Often the two ways are interrelated in a given
phrase.
Relative to this distinction there seems to be no
reason to assume that the numeral classifiers are in any
way specifically concerned with spatio-temporal individu¬
ation. From my — rather limited — knowledge of classi¬
fier languages it seems rather to be the case that, if a
language employs a numeral classifier in demonstrative
phrases, it also employs a classifier in simple enumerat-
ive phrases, whereas the reverse does not necessarily
hold (Vietnamese and Thai vs. Burmese and Tzeltal). Since
only demonstratives, and not only numerals, presuppose
lexicalization of by a strong deictic, it seems to
be the case that it is the presence of ind-L in a refer¬
ential branch that is of relevance for an evaluation of
the function of numeral classifiers. To this extent Green-
berg's (and others') appeal to individuation is borne out
by the present analysis.
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7.12 Case vs. classifier.
The few points made in the preceding section concern
the most directly relevant traits of numeral classifiers
for the referential theory. In this section, on the other
hand, I shall present the rudiment of a speculative hy¬
pothesis into the details of which time has not permitted
me to go. It is, however, a sound hypothesis in the sense
that it is easily falsifiable by anyone who has greater
knowledge of the general structure of classifier languages
than I.
It is generally accepted, I think, that there are (at
least) two distinct kinds of classifier, semantically.
For example, Okell (1969s2o9-lo) recognizes for Burmese






Of these four subclasses, (c) and (d) can be collapsed.
Furthermore, (a) and (b) may be regarded as variants of
each other, (a) presupposing (-count), (b) presupposing
(+count) on part. The class into which (a) and (b) fall
may be called partitive, that into which (c) and (d)
fall, generic. Examples (from Okell, 1969:21o-13) are:
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(7s12)(a) yei hna hkwe
water two cup = "two cupfuls of water"
(b) nwa hna hyin
ox two yoke "two yokes of oxen"
(c) da hna hcaun
knife two long thing » "two knives"
(d) hkwe hna hkwe
cup two cup = "two cups"
(I have omitted the diacritics to indicate tones).
Despite Berlin's (1968:18o) warning against relying on
a simple schema of class-inclusion when dealing with num¬
eral classifiers, one interesting feature relative to
(7:12) can be brought out in such simple terms. Repres¬
ented in Venn diagrams, (a) and (b) conform to (7:13 a)
whereas (c) and (d) conform to (7:13 b):
That is, from a RS-viewpoint the extension of HN in
(7:13 a) constitutes the background group for the deno¬
tata of C. In (b) the situation is reversed. From a syn¬
tactic viewpoint (of serialization), however, all of (7:





One more observation is pertinent. Again from a sem¬
antical viewpoint, the relationship between head noun
and classifier in (7:12 a and b) is syntagmatic (Porzig)
whereas in (c) and (d) it is paradigmatic (Trier1)- Ap¬
parently an equation has occurred by which the syntactic
(appositive serialization) pattern corresponding to the
paradigmatic semantic pattern in (7:13 b) has been gen¬
eralized so that it also covers semantically syntagmatic
collocations, represented by (7:13 a).
Consider now English. Those items that are frequently
compared to numeral classifiers ("shoal", "piece", "kilo",
etc.) all stand in a syntagmatic semantic relation with
HN. Even such a fairly restricted 'classifier' as "herd"
has no place in the hyponymical system which includes
"cattle". And the syntactic pattern for these is invar¬
iably delimitative, involving "of".
The question now arises: Are there generic 'classifiers'
in English? The answer is yes. There are four (basic) ones,
viz. "thing", "people", "place" and "kind". The phrases in
(5:7) are instances of classifier use of "thing", "people",
and "place", but as we saw, this usage is restricted to
certain emotional registers of English. What is more, they
can only occur in delimitative serialization, as can of
course also "kind".
1
Joost Trier, Per deutsche Wortschatz im Sinnbezirk des Verstandes
(Heidelberg, 1931) has not been available to me. I rely on Lyons'
exposition of Trier's contribution (Lyons, 1963:44 ff; forthcoming:
ch. 8).
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The situation emerging is now clear. English has general¬
ized the syntactic pattern associated with a syntagraatic
semantic relationship. In modern English this pattern is
delimitative.
If we now turn to the classical Indo-European languages
we note that the partitive pattern was associated with a
particular case, usually the genitive. When we confront
this fact with the fact (?) that languages with numeral
classifiers do not involve cases, a potentially interest¬
ing question presents itself about language genetics: Is
it true that languages involving case-distinctions do not
contain numeral classifiers, and vice versa?
The few languages which I have looked at bear out this
hypothesis, with one exception. Tarascan apparently has a
morphological reflex of what Friedrich (197o:382) calls
the objective case (cf. (7:8)). It is then interesting
that Tarascan also on the question of number distinction
displays phenomena that do not square with Sanches' hy¬
pothesis about the relationship between classifiers and
marking of the head noun for number (cf. (7:2)).
However, I must stress once more the purely speculative
character of this discussion. I cannot say that it is so.
All I can say is that if it is so, then there are genet¬
ically significant distinctions to be drawn from RS-phen-
omena.
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7.2 Danish "nogen", "noget", and "nogle".
In § 5.312 I decided to regard as linguistically basic
"all", "some", and "one" as the lexical reflexes of the
functional nodes pres, part, and ind, respectively. Where¬
as the question of basicness is a matter of definition —
or decision — the question of the origin of the three
basic expressions may require some justification. Con¬
sider in this connection (7:14):
(7:14) (i) (a) all the whisky
(b) all the house
(c) all the houses
(ii) (a) ♦some the whisky
(b) ♦some the house
(c) ♦some the houses
(iii) (a) ♦one the whisky
(b) ♦one the house
(c) ♦three the houses
II.(i)(a) ♦the all whisky
(b) ♦the all house
(c) ♦the all houses
(ii) (a) ♦the some whisky
(b) ♦the some house
(c) ♦the some houses
(iii)(a) the one whisky
(b) the one house
(c) the three houses
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The uncompromising nature of the distribution of ac¬
ceptability displayed by these systems is an indication
of very decisive properties of the underlying strings.
Since there is no reason to believe that the point of or¬
igin should differ for "the" and the nouns involved from
one set of phrases to the next, the most decisive differ¬
ence we can come up with is that it is in fact the point
of origin of the quantifiers which differs from one set
to the next. And since we have independent — metaphys¬
ical — reasons for deriving "all" from pres, and also
independent — logical — reasons for deriving "one" from
ind, this thesis is confirmed if we can show that it is
consonant with the facts to derive "some" from part. I
exclude gen as a possible source for quantifiers on the
grounds that it is — intuitively, at least — rather the
source of the 'generic classifier' mentioned in the last
section. This point still needs confirmation, though; we
return to it in chapter 9.
Apart from the distributional evidence provided by
(7:14), English offers only intuitive reasons for deriv¬
ing "some" from part. In particular, English offers no
hard and fast morphological and/or syntactic evidence
that "some" cannot be derived from ind. In fact, dia-
chronic evidence pertaining to the syntax of Old English
an and sum might even suggest that the decline of sum in
many syntagms was due to the working of an economy prin¬
ciple indicating a common (positional) source for the two
quantifiers (cf. Mustanoja, 196o:259 ff).
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However, Danish offers a few points of interest in
this connection. Even if they cannot be conclusive for
English, they support the specifically English evidence
provided by (7:14).
There is no pair in Danish which reflects the distinc¬
tion between "some" and "any"; both correspond to Danish
"noget" and "nogen". These two forms are both singular.
They have a common plural form, "nogle"1. The two singular
forms reflect the basic gender distinction between neuter
(-t) and non-neuter (-n) which chracterizes the Danish nom¬
inal system. Cf.:
(7:15) (nogen bil (cf. en bil - bilen)
any car a car car-the
noget hus (cf. et hus - huset)
any house a house house-the
han har ikke ^




Both "bil" (non-neuter) and "hus" (neuter) are count-
ables ("en" and "et", respectively); yet despite the gender
distinction the same form of the quantifier is used with
both in the plural.
1 The plural form "nogle" is in fact rarely used, and is hardly ever
heard outside classes on Danish grammar. Instead, the non-neuter
singular form is used. "Nogle" occurs in (formal, or at least care¬
ful) writing. I shall use all three forms, mainly to have a clear
graphic distinction between singular and plural. The reason for the
formal confusion will be clear from a consideration of the opposi¬
tions actually embodied in the three forms to be explained presently.
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This is the basis for the recognition of a different
distinction, now between "nogle" and "noget": "nogle" is
the form of the quantifier when it occurs within a count¬
able plural nominal, irrespective of gender. So "noget"
becomes the form of the quantifier within an uncountable












A crucial part of the argument in favour of the point
to be made is now the behaviour in Standard Danish of the
noun "penge" (= "money"), and the behaviour in certain
major dialects of Danish of the nouns "kaffe", "sm0r",
"gr^d" (= "porridge"), etc. In Standard Danish (and in










"Penge" is usually described as a countable plural
noun (in contrast to "money"), a description which cor¬
relates with the form of the quantifier. Yet it cannot








The usual interpretation of these facts is that "pesge"
is a countable plural noun which lacks a singular. In¬
cidentally, it is interesting that children quite consist¬
ently use (7:18 a and b). They have grasped the relation¬
ship between countability and the quantifier-form "nogle",
but not that "penge" is anomalous with respect to count-
ability.
The situation is similar for the dialectal variants
with "sinjrfr" , etc. Though formally countable plurals they
cannot be counted.
The only analysis that accounts for these facts as well
as for the normal use of the quantifier-pairs in Danish
has implications for the reference-based analysis of
partitive quantifiers in general. The structure underly¬
ing Standard Danish "noget smjzJr" is (7:19) (only relevant










This is an instance of a simple uncountable nominal.
On the basis of that I shall show that none of the uses
of "noget", "nogle" , and "nogen" can derive from ind.
Consider again the English phrase "any dog". This was
said above to be ambiguous with respect to countability.
This ambiguity is resolved morphologically in Danish —
provided the noun is non-neuter — so that we have, cor¬
responding to the two readings of the English phrase:
(7:2o)(a) nogen hund (countable)
(b) noget hund (uncountable)
If the noun is neuter the ambiguity remains:
(7:21) (countable: = "any tree")HO'.; — /nn faKI a ■ sa " or\ma /am;
Relative to the structure (7:19) it would now be pos¬
sible to argue that "nogen" in (7:2o a) and the uncount¬
able reading of "noget" in (7:21) derive from ind, whereas
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the uncountable "noget" derives from part (as in (7:19)),
and that this would account for the disambiguation of
"any dog" in (7:2o). This would imply, however, that
"nogen" and countable "noget"' should behave in the same
way as the indefinite articles "en" and "et", which they
do not:
(7:22) (i) (a) han kjzJbte en hund
he bought a dog
(b) *han kjzJbte nogen hund
he bought some dog
(ii) (a) hunden ledte efter et tras
dog-the was looking for a tree
(b) *hunden ledte efter noget trae
dog-the was looking for some tree
(ii b is, of course, acceptable on an uncountable reading).
It is only in negative declaratives and questions —
and not generally in opaque contexts, cf. (ii) — that
"nogen" and "noget" can be used in the same environment
as "en" and "et".
It could then be said that all instances of "nogen",
"noget", and "nogle" derive from ind, and that some further
rules not taken into account would deal with distribution¬
al and other idiosyncracies on their part. It was in order
to counter precisely this objection that appeal was made
to the behaviour of "penge", etc. Only if "nogle" does not
derive from ind can we explain the fact that these nouns
may appear in countable nominals without the capability of
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actually being counted. The reason for this can now be
stated in formal terms. Although part is specified as
(+count) in nominals containing the denotative features
which are expressed by 'penge', etc., restrictions are
imposed on the normally free choice between (+) and (-)
plural on ind following (+count); (+plur) must be chosen,
and that must furthermore be (-specified).
I have now shown that the Danish quantifier-pair "noget"
and "nogen", and their common plural form "nogle" are
compatible with an analysis that derives them from part
always, and incompatible with an analysis that derives
them from ind, always or only sometimes. This holds for
their use as gender-markers, as well as for their use as
countability-markers. I venture to regard this as cor¬
roborative evidence for the derivation of English "some",
which is already implied by distributional criteria in
(7:14).




In this the final part we shall apply the theoretical
framework developed in part II to selected areas of Eng¬
lish nominal composition.
From the very first inception of the research reported
on in the present work my focus of attention was on pro¬
nouns, and it was my original plan 'simply' to account
for pronominalization in English, essentially on the basis
of a substitution model £ la Harweg (1968) and Crymes (1968);
several — abortive — attempts were made to come to grips
with what Hjelmslev calls "la nature du pronom" in this
way. The preceding sections may be read as the testament
of ray disillusionment with such an approach. From being
traditionally a comparatively clearly delimited, closed
class with a rather small membership — at least to a
naive observer — the class soon became invaded from all
sides, by modal verbs (Crymes), by definite NP's (Harweg)
and by determinatives (SjzJrensen, 1958; Sommerstein, 1972;
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Lyons, 1973). The result was that 'the pronoun' gradually
receded to the point of vanishing (Postal, 1966), hiding
behind all manner of phenomena which all seemed to have
one thing in common: referentiality. From being a major
class within — apparently — easy access for investiga¬
tion, it became a minor class virtually inaccessible.
The shift in viewpoint from 'pronouns' to 'referential¬
ity' as the basic notion thus shifted the approach in the
direction of Collinson (1937) with its basic appeal to
"indicaters". Although this is in many respects an inter¬
esting work I think it is fair to say that it is somewhat
impressionistic and too intuitive to constitute a prin¬
cipled basis for a general theory of linguistic reference.
The framework developed in part II of the present work
purports to provide such a basis.
This framework restores autonomy to the class of pro¬
nouns — or rather to a class of pronouns; but it does
not restore it as a major class. The class of pronouns
constitutes itself naturally within the major class of
referential functives.
This term is the name of a class of functional items
the defining characteristic of which is that — at some
stage in their derivation — they are dominated ultimately
by a DC. The class of referential functives is a large,
heterogenous, but closed class (though for a qualifica¬
tion of this latter claim, cf. § 9.1). A priori I submit
that the traditional classes of determinatives (determiners),
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quantifiers (indefinite pronouns), and pronouns (demon¬
strative, personal, possessive, interrogative, relative)
are referential functives in the present sense, and that
we further have to incorporate a class not generally con¬
sidered in this connection — at least in descriptions of
English — viz. the class of what I shall call E-classifi-
ers.
The distinction between the two referentially signif¬
icant serialization-types — the appositive and the del-
imitative — is the basis for a subclassification within
the major class of referential functives which leads to
a recognition of four subclasses, three of which are more
or less isomorphic with the traditional classes of deter¬
minatives, pronouns, and quantifiers. Consider
(8:1)(i)(a) some men
(b) *some these men
(ii)(a) some of these men
(b) *some of men
(i) and (ii) are manifestations of the appositive and
the delimitative serialization-type, respectively. In gen¬
eral we can set up the following two formulae:
(8:2) (a) x Noun
fthese
(b) x of {this Noun
It
— where x is a referential functive, and where Noun may
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be either uncountable, countable singular, or countable
plural.
These two environments are referentially diagnostic,
and on the basis of them we define:
(8:1)(a) "a quantifier" = "a referential functive that
may occur in place of x in both (8:2 a) and (b)";
(b) "a determinative" = "a referential functive that
may occur in place of x in (8:2 a) but not in (b)";
(c) "an E-classifier" = "a referential functive that
may occur in place of x in (8:2 b) but not in (a)";
(d) "a pronoun" = "a referential functive that may
occur in place of x neither in (8:2 a) nor (b)".
A brief glance at these definitions is enough to show
that terminological distinctions will now separate items
usually considered to belong to the same class. For ex¬
ample, "each" will be a quantifier, "every" a determinat¬
ive; interrogative "which?" will be a quantifier, "what?"
a determinative? "I" a pronoun, "we" a determinative, etc.
This may at first look rather unattractive, but in
fact it is not. First of all, these phenomena stress the
high degree of interrelation that there is between the
subclasses, an interrelation which is due to the fact
that the important class-membership for these items is
membership of the major class of referential functive. We
highlight the debate between Postal (1966) and Sommerstein
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(1972) as to whether personal pronouns are articles (Postal)
or vice versa (Sommerstein) as essentially vacuous. They
are similar in that they both belong to the major class
of referential functives (cf. also Lyons, 1973). Further¬
more there are quite good reasons for these anisomorph-
isms, which are explicable on the basis of the general
principle of suppletion. This principle is of crucial
importance to the class of referential functives. Thus,
the subclass constituted by E-classifiers is the supplet-
ive counterpart to the class of quantifiers. They fill
the gap which is created by the inability of quantifiers
to occur in delimitative serializations unless the head
noun is definite. Quantifiers conform to the pattern x of
these Noun. E-classifiers conform to the pattern x of Noun,
with some of them (the partitive E-classifiers) also con¬
forming to x of these Noun.
In this way we could — at least in principle — claim
that the 'word-class' of referential functives is consti¬
tuted by abstract, underlying entities which are often real¬




/ >T /\quaat E-clas det pron
I I I I
"some" "a part of" "the" "it"
However, the meaning of these abstract entities (RF)
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would largely correlate with (the inherent meaning of)
the functional categories, so to establish an abstract
class would only complicate matters without yielding any




8.1 The class of quantifiers.
Application of the distribution test established in
the preceding section to the items which I have a priori
singled out for attention yields the following list of
quantifiers in English:
all (n)either more one first
any (a) little less two second
some (a) few most three
each much least four last
both many half • • • • next
which? former latter • • • • (an)other
However, although all of these conform to (8:2) in
the same way, they do not behave alike in all respects.
In particular, they are sensitive to a preceding def¬
inite article. Thus, on the basis of the pattern (8:4)
we can establish two subclasses within the class of
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quantifiers:
(8:4) the x of these Noun
I shall say that quantifiers which are incompatible
with (8:4) are the central quantifiers, whereas those















• • • • • • • •
last
next
1 "Half" is a special case. Its applicability is certainly greater
than that of most other quantifiers, but it is quite possible that
it is in fact incompatible with (8:4). However, due to its avail¬
ability for noun-status — which suggests affinity with E-classi-
fiers — I have decided to leave it out from the group of central
quantifiers. Moreover, if we included it, we would have to go into
a more detailed discussion of the part:whole relation them we have.
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I shall (arbitrarily) restrict the discussion to the
central quantifiers. As for the peripheral quantifiers,
the most important point seems to be that they involve a
number of diachronic lexical subjunctions in combination
with the synchronic subjunctions on which the central
quantifiers depend. The diachronic subjunctions all ap¬
pear as fossilized representations within the synchronic
representations (cf. § 8.45 ).
8.2 The central quantifiers.
Three of the four functional items which I take as
primitives — "all", "some", and "one" — are central
quantifiers. The implication of this is that I not only
commit myself to deriving the other (central) quanti¬
fiers from various subjunctions involving these three, but
also to deriving some of the other referential functives,
E-classifiers and determinatives in particular, from them.
I do not commit myself to deriving all referential func¬
tives from these three. Some of them involve reference to
"kind" as well.
8.3 Primitive quantifier phrases.
A primitive quantifier phrase is a NP which displays
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superficially one of the primitive quantifiers. Let us be¬







The common underlying structure for (8:6) is (8:7),


































The specification on ind for (c) would be (-plur
-cond), and it would be expressed by 'one'.
No lexical subjunctions are relevant for the deriva¬
tion of any of (8:6). RP-subjuction occurs relative to
gen-L, part-L, and ind-L, this structure being adjoined
to pres for (8:6 a), subjoined to it for (b) and (c).









The superficial non-expression of "some" here is the
linguistic parallel to the positive subaltern relation¬
ship in the traditional square of oppositions in logic













there ^ man <f>
then^
some men
The non-expression of "all" in (b) has no logical
equivalent — as far as I am aware — but notice the im¬
plicit presence of "all" in "some" in expressions like
"some men came who (all) In such a relationship,
"all" expresses universality within the section delimited
by "some".
In (8:8)(c) below, the non-expression of "all" rel¬
ative to"some" is as in (b); the relationship between
"some" and "one" is the linguistic parallel to the logic¬
al interpretation of the existential quantifier, "some x"












(8:9)(a) all the men
(b) *some the men
(c) *one the man/men
In § 7.2 this pattern was considered to provide dis¬
tributional justification for deriving "all" from pres,
in contrast to "some" and "one". We need to show that
this is justifiable also on referential-semantic grounds.
First of all we note that (8:9 a) is not referentially
isomorphic with (8:6 a). "All men are mortal" is a well-
formed (and famous) sentence; "all the men are mortal" is
certainly not famous, and it is well-formed only on a
model-theoretical interpretation in which the universe
of discourse is artificially restricted so as to correl¬
ate with a 'possible world' with a limited number not
only of individuals but also of species, one of which is
of necessity immortal.




In contrast, "all the men were sick" is well-formed,
"all men were sick" is not, where "well-formed" has to
be understood in relation to a universe of discourse
correlating with the 'actual world'.
The underlying representation (prior to subjunction)
of (8:9 a) is identical to (8:7). In contrast to the sub¬
sequent derivation of (8:6), however, (8:9 a) involves
lexical subjunction of ind-L; otherwise it follows the
lines of (8:8a):
(8:lo) N
In other words, "all the men" is referentially ident¬
ical to "all the some men". We now clearly see why*. (8:9)
(b) and (c) cannot be well-formed: in each case the lex¬
ical subjunction of ind-L conflates the two quantifiers



















The derivation of (8:11) is the same as (8:8)(b) and
(c), only with lexical subjunction of ind-L.
Notice finally that (optional) application of the last
step in the subjunction cycle to (8:lo) brings the MI-
convention into operation, yielding "the men all". If
RP-subjunction applies without the Mi-convention, the
result is (8:11 a). We should expect, therefore, that
(8:12) (a) all the men
(b) the men all
(c) the men
are referentially identical, which, as a matter of fact
they are, with one modification. The referential potential
of (c) is greater than that of (a) and (b). Wherever (a)
or (b) can be used, (c) can be used, but not vice versa.
The reason for this is that "the men" can be used to ref¬
er to two men, which (a) and (b) cannot. They enter a
suppletive relationship with "both (the) men" and "the
men both", such that these four phrases together ex¬
haust the referential potential of "the men". (For "both",
see below).
We now turn to the derivation of primitive quantifier
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all of the men
some of the men
one of the men
We have just established that "the men" in itself der¬
ives from a single-branch structure involving lexical sub-
junction of ind-L. Furthermore, it has been suggested
(§ 4.432) that the superficial presence of "of" is an in¬
dication of an underlying recursive structure, of which

















> all kind man seme (one) there-
then.
Whether "one" is expressed in the subordinate or not
depends, of course, on the secondary feature-specification,
which is identical to that in (8:7) in all respects.
On the principle that subjunction and adjunction are
25o
recursive, cyclical processes, they apply first to the
subordinate. Since on the other hand the generation of
the complex structure has taken place 'from above', the
generation of the subordinate to some degree involves a
measure of reduplication, in particular with respect to
the denotative features1. I exploit this fact by suggest¬
ing that the subordinate is characterized by a high degree
of lexical subjunction; in fact all referential phrases
except ind-L are lexically subjoined, which yields a
structure like (8:15) (assuming that we are deriving (8:



















This formulation is deliberately vague, but it suffices for our pres¬
ent purposes. Later (in § lo.43; 11.42-3) I shall discuss in more de¬
tail the issues involved.
251
Like all adjoined structures, (8:15) is potentially
subject to subjunction, viz. with respect to abl and the
rest of the structure under pres; and as with all in¬
stances of subjunction, the result is either absorption
of the sense of the node under which subjunction takes
place, or a string which reflects the workings of the
Mi-convention. It is the latter result we get by sub¬
joining N to abl, resulting in a string with the order
'some-there1-of'.
then^
Above (p. 159 fn) attention was drawn to the cognitive
similarities between the syntactical and the referential
categories. I now exploit these similarities by saying
that a syntactic category node (like abl) may be adjoined
to the referential category with which it shares such cog¬
nitive characteristics. Abl is the case-grammatical cat¬
egory associated with the notion of partition, just as
part is the referential category associated with partition.
The structure (8:15) may therefore be adjoined to part in
the superordinate. The question as to whether or not this
adjunction occurs will be taken up in § 8.42. The conclu¬
sion there will be that in this case it must apply.
The derived structure which these considerations give




























Finally, the abl branch is subjoined under part; since
the content of the superordinate RP-subjunction must be ex¬




1 L 1 abl
abl I I 1 case
-quest 1 1 1 -quest
-neg
1 1 1 -neg
2gend > all there^ of 2gend








4 man 4 some of
the men
The most noteworthy feature of (8:17) is that it is the
first instance we have of the subjunctional shift between
originally subordinate and superordinate, reflected by the
case-specifications in the morphophonemic carriages. The
real significance of this, however, will not be fully ap¬
preciated until we come to discuss E-classifiers and, later,
the relationship between the genitive (-'s) and the del-
imitative serialization-type.
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8.4 Non-primitive quantifier phrases.
The remaining members of the class of central quanti¬
fiers are all non-primitive; that is to say, phrases con¬
taining non-primitive quantifiers do not display super¬
ficial "all", "some", of "one". Nevertheless, their mean¬
ing involves reference to the meanings expressed by 'all',
* some•, and 'one1.
8.41 "Two" and "both".
I shall not here attempt to explore the possibilities
of analyzing the natural numbers — and thus the numerals
— in terms of "one", ("zero"), and "plus". I assume that
such an analysis is possible, and consequently that "two"
is non-primitive. I am more interested in the relation¬
ship which holds between "two" and "both" (and "(n)either";
cf. § 8.42).
"Both" shows many distributional characteristics also
shown by "all"; cf:
(8:18)(i)(a) all the men
(b) both the men
(ii) (a) the men all




(iv)(a) all the ten men
(b) both the two men
Yet there are some dissimilarities:
(8:19)(i) (a) *all Tom, Dick, and Harry left
(b) both Tom and Dick left
(These exx. from Carden, 1973:94)
(ii) (a) all ten men
(b) *both two men
Cf., relative to (8:19 ii b) , Danish:
(8:2o)(a) begge drenge (kom)
both boys (came)
(b) begge drengene (kom)
both boys-the (came)
(c) *begge to drenge (kom)
♦both two boys (came)
(d) (de var) begge to drenge
♦(they were) both two boys (« "they were
both of them boys")
(e) (de var) drenge begge to
♦(they were) boys both two (= "they were
boys both of them")
For similar (pleonastic) uses of "both two" in Old- and
Middle English, cf. Campbell (1958:§ 693) and Mustanoja
(196o:214).
A certain amount of ambiguity is rife in Danish in
phrases like (8:2o d), stemming from the fact that "begge"
may also be an independent "pronoun*. Thus, for example:
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(8:21) de havde begge to sinner
they had both two sons
— may mean either "both of them had two sons", just like
the English transliteration, or "*both two of them had
sons", or even "each of them had a son", where "them"is
understood to refer to two persons.1
If such is needed, these data are meant to suggest
that "both" and "two" are semantically related to such
an extent that an analysis of "both" that does not some¬
how involve reference to "two" is doomed to failure.
At the same time, (8:18) suggest that "both" and "all"
should be analyzed in more of less the same terras, per¬
haps with minor differences, allowing for (8:19). Carden
(1973:92 ff) therefore tries both to analyze "both" as a
universal quantifier and not to analyze it as a universal
quantifier, the latter mainly because of sentences like
the one immediately preceding this one. In his non-quanti¬
fier analysis he relies on Lakoff & Peters (1966:115),
who derive "both" from sentence conjunction. However, we
restrict the discussion to quantifier "both".
We begin by noting a feature of (8:18 i) vs. (iii).
Whereas (i b) and (iii b) are referentially identical
— i.e. have the same referential potential — this is
not true of (i a) and (iii a). The definite article in
1
As often with such ambiguities they are only ambiguous on paper.
There are quite clear suprasegmental features to disambiguate
(8:21) in the spoken language, "to" bearing heavy stress after
a sharp juncture if "two sons" is meant.
257
(i b) is redundant. This may be due to diachronic pro¬
cesses, at least if the traditional phonological source
for "both" (< OE ba |>a) is adhered to. In that case
history repeats itself in modern English "both the",
since OE ba on its own is considered to mean "both",
and ^a is nom/acc plural of the weak spatial deictic,
equivalent in many respects to modern English "the";
cf. Campbell (1958:§§ 683; 7o8).
What this implies in my terms is that "both" derives
from a structure in which ind is subcategorized as
(+plur +spec) — or perhaps (+dual) — expressed by
'two', and that ind-L is lexically subjoined. Thus the
derived structure (8:22) is the pertinent structure for

















However, this will not account for (8:18)(i), (ii),
and (iv) (b). They all rely on a structure similar to
(8:22), but whereas (8:22) displays absorption of "two"
by the weak deictics after lexical subjunction has ap¬
plied, the remaining three display the MI-convention.
That is, the lower part of (8:22) is, for the three








If (8:22) is fully subjoined with (8:23) as its lower
configuration, the Mi-convention will apply on the last
cycle, yielding "the men both".1 If on the other hand
(8:22) is not fully subjoined, but the subjoined string
under gen is rather adjoined to pres, we get a configura¬
tion like (8:24):
1
Here the ability of the Mi-convention begins to look suspect, how¬
ever, as indeed suggested already in § 6.5, as a viable source for
such phrases as "the men both", since it implies that the already
conflated branch is moved by it. In the next paragraph we shall
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— which underlies 'all the two men'. This is normalized
in accordance with the basic absorption of "all" + "two"
to "both", with "two" leaving a trace behind for option¬
al (and redundant) lexicalization in "both the two men".
These latter processes are presumably of a diachronic




8.42 "Each" and "either".
"Each", like "all" and "both", is usually considered a
universal quantifier, "either" — in so far as it is con¬
sidered a quantifier at all — rather an existential quanti¬
fier (for the purpose of this discussion I restrict my¬
self to "either", assuming that it differs from "neither"
26o
only with respect to (±neg) on pres in the branch under
which it is generated). A point often made with respect
to the distinction between universal and existential
quantifiers (in logic, and — latterly — also in ling¬
uistics, e.g McCawley (1972) and Anderson (1974b)) is
the affinity of the former with conjunction, of the lat¬
ter with disjunction (cf. e.g. Reichenbach, 1947:92).
These affinities will serve as a basis for a reexamina¬
tion of the special serialization possibilities which
characterize "all" and "both" — which were handled by
the Mi-convention in preceding sections — and which are
also shared by "each"; for although the Mi-convention
quite neatly accounted for "the men all", and — some¬
what less neatly — for "the men both", it can hardly ac¬
count for "the men each". The reason for this lies in cer¬
tain properties which "each" shares with "either" ( and




(ii)(a) each of the men
(b) either of the men
(iii)(a) the men each
(b) *the men either
"Each", "either" (and "which?") share with "both" the
characteristic against all other quantifiers1 that they
1 "All" may also have a definite background group in appositive
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require reference (explicit or implicit) to a definite
background group when they enter appositive serializa¬
tions as well as deliraitative serializations (which lat¬
ter situation is the normal state of affairs for quanti¬
fiers) . But they differ from "both" (and "all") in that
different number morphemes characterize the head noun in
the two serializations? thus:
(8:26)(i)(a) each man vs. each of the men
(b) either man vs. either of the men
(ii)(a) both men vs. both of the men
(b) all the men vs. all of the men
Whereas "both men" and "all the men" can be accounted
for satisfactorily on the basis of a single-branch tree,
this is not the case with "each man" and "either man". In
the derivation of these latter two, two different number-
specifications are required, one accounting for the plur¬
ality of the (implicit) background group, and one account¬
ing for the superficial appearance of singular "man".
Since number is a feature on ind, and since we have no
means for developing two inds (or two number-specifica¬
tions on the same ind) within a single referential branch,
it follows that there must be two. Of these, the branch
generating the background group is the superordinate, that
generating "each" and "either" the subordinate.
The structure underlying (8:25)(a) is (8:27):




















Relative to the structure (8:27)I shall suggest that
there are three possible subjunctions, one for each of
(8:25)(a). (The secondary features — excluded from (8:
27) — will be included in the morphophonemic carriages).
The basic difference is that either the subordinate or
the superordinafce may be lexically subjoined. If the sub¬
ordinate is, there are two options. Either abl is adjoined
to part in the superordinate, or it is not. Let us ex¬
plore these three possibilities in turn.
With lexical subjunction of the superordinate we get a

















Next the subordinate N is subjoined to abl, and "of"
is absorbed by the subjoined functional nodes; then, in
virtue of the cognitive similarities between abl and part,














































Finally, abl is subjoined to part, the whole superord-
inate being absorbed by the subjoined category-nodes in
the subordinate, and with the subordinate morphophonemic
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carriage replacing that of the superordinate. The sur¬































4> man each man
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There is a problem of a practical nature inherent in
this representation. The subjunction of abl to part im¬
plies that the subordinate is superimposed on -L-ind-L in
the superordinate. I have inserted them at the end of the
functional string, mainly to emphasize that the sense they
contain — at least which ind-L contain — is still ex¬
pressed by "each".
The second and third alternatives develop initially
along the same lines; but instead of the superordinate be¬
























Next the subordinate is subjoined to abl. If the der¬
ivation stops at this stage, we have the structure imme¬
diately underlying "the men each". That is, "of" is ab¬
sorbed by the lexically subjoined string, and the morpho-
phonemic carriage of the superordinate determines the
surface occurrence of "men". Furthermore, the whole phrase
is marked for plural, requiring a plural verb.
What I consider to be the normal derivation for del-
imitatively serialized quantifier phrases procedes from
the stage superficially realized as "the men each". Abl
is adjoined to part in the superordinate, and eventually
subjoined to it under observation of the Mi-convention,


















abl 1 1 case 1





2gend > all of 2gend > all
+count kind ♦count kind








jrf man $ each of the men
Notice in particular that it is now the morphophonemic
carriage of the originally subordinate branch that deter¬
mines the number of the entire phrase — "each of the men"
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requires a singular verb — whereas the originally super-
ordinate morphophonemic carriage determines the plural
morpheme on "men".
The derivations outlined for "each"-phrases here re¬





















The left-hand column specifies the subcategorial feat¬
ures, and the right-hand column the categorial features
which are correlated with the expression 'each'. Further¬
more, the complex symbols within the right-hand column
signify that two lexical subjunctions are involved in
the sense-specification of "each", one of which indicates
that "each" may have independent noun (or pronoun) status,
whereas the other indicates that "each" is 'definite'.
It is clear from the derivations that the definiteness
of the background group is a presupposition on "each",
rather than part of its sense. On occasion, however, the
presupposition may be incorporated in the sense-specifi¬
cation, as in (8:3o); but it is no integral part of the
meaning of "each".
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I shall not give such a detailed account of "either",
but only comment on one or two important points. First,
the derivation of "either" involves a superordinate ind
specified as (+plur +spec) — or, again, (+dual), if we
can be permitted to incorporate such a diachronic feature
in a synchronic account of modern English. Secondly, and
more importantly, since "*the men either" is ruled out,
the second option for subjunction in the derivation of
"each" is ruled out for "either". More specifically,
"either" demands that the lexically subjoined lower branch
is subjoined to part in the higher. (With lexical subjunc¬
tion of the higher branch we get, of course, "either man"
along the lines of (8:28, 29, and 3o). Why should this
be, if the derivations of "each" and "either" otherwise
follow the same lines, as they seem to do?
As mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph, con¬
junction and disjunction have been associated with uni¬
versal and existential quantifiers, respectively. Now it
so happens that only the (linguistic) universal quanti¬
fiers "all", "both", and "each" have the possibility of
post-noun position, and only when the head noun is pre¬
ceded by the definite article (or another definite deter¬
minative) .
I showed in § 8.3 that the primitive quantifiers in
delimitative serialization derive from a double-branch
tree, and the same holds for "both of the men". That is
to say, "all" and "both" are also involved in derivations
like the one required for "each". In consequence of this
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we might suggest that quantifier phrases displaying surface
serialization 'the Noun xT all derive from a double-branch
tree, and then associate optional — though syntactically
restricted, cf. Anderson (1975b); Dougherty (197o) — ad¬
junction to part in the upper branch with the fact that
such constructions all involve universal quantifiers; or,
to put it more precisely, with the fact that the quanti¬
fiers allowing such serializations are associated with
conjunction. Negatively, this means that the quantifiers
associated with disjunction require explicit morphological
marking of this fact. This end is achieved by adjoining
the subordinate ablative phrase to part in the superord-
inate because "of" will be brought out superficially by
the Mi-convention during the subsequent step of subjunc¬
tion.
However, it should be noted that this will not account
for Perlmutter/Carden*s dialects which only allow "the
guests all" (as opposed to "all the guests"), unless
"all the guests" is also considered to derive from a
double-branch tree, for which there is no decisive evi¬















(ill)(a) *alle af drengene
all of boys-the
(b) *begge af drengene
both of boys-the
(c) hver af drengene
each of boys-the
— disregarding the fact that other distribution-tests
would have to be devised for classifying referential
functives in Danish than in English.
The tidiest analysis of these Danish data is a one
-branch structure for "alle" and "begge" — along the
lines proposed for English "all" and "both" — and a
double-branch structure for "hver" — again like English.
Pending further evidence, the tentative conclusion to
this is that English quantifier phrases displaying post
-noun position of the quantifier can all be accounted for
on the basis of a complex structure. In addition, such
phrases involving "all" — and perhaps "both" — can also
be explained on the basis of the Mi-convention working on
a non-complex structure. This convention is highly produc¬
tive in all the compartments of referential structure, and
it accounts for aspects of post-noun "all"-phrases which
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cannot be accounted for on the basis of the double-branch
derivation.
The preceding discussion is of course incomplete in an
important respect. Both "all", "both", and "each" may ap¬
pear in post-noun position, separated from the noun by a
(auxiliary) verb, notably "be" and "have", but also e.g.
"seem". The modifications which these possibilities re¬
quire will not be gone into, although one or two points
will be raised in chapter lo about the superficial real¬
ization of (±time) on Lind which have a bearing on this
point. Its further elucidation must await the attempt to




















There are many and intricate problems involved in pre¬
cisely characterizing the semantic properties of (8:35),
most of them stemming from the intricacies of "can".
Since we are mainly interested in the subject NP's and
their characterization, I shall not even begin to go into
detail over the modal. Suffice it to say that the epistem-
ic sense of "can" — associated with possibility — is
prominent in (i), whereas the pragmatic sense — assoc¬
iated with capability — is prominent in (ii). For the
terminological distinctions, cf. Fillmore (1975:5), who
applies them to "may". There is also involved, especially
in (ii), the element of permission, which is the modality
to which Fillmore applies the term 'pragmatic*.
What interests us, however, is the incapability of
"any" to occur with a plural head noun in non-negative
declaratives like (ii c), and the — somewhat less clear
-cut — inadmissibility of "some" with a singular head
noun in an epistemic context.
Notice further that the distinction between (i a) and
(b) involves a shift in perspective of the modal. Whereas
(i a) is most likely with an epistemic interpretation of
"can", (i b) is rather more likely on a pragmatic reading.
This is correlated with the paradigmatic gap in (ii).
Yet all difficulties do not stem from the range of
interpretations of the modal. The restrictions in the
paradigms in (8:35) can be interpreted as superficial
evidence of selection restrictions between features on
the subject NP and the various readings of "can". It is
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our task to find those features.
We approach this task by way of the following observa¬
tion by Donnellan (1966:lo2):
In the attributive use (viz. of definite desrip-
tions), the attribute of being so-and-so is all
-important, while it is not in the referential
use.
It has been shown (by Bell, 1972; Partes, 197o) that
Donnellan's restriction to definite descriptions is hard¬
ly warranted, and I fully agree. It is precisely the at¬
tribute of being — in this case, a man — that is all-
important for the analysis of the phenomena in (8:35) in
which we are interested. (8:35 i a and c) can be explicit¬
ly (and clumsily) paraphrased as "that stone can be lifted
by anything, provided it satisfies the condition of being
a man". No such condition of being a man is implied by
(i b). In so far as a condition is involved, it is rather
a condition on the number of men. The same holds for (ii
b).
It is now clear that we are concerned with the second¬
ary functional feature (iconditional) on ind. Further¬
more, it is now clear why this feature is introduced by
(-plur). It imposes a condition on the denotative features
under the higher L-nodes. It is concerned with the estab¬
lishment of categorial locations, or 'predicational prop¬
erties', or universals; and these, it will be appreciated,
are only there or not, they are not there in numbers.
With these preliminaries over, we can suggest as the
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> all kind man some <t> one there
then.
No lexical subjunctions apply, but there are two pos¬
sibilities during the RP-subjunction cycle: "some" is
either absorbed by "one", or they enter the Mi-convention.



















In this way we bring out the affinity between, on the
one hand, "a" and "any" (Perlmutter, 1969:fn lo), on the
other the implicit recognition of universality (by sub-
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junction to pres) with which "any" is often associated
— but cf. Vendler (1967:79 ff); Jackendoff (1972b).
That is, I equate semantically the so-called 'generic'
use of the indefinite article with "any", distinguishing
between them transformationally (or subjunctionally). AS
we shall see in chapter lo, precisely the same subjunc¬
tional distinction can be invoked as the distinction be¬
tween non-'generic' "a" and "one", the (synchronic) af¬
finity between which is also established by Perlmutter.
However, it is clear that not all instances of "any"
are derived from a conditional source. In particular,
"any" appears in appositive serialization with a plural
noun in negative and interrogative contexts. Such occur¬
rences are often considered to be suppletive with "some"
in positive declarative contexts; cf.:
(8:37)(a) I don't have any apples
(b) Do you have any apples?
(c) I have some apples
The fact that this is not a hard and fast rule has led
R. Lakoff (1969) to the conclusion that the choice between
"some" and "any" is determined by mechanisms involving
presuppositions on the part of the speaker, but only at
the cost of a new — and somewhat vague — concept of
synonymy.
The implication (to me) seems rather to be that there
are features on the nominal that determine the occurrence
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of "some" and "any", and that those features may, but need
not, correlate with the contextual features of negation and
interrogation.
We are led by considerations of other phenomena to
postulate the occurrence on pres of a feature (±negative)
and a feature (±question). Like (iconditional) these feat¬
ures will be included in the morphophonemic carriage dur¬
ing subjunction, and will thus come to influence the sup¬
erficial appearance of the string.
Apart from certain — non-factive (Kiparsky & Kiparsky,
1971) — predicates, the three features (inegative),
(iquestion), and (iconditional) are the main source of
opaque contexts (cf. also Giv6n, 1972), and since (icon¬
ditional) may influence the superficial occurrence of
"any", it is at least not unreasonable to inquire into
the possibility that the two other features may do the
same.
However, there is a notable difference between (icon¬
ditional) on the one hand and (inegative) / (iquestion)
on the other. Whereas the nominal subcategorization feat¬
ure (iconditional) is relatively easy to keep apart from
the corresponding illocutionary force indicator, this is
not the case with (inegative) and (iquestion). In virtue
of our equation of existence with categorial location
(§ 2.32), (tconditional) can be seen as imposing a con¬
dition on the categorial locations established higher in
23o
the hierarchy under L and L . The interpretation of
gen part.
(+conditional), consequently, is
If there is a categorial location, x, then
anything that is located in x is ...
The two other features under consideration cannot be
associated with categorial location in the same way. "No
horses on this path" does not negate the categorial loc¬
ation ("horse"), it assumes it; the same holds for (iquest-
ion).
This means that it is much more difficult to draw a
clear distinction between the nominal subcategorization
features of negation and interrogation and the status of
these as linguistic operators with predicational — or
propositional — scope. Yet that such a distinction is
called for seems clear (cf. Searle, 1969:31 ff), although
its nature remains mysterious (to me).
Taking these various points into consideration, I shall
not attempt to exhaust the analytical possibilities. I
shall rather present an analysis of "which?", which is in
keeping with the general approach, and then suggest a ten¬
tative analysis of "any" on this basis. Passing comments
will be made on "no" in the following section as well.
Then later, in § lo.22, we shall go further into the rel¬
ationship between (+negative) and (+conditional) in par¬
ticular.
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8.44 "Which?" — "any" and "some".
Like "each" and "either", "which?" requires reference
to a definite background group. In contrast to "each" and
"either" it may collocate with a plural head noun in both
appositive and delimitative serialization, though it need
not. That is, all of (8:38) are acceptable:
(8:38)(a) which man?
(b) which men?
(c) which of the men?
— but not, of course,"which of the man?".
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that "which?"
does not — unlike "each" and "either" — invariably re¬
quire a derivation based on a complex structure. In par¬
ticular, both (8:38 a and b) may be derived from single
-branch trees. Notice that (a) always requires a singular
verb, (b) invariably a plural verb, whereas (c) may take
either, although "which one of the men?" will probably oc¬
cur with disambiguating function instead of (c) on occas¬
ion.
We shall not go into the derivation of (8:38 c), which
follows the lines of (8:27 ff) with "which?" originating
in the (lexically subjoined) subordinate. Let us instead






















The specification on ind implies that this is the
structure underlying (8:38 b); (a) differs only on the
features (-plur -cond).
The definiteness of the background group is, as always
in single-branch quantifier derivations, ensured by lex¬
ical subjunction of ind-L, and application of the full
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I shall now tentatively suggest that the derivation of
"any m®n" differs from that of "which men?" on two points
concerning subjunctions there is no lexical subjunction of
ind-L, and the HP's subjoined under gen are only adjoined











> all there. <f> man </>
then.
(were there) any men?
Before this derivation is dismissed out of hand, let us
look at the comparable situation for (+neg). The derived
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there. 4 man 4 -*■ no men
then.
"No men" is generally considered synonymous with "not













> all kind there^
some
man 4 (there weren't) any men
(8:42) looks rather more attractive as a source for
"(not) any men" than does (8:4o) as a source for "?any
men", in particular with respect to the fate of the ex-
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pression of pres. If "no men" involves "all", and if "not
any men" is synonymous with "no men", then "not any men"
involves "all". Pres in (8:42) can consequently be re¬
garded as carrying the negative morpheme superficially,
"all" being implicit between "not" and "some". Cf. the
referential identity of
(8:43)(a) there were (not-some) men there
(b) (all-men) were not there
(c) of all men, not one was there
Furthermore, dialects allowing double negatives like
"there weren't no men there", on this analysis, now simply
allow full subjunction in (8:42), with "n't" as obligatory
part of the lexical reflex of pres when marked (+neg).
Lastly, a diachronic point which may reflect this der¬
ivation is the Old- and Middle English forms "naenig" and
"nany", and it may also account for the fact that "any" on
the whole is more resistent to substitution by "some" in
negative contexts than in interrogative contexts (cf. on
this point R. Lakoff, 1969:613).
By analogy, pres in (8:4o) should then be regarded as
the carrier of the question morpheme. This is not lexical-
ized in English, but it is in various other languages in¬
cluding Latin ("num", "nonne" — which are both also rel¬
ated to the negative morpheme diachronically) and Danish
("mon"). It is then interesting to note the serialization
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possibilities in Danish questions involving "raon" (which
is not obligatory; questions may also be characterized by
inversion; likewise, "mon" may occur in the Danish equi¬
valents of wh-questions ).
There are a great number of possibilities for the place¬
ment of "mon" in Danish, but we are especially interested
in one impossibility. Cf.s
(8:44) (i) (a) hvilke piger mon kommer?
which girls ? come (= "I wonder which
girls are coming")
(b) *mon hvilke piger kommer
(ii)(a) *nogle piger mon kommer?
(b) mon nogle piger kommer?
? any girls come (= "I wonder if any
girls are coming")
The starred examples are definitely out in any register
or dialect of Danish with which I am familiar. The un-
starred ones are acceptable, although they would hardly
be used in the spoken language. Instead of (i a) we would
get "hvilke piger mon der kommer?" (which girls ? there
come), and instead of (ii b), "mon der kommer nogle piger?"
(? there come any girls), i.e. with inversion.
However, the implications for my argument are clear,
(i a) — with full subjunction under pres — allows only
"mon" by courtesy of the Mi-convention; (ii b), on the
other hand, allows only "mon" in pre-quantifier position,
thus indicating that the node dominating "nogle" is only
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adjoined to pres. This correlates precisely with ray anal¬
ysis of the English phenomena.
Although we thus may draw support for the proposed an¬
alysis — according to which "any" is the superficial re¬
flex of "some" marked by a positive value of either (neg¬
ative) or (question) — problems remain, notably with re¬
spect to the distinction between "?" as a nominal subcat-
egorization-feature and as an illocutionaEy force indicat¬
or. Comparable problems adhere to the determination of the
scope of the negative feature.
Furthermore, although the proposed analysis gives rise
to a tidy equation pattern:
(8:45) no men : neg any men :: which men : ? any men
— which brings out the often observed affinity between
negation and interrogation, there are no immediately ob¬
vious semantic grounds for such a pattern, except perhaps
the common feature of opacity.
Lastly, this analysis does not bring out a number of
points concerning question-formation in a great many lang¬
uages; cf. Danielsen (1972) for a valuable survey.
In the light of these problems the proposed analysis
remains tentative.
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8.45 "Many" and "much".
In his critical discussion of Lakoff's quantifier anal¬
ysis, Anderson (1974a:4) proposes a distinction between
"some" and "many" which might account for the paradigmat¬
ic gaps in (8:46):
(8:46)(i)(a) some men read books
(b) many men read books
(ii) (a)
(b) the men who read books are many
(iii)(a) a number of men read books
(b) a large number of men read books
(iv) (a)
(b) the number of men who read books is large
To put the difference in my terms, "many" involves a
lexical subjunction of part-L in the E-classifier para¬
digm which suppletes the quantifier-paradigm to which
"some" and "many" belong, whereas "some" does not. I
want in fact to argue that "many" is the lexicalization















> all i kind number seme large one there
then.
"Many" is not definite? therefore ind-L is not lexical¬
ly subjoined. Otherwise all referential phrases in this
branch are. Subsequent RP-subjunction and subjunction of
the whole branch to abl yield a derived structure like
(8:47 b) (see the next page).
I want furthermore to suggest that "much" is derived in
the same manner, only involving "amount" instead of "num¬
ber".
If the lexeme under L .in these derivations were
part
"small" instead of "large", we get "(a) few" and "(a)
little", respectively, which still show traces of the sub¬
ordinate ind in "a". The tripartitions which these systems






























This structure is essentially a partitive E-classifier
structure (cf. ch. 9). As such it is — possibly diachron-
ically — subjoined to part in the superordinate. The
same applies to the structures underlying "much", "(a)
few", and "(a) little". I shall, however, concentrate on
"many", which in several respects shows 'abnormal* be¬
haviour for a quantifier, all of which can be satisfac¬
torily accounted for on the assumption that it derives
from a partitive E-classifier structure.
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Consider
(8:48)(a) many a good man (died in vain)
(b) the many men (who died in vain)
(a) is well attested, though generally considered an
idiomatic expression, and this may well be the case. At
least it appears to be the case that when "many a" was
first introduced in Middle English, it was associated with
a plural head noun (cf. Mustanoja, 196o:3o4 fn It barons
and knigtes and heiemen moni on).
Let us now assume that structures like (8:47 b) in
the simplest cases are just subjoined to part in super-
ordinate structures like (8:7), yielding, by normal RP
-subjunction, "many men". That is, the subordinate "many"
-structure simply takes the place of 'some' in a struc¬
ture that is specified as (+plur) on ind.
It has been argued that subjunction does not occur
directly, but passes through a stage of adjunction. If
this is the case we should expect phrases involving
"many" to show traces of the intermediate stage of
junction, for even diachronic processes have a claim to
being regarded as synchronic at some point in time. Such
















When abl is subjoined to part it either absorbs the
superordinate RP-subjunction, or it enters the Ml-conven-











As it stands, (8:49 b) is redundant. However, it is
the possibility of exploiting the 'slot* under ind which
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is the structural basis for the occurrence of "a" after
"many". The subcategorial basis for "a" is the conflict
between (+plur) and (-plur) in the two originally distinct
morphophonanic carriages when they are conflated.
The derivation of (8:48 b) depends on lexical subjunc-
tion of ind-L in (8:47 b). Since no monomorphemic expres¬
sion is correlated with the ensuing senee-configuration,
the Mi-convention applies, eventually yielding"the many".
The last peculiarity we shall look at is exemplified
by "a great many men". Jespersen (1913:§ 4.971) puts this
usage down to the 'noun-like' nature of "many", on this
ground querying the disinclination by the NED to derive
"many" from the Old English noun "menigeo" ("multitude").
However, the oldest examples Jespersen can muster are
from 169o and 1776 (both from the NED), which makes the
hypothesis of a direct historical link with an OE noun
appear somewhat weak.
A rather different source for the 'noun-like' status
of "many" is within easy reach if we take into account
that "many" itself derives from a partitive E-classifier
branch. Partitive E-classifiers are usually nouns in that
they lexicalize Thus the comparatively late first
occurrences of this type go in favour of a 'normalization'





9.1 The class of E-classlflers.
The class of referential functives was said above to
be a closed class, with one modification. The modifica¬
tion concerns the class of E-classifiers.1
E-classifiers are defined by their inability to occur
in appositive serialization with their head noun, and
among them we find such typical examples as "kind", "sort",
"pair", "group", etc. Yet we also find a great many'nor-
mal' nouns which have this characteristic, e.g. "cup",
"school", "glass", "bucket", etc.
There are, however, clear selection restrictions be¬
tween such •normal' nouns when they are used as E-classi-
1
I disregard the question as to whether the natural numbers actually
form a closed class. I avoid this question by simply noting that a
new number cannot be introduced, only a further number. The numerals
constitute an open-ended class, not an open class.
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fiers and the range of adjectives with which they may co
-occur in their non-classifying use; cf.:
(9:1)(a) a broken glass vs. a broken glass of milk
(b) a comprehensive school vs. a comprehensive school
of whales
(b) an embroidered bag vs. an embroidered bag of
pheasant
etc.
This might invite the view that there are in fact two
nouns "glass", "school", "bag", etc. It could also be
taken to imply that a number of nouns are capable of a
duplicity of function, and that specific selection re¬
strictions apply to the function which the noun performs
on a given occasion. Whichever of the two views we take,
however, we are forced to recognize that some nouns dis¬
play syntactic peculiarities which can be explained on
the assumption that they may function as E-classifiers.
Consider in this connection the noun "hop" ("can") in
Vietnamese, which occurs at least in the following two
environments:
(9:2) (a) hai cai hop sua
two thing can milk = "two milk cans"
(b) hai hop sua
two can milk = "two cans of milk"
In (a), "h9p" is the head noun, classified by the gen¬
eral classifier, "cai", and with "sua" as an attributive
noun. In (b), "hop" is itself a (partitive) classifier,
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classifying the head noun "sua". It is a situation which
is precisely comparable to the situation for which I am
arguing in English with respect to e. g. "bag"; cf. also
the Burmese exx. (7:12 a and d) above (p. 223). The Viet¬
namese exx are quoted from Thompson (1965:197) — though
without the tone-indicators.
Relative to the distinction between closed and open
sets it is now the case that only some English nouns can
be used as E-classifiers. Innovations in this system are
rare but do occur. Thus I have recently heard
(9:3) a giggle of girls
an asylum of prime ministers
a jam of tarts
— the latter in relation to a giggle of girls of dubious
morals. Yet even such innovations lead to comparison with
the 'true' classifiers, one major stylistic function of
which is precisely to give a humorous and/or ironic twist
to the discourse about familiar things.
9.2 Generic and partitive E-classifiers.
Languages with numeral classifiers, like Thai and Viet¬
namese, are characterized by a high proportion of what I
called generic classifiers (§ 7.12), and by having general¬
ized the appositive serialization pattern associated with
297
a paradigmatic semantic relationship between head noun
and classifier — which defines a classifier as generic
— to partitive classifier structures. English is char¬
acterized by a low proportion of generic E-classifiers
and a high proportion of partitive E-classifiers, and
also by having generalized the delimitative serialization
pattern associated with a syntagmatic semantic relation¬
ship between head noun and classifier to generic classi¬
fier-structures. Apart from "thing", "people", and "place",
which in a certain respect can be seen as generic E-clas¬
sifiers, there are, in English, only "kind", "sort", and
a number of less general terms like "type", "category",
"make", "brand", etc.
It is perhaps questionable whether these can be said
to stand in a paradigmatic semantic relationship with
their head nouns, but there is a distributional test that
will separate generic from partitive E-classifiers; cf.:
(9:4)(i)(a) that kind of car
(b) a car of that kind
(ii)(a) that cluster of trees
(b) a tree of that cluster
The two phrases in (i) are referentially identical,
those in (ii) are not. A related test is provided by:
(9:5)(i)(a) that type of car
(b) that car-type
(ii)(a) that cup of coffee
(b) that coffee-cup
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— where again the phrases in (i) are referentially ident¬
ical as opposed to those in (ii).
In (9:4) the head nouns are "car" and "tree"; in (9:5)
the head nouns in the (a) examples are "car" and "coffee",
in the (b) examples "type" and "cup". If we now apply the
number-criteria discussed in § 7.11 to the phrases at
hand it will be clear that only the (a) examples in both
(9:4) and (9:5) will be 'true* classifying constructions.
If the numeral "two" is inserted throughout, its scope
will be the head noun in all the (b) examples, whereas it
will be the E-classifier in all the (a) examples. Cf. this
with the superficially similar phrases in
(9:6)(a) a wall of stone
(b) a stone wall
I consider "wall" the head noun in both (a) and (b);
that is, the denotatum of "wall" is the referentially most
significant denotatum. In each case a special kind of wall
is being denoted. Insertion of "two" for "a" will have
"wall" within its scope in both (a) and (b). Hence neither
is a classifying construction.1
1 The question as to which element is the head noun and which the clas¬
sifying element is not quite straightforward, and it is somewhat in¬
tuitive. Consider, however, the following equations:
(i)(a) two walls of stone : two stone walls
(b) two types of car : two car-types
(c) two kinds of car : *two car-kinds
(ii)(a) two walls of stone : two walls of the stone kind
(b) two types of car : *two cars of the srf kind
There is an implicit hierarchy in these equations:
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All classifier structures are double branched. The
head noun originates in the superordinate, the classi¬
fying element in the subordinate. The distributional
characteristics of generic and partitive E-classifiers
are due to different adjunctions of the subordinate to
the superordinate. A subordinate structure containing a
generic E-classifier is adjoined to gen in the superord¬
inate, whereas one containing a partitive E-classifier
is adjoined to part. These different properties of E-
classifier structures again reflect the adnominal cases
that govern them. Generic E-classifler structures are
governed by nom, partitive structures by abl.
9.21 The derivation of generic E-classifiers.
The underlying representation of (954 i) is a complex
structure of the form (9:7)(a):
1. "wall" : never E-classifier
2. "type" : sometimes E-classifier
3. "kind" s always E-classifier
The structural similarities between all of these delimitative ser¬
ializations will be commented on later in the present chapter,
where I shall argue that it is "stone" (i a) that can be called































E-classifiers are characterized derivationally by lex¬
ical subjunction of gen-L1, the effect of which is to
superimpose the denotative features on Lgen on the inher¬
ent semantic content of "kind" in gen. When L is not
gen
specified by any denotative features, the superficial re¬
flex of this subjunction is "kind" or "sort", the two
•neutral' generic E-classifiers. Notice that I consider
not only generic but also partitive E-classifiers to par¬
take in this subjunction, taking this as the source of
the selection restrictions on (partitive) E-classifiers
commented on above.
A concomitant effect of this lexical subjunction is
to ensure that E-classifiers appear superficially as
nouns, since L — the node carrying the inherent
gen
specification (+subst +stat) for nouns — is now sub¬
joined to gen, and thus specifies the lexical material
under gen as a noun.
The subordinate structure of (9:7 a) thus develops into
1 It is possible — though difficult to substantiate and even more
difficult to falsify — that E-classifiers also involve lexical
subjunction of pres-L, and that this is the reason why they can
be compared to the 'true' classifiers (which, as we saw in ch. 7,
cam be regarded as lexicalizations of pres-L). Such an account
would explain the impossibility of "that kind-thing of a caur",
since L is the node dominating "thing" in the few expressions
pres
in English that incorporate "thing" after a noun, as in "that
pencil-thing". Since I have been unable to find other (non-in¬
tuitive) reasons for it, however, and since E-classifiers cam
—apparently — be analyzed without it, I merely mention it as
a possibility for further inquiry.
3o2
(9:7 b) , which also incorporates the lexical subjunction








all # kind some gf one
there,
then,'
The reader is reminded that lexical subjunction pre¬
cedes RP-subjunction.
The full cycle of RP-subjunctions yields a derived
string like (9:7 c), where the workings of the Ml-con-


























There are two ways in which (9:7) can be developed
further: either the subordinate (nom) structure is ad¬
joined to gen in the superordinate, or it is not. The
optionality is parallel to the development of complex
structures involving universal quantifiers. In contrast,
the partitive E-classifier structures must be adjoined
to part in the superordinate, thus creating a parallel
to the development of complex structures involving ex¬
istential (disjunctive) quantifiers. If the subordinate
in (9:7) is not adjoined to gen we get the structure
(9:7 d), which shows normal development of the superord¬
inate:
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(9 s 7) (d)
nom


















The Mirror-Image Convention is the source of the in¬
definite article (cf. § lo^21). The application of the
morphophonemic rules to (9:7 d) eventually gives "a car
of that kind".
However, as was pointed out above, this is not a
classifying construction in that a numeral in the super-
ordinate will have "car" as its scope. The classifying
construction is the one that involves adjunction of the
subordinate to gen in the superordinate, i.e. (9:7 e),
again with broken determination lines to indicate the
effect of the Mi-convention between nom and the struc¬

























Finally, nom is subjoined to gen, absorbing the func¬
tional structure of the superordinate, at least in non
-colloquial English. It is only latterly, I think, that
the Mi-convention is seen at work in this subjunction, es¬
pecially when the subordinate is marked (+quest), yield¬
ing phrases like "what kind of a car (is that)".
Without the MI-convention, subjunction of nom to gen
in (9:7 e) provides us with the representation directly






















The main piece of empirical evidence in favour of the
conflation of the morphophonemic carriages is provided by
generic E-classifier structures like this. The variety of
number specifications available to the combination of clas¬
sifying element and head noun defies conventional accounts
of the category of number in English; indeed, a case could
probably be made for the claim that the head noun in such
constructions is outside the scope of the category of
countability. Since on the other hand such structures
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display referential identity with non-classifying struc¬
tures like (9:7 d) in which clearly two number specifi¬
cations are needed, the natural consequence is to derive
the classifying structure from the non-classifying one
(as I have done). And this entails a transformational
'conflation' of the compartments that account for number
in the two partial structures involved in (9:7 d). It
may be, however, that it is an unjustifiable simplifica¬
tion not to incorporate the (originally superordinate)
carriage in (9:7 f). In languages other than English some
of the features included in it are clearly relevant to
the head noun.
The generic E-classifier structure is a marked feature
of colloquial (British and American) English, where it
manifests itself in the frequent use of "sort of" and
Tcind of" as 'downtoners' (cf. Quirk et al., 1972:§§ 5.
51 note; 5.58). The examples quoted in the latter of these
paragraphs show the Mi-convention at work, even without
the subordinate having been marked (+quest), as in "he
gave sort of a laugh". However, the alternative to this,
"he gave a sort of laugh", is an indication that the sub¬
ordinate ("sort of") structure has become a fossilized
subjunction in the same way as the "many"-structure com¬
mented on above. It would appear that it can be inserted
directly in a single-branch tree, either adjoined or sub¬
joined to gen, the former possibility accounting for "he
gave sort of a laugh", the latter for "he gave a sort of
3o8
laugh". This, too, will account for the use of "sort of"
and "kind of" as modifiers of adjectives, since if the
"kind of"-subjunction is inserted in a branch with lex-
icalized L . we will get either "he gave a sort ofpart,
strange smile" or "he gave a strange sort of smile",
again depending on whether "sort of" is adjoined
or subjoined. (The latter of these examples should not,
of course, be equated semantically with "he gave a strange
kind of smile" — stressed "kind" — in which the adjec¬
tive derives from L , in the subordinate "kind of "-branch}.
part
The last point I want to comment on relative to gen¬
eric E-classifiers is their relationship with such non
-classifying constructions as "a wall of stone" and "a
stone wall". As mentioned above, "wall" is considered to
be the head noun in both cases, thus originating under
Lgen in some structure. The question then is whether
"stone" originates in the same branch, or whether a com¬
plex structure is required. Put in different words, we
are interested in the old problem whether "stone" is a
'noun' or an 'adjective' in "a stone wall". If it is an
'adjective' then w« can derive it from L^art in the same
branch that develops "wall"; if it is a 'noun' it must
be derived from L and consequently from a different
gen,
branch from that which generates "wall".
Since the two phrases are referentially identical, and
since one of them is a delimitative serialization, the
best prospects are offered by considering both to derive
from complex structures. Whereas delimitative serializa-
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tions invariably involve a complex structure, appositive
serializations only sometimes derive from non-complex
structures. Since furthermore there are similarities be¬
tween classifying constructions (generic) and the phrases
under discussion, some evidence is available in favour of
a double-branch derivation.
This similarity is due to the arguable fact that
"stone" is the reflex of the same lexical subjunction of
gen-L in a subordinate branch as "kind": it indicates a
kind of wall. It is then not an E-classifier in not being
adjoined to gen in the superordinate, but rather to Lgen
with which it enters the Mi-convention under subjunction.







By subjunction of N to nom, and nom to Lgen get
"a stone wall", with absorption of "of". However, "of"
is realized as "-'s" in the parallel derivation of "a
31o
bird's nest".
We now also see why "a red stone wall" is the correct
serialization, and not "*a stone red wall". As a modifier
on "wall", "red" will lexicalize Lpart in the superordi&ate
and thus come to precede "stone" in the final derived
string. It is interesting in connection with my hypoth¬
esis that the lexical subjunction of gen-L should account
for the selection restrictions on E-classifiers to notice
that if "stone" was modified by "red" in the subordinate,
subjunction cannot take place in English; there is no
phrase "*a red-stone wall". Instead we get "a wall of red
stones" (or "... of red stone"). The implication is that
only when L is empty — or perhaps lexicalized by an
pQiU
item from a restricted set of items — does the lexical
subjunction of gen-L occur. Cf. this with the Danish
phrases
(9:9)(a) en stenmur (cf. *en stensmur)
a stonewall
(b) en r^dstensmur (cf. *en r^dstenmur)
a redstone'swall
See further Bauer (1975) for an admirable account of
Danish (and English and French) compounds — although he,
too, is puzzled by the distributional properties of the
three 'compounding morphemes' in Danish, i.e. "0" (zero),
"s" and "e". Investigation of the lexicalizations in the
subordinate structure along the lines suggested here might
lead to further insights into this problem.
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9.22 The derivation of partitive E-classlflers.
Essentially the same derivation applies to the partitive
E-classifiers as the one treated in some detail for gen¬
eric E-classifiers. The main difference is that the part¬
itive structure is governed by abl — rather than nom —
and that consequently it is adjoined to part in the super-
ordinate. This difference in case government is postulated
on the basis of the irreversibility which characterizes
partitive E-classifier structures as opposed to generic
structures (cf. (9:4)); and this, in its turn is linked
with the obligatory adjunction of subordinate structures
generating referential functives associated with disjunc¬
tion.
Partitive E-classifiers fall into the same two groups
as those recognized for Burmese by Okell (cf. S 7.12);
that is, we have both grouping E-classifiers ("cluster",
"group", "class", "team", etc.), and measuring E-classi-
fiers ("ton", "yard", "lump", "glass", "bucket", etc.).
These two subgroups are fairly consistently associated
with countability vs. uncountability, although a measure
of overlap is in evidence (e.g. "a bucket of bricks").
The decisive factor in counting even these overlapping in¬
stances among the classifying constructions is then the
lack of a phrase "a bucket of brick" which is in referen¬
tial contrast with the former.
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This intimate relationship with the feature (icount)
is further evidence for the adjunction of partitive E-
classifier structures to part — assuming, of course,
that my placement of that feature (on part) is correct.





lo.l The class of determinatives.
The class of determinatives that can be established on





























The layout of the determinatives in this manner is meant
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to suggest that I consider a certain amount of subclassi-
fication relevant within the class. These subclassifica-
tions are related to what I have called the suppletive
nature of the referential functives.
In one sense the determinatives form a hybrid class.
That is, each determinative has a suppletive counterpart
in one of the other subclasses of referential functives,
whereas not all quantifiers, E-classifiers, and pronouns
have a suppletive counterpart in one of the other sub¬
classes. This viewpoint is behind the organization of
(lo:l), which is based purely on formal and distributional
criteria. In this way (a) and (b) are suppletive with pro¬
nouns, (c) with quantifiers, and (d) with E-classifiers.
The distinction between (a) and (b) is of a formal nature:
the members of (a) are suppletive with formally identical
pronouns, the members of (b) with formally non-identical
pronouns. This view, of course, depends on multiplication
of entities. It recognizes two kinds of "this", "that",
etc. on the basis of a pattern like
(lo:2) (a) her : hers :: his : x; x «= his
(b) the : it :: that : x; x » that
Although such a view is stringently in accord with dis¬
tributional analysis it gives rise to a certain uneasiness.
First, and not very seriously, it cuts across traditional
classifications. Secondly, it multiplies entities apparent¬
ly beyond necessity. Thirdly, and most seriously, it is not
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even clear that it is semantically (or referentially) ten¬
able. In particular, whereas determinative "we" (etc.) — at
least intuitively — is parasitic upon pronominal "we",
pronominal "that" (etc.) conversely encroaches on deter¬
minative "that". A formal/distributional analysis cannot
account for this intuition. Furthermore, it cannot account
for the fact that only the plural forms "we" and "them"
are suppletive, not the singular forms "I", "he", "she".
"One"-deletion along the lines of Postal (1966) accounts
for it — superficially, at least. Yet Postal neglects to
explore the possibilities of "one"-insertion instead, which,
as Sommerstein (1972:198 ff) points out, is not only more
economical but also far more plausible.
If we want to take heed of this intuition about
group (a) and at the same time do not want to reduplicate
from one class to the other, "that", "this", etc. come out
as determinatives with no suppletive counterparts, but with
occasional pronominal function. The same applies, mutatis
mutandis, to "we", "you", etc., whereas the question is
indeterminable for "his" and "its". We have ended up in a
deadlock.
This discussion might appear rather whimsical. Yet the
issue lurking behind it is a real and important one. I be¬
lieve it is fair to say that when linguistis have spoken
about determinatives (or determiners) it has on the whole
been tacitly assumed that "the" and "a" in some sense are
the basic determinatives on the behaviour of which all
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other determinatives had to be explained or described.
This view, as will have appeared, is a natural and just¬
ifiable one as long as the determinatives are considered
in isolation. These two can only behave like determinatives,
as can the other members of groups (b), (c) and (d) with
the exception of relative "which(R)" (which is suppletive
with itself as a pronoun, and with "who(R)" and "that(R)").
However, when the immanent suppletive structure in the
system of referential functives is taken into considera¬
tion, it emerges that "this", "that", "these", "those",
and "same" — the latter not generally taken to be a det¬
erminative because it co-occurs with "the"1 — have an
equal' not greater claim on being taken as basic, since
it can be argued that they have no suppletive counterparts
except themselves. To this might be added the historical
evidence of the development both of "a" and "the" (cf.
Christophersen, 1939:ch. V; Keltveit, 1953:99 ff) from a
numeral and a demonstrative, respectively.
Thus, in his recent (1973) paper, Lyons takes "that"
as basic with "this", deriving "the" from the weak non
-proximate deictic (i.e. "that^") in the synchronic de¬
scription. Although he only discusses a limited number of
determinatives, the implication is that they should all be
1
Just as a verb may have two tenses, in the sense of two time-ref¬
erences — cf. "John has been here" with reference to both past
and present — a noun might be thought capable of having a compos¬
ite determinative. "The same" and "such a" sure such composite det¬
erminatives .
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dealt with in terms of the system which generates "that"
and "this" as basic.
The difficulty of deciding in a principled way which
determinative is basic is a consequence of the fact that
none of the determinatives are basic qua referential func-
tives. They all derive from (various combinations of)
"all", "kind", "some", and "one" by different transforma¬
tional processes, notably lexical subjunction and the MI
-convention. Whether or not a given determinative can be
established as basic relative to the other determinatives
is a question on which I suspend judgment.
lo.2 The suppletive determinatives.
In view of the discussion in the last paragraph I shall
regard the members of groups (lo:l) (c) and (d) as the
suppletive determinatives, whereas those in (a) and (b)
will be referred to collectively as the definite determin¬
atives.
Iq.21 "A", "every", and "what?".
The suppletive pattern appropriate for the three deter¬
minatives to be dealt with here is (lo:3):
318
(lo:3) a : one :: every : each :: what? : which?
To say this is to say that it is the same kind of pro¬
cess that, applied to the same area in the referential
branch, will account for the differences between "a" and
"one", "every" and "each", "what" and "which". The area
involved is ind-L, and the process is different exploit¬
ations of adjunction, subjunction, and the Mi-convention
during the first step of the RP-subjunction cycle.
The common feature of "a", "every", and "what?" is that
none of them derive from a structure with lexical subjunc-
tion of ind-L. This also applies to "one", but not to
"each" and "which?", as we have seen (§§ 8.3; 8.42; 8.44).
The (synchronic) distinction between "a" and "one" is
that, whereas "one" is conflated with "all", "kind", and
"some" during subjunction, "a" derives from a structure
in which "one" has entered the Mi-convention with "some"
on the first step of RP-subjunction. The partial repres¬





(all) there. -► one
(kind) then^





If ind is (+cond) the outcome of (a) is still "a"
('generic'), whereas the outcome of (b) is "any" — cf.
(8:36) .
The main feature which distinguishes "every" from
"each" is non-application vs. application of lexical sub-
junction of ind-L plus the fact that "each" always in¬
volves a complex structure. The main feature which dis¬
tinguishes "every" from "a" (and "any") is that ind
— subcategorized as (-plur -cond) — in the derivation
of "every" is only adjoined to part with optional expres¬
sion of "one". I take (lo:5) to be a representation of
the structure immediately underlying "every man":
(lo:5) N
We are led to this analysis by reflecting on the pat















one of the men
any of the men
each of the men
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(d) *a of the men
(e) *every of the men
(ii)(a)
(b) any one of the men
(c) each one of the men
(d)
(e) every one of the men
The common characteristic of (i a-c) is subjunction
and absorption of ind under part? (id) is characterized
by subjunction and the Mi-convention; and (i e) by ad¬
junction of ind to part. Since (i b) may take a singular
verb, and since (i e) is ill-formed, these two must dif¬
fer in their treatment of ind — though not necessarily
in the way I have suggested. Since on the other hand
(i a and c) are well-formed, and are best analyzed on
the absorption-theory1, it is natural to analyze (b) on
the same basis. Finally, from the — self-explanatory —
paradigmatic gaps in (ii) it follows that (i e) cannot
be analyzed on the basis of (i d). (ii b and c) then
presumably represent the intermediate stage of adjunction
of ind to part which forms the analytical basis for the
description of "every". Whereas they — i.e. "each" and
"any" — allow subjunction, "every" does not.
1 That the absorption-hypothesis is the best analysis follows from
the necessity of subjoining ind to part for the analysis of'all
the men" and "both the men" (cf. (8:lo) and (8:22)).
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Appositive serializations involving "what?", like
"every", originate in a single-branch tree. It depends on
application of the full cycle of RP-subjunctions, and of
course on (+quest) on pres. The directly underlying struc¬













<f> car <f> what car?
Notice that this phrase is ambiguous. It can be under¬
stood as either (lo:8) (a) or (b):
(lo:8)(a) what (kind of) car (is that)?
(b) what (specimen) car (is that)?
This is naturally to be expected since both gen and ind
are involved in the subjunction of functional categories.
Explicit disambiguation in favour of (a) involves a com¬
plex (generic E-classifier) structure in which "what?" and
"kind" originate in the subordinate.
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lo,22 "No" and "such".
"No" is the determinative that suppletes the E-classi-
fier "none" — which latter may, of course, have indepen#
dent pronominal function as well. "No" can only appear
in appositive serializations, "none" only in delimitative
serializations. In this way "no" and "none" probably con¬
stitute the most symmetric suppletive pair of referential
functives, although the same relationship holds between
"such" (determinative) and "kind" (E-classifier).
Noun phrases introduced by "no" look deceptively simple,
and it might be tempting to say that the meaning of "no"
embodies "all" and (+neg) and leave matters at that. Al¬
though such an analysis might not be wrong, it certainly
would not be exhaustive.
We note first that a NP containing "no" may be either
uncountable, countable singular, or countable plural. NP's
introduced by "all" have only the first and the third of
these options, barring such predicative NP's as "she was
all woman", the analysis of which is somewhat special and
might indeed constitute grounds for allowing primary sub-
categorization of N in terms of (universal elective) al¬
one, thus rather making the countability distinction in¬
applicable (in excluding part) than actually containing a
singular countable noun. We shall touch upon this question
again in the discussion of so-called 'generic' NP's in¬
troduced by "the".
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The second noteworthy point is that there are in fact
restrictions on the availability of singular and plural
countables after "no" which can be related to contextual
features; cf.:
(loslo)(i)(a) no dogs are allowed in the park
(b) ?no dog is allowed in the park
(ii)(a) *no horses could jump that fence
(b) no horse could jump that fence
A third interesting point is the paraphrasability of
(lo:lo). The marking of (ii a) as unacceptable should be
taken to mean that it is likely to be substituted by
(lo:lo)(ii)(a1) none of the horses could jump that fence
A comparable paraphrase — or substitution — is not
possible for (i a), which is the expression of a*law
-like' proposition. In contrast, (ii a') is spatio-tem¬
poral ly bound.
(ii b) is also — perhaps more precisely, could also
be used as — an expression of a law-like proposition,
but one of a different sort from that expressed by (i a).
A valid paraphrase of (ii b) would be
(lo:lo)(ii)(b') there is/was no horse that could jump
that fence
A comparable paraphrase of (i a) would be meaningless,
and the comparable paraphrase of (ii a) would, if it is
feasible at all, incorporate an expression like "on that
324
occasion". Taking note of the interpretation of the feature
(+conditional) (p. 28o) , we can paraphrase (loilo ii b) as
(lo:lo)(ii)(b") if there is a categorial location "horse"
then nothing that is located in it can
jump that fence
A number of interesting points can be made in connec¬
tion with this paraphrase.
Although (lo:lo)(ii)(a) might be given a paraphrase
similar to (lo:lo ii b') if some space/time indication
is provided, it cannot be given a paraphrase similar to
(lo:lo ii b"), and it is clear why not. (+cond) sets a
condition on the categorial location — rather than on
the level zero entities that may be located in it — and
therefore the notions of countability and number are ir¬
relevant.
Further points are connected with the epistemic/prag-
matic distinction in the modals in the original sentence
and the paraphrases, and connected with this again are
the various relationships with the original example dis¬
played by the set of sentences in (lo:ll):
(loslo)(ii)(b) no horse could jump that fence
(lo:11)(a) not any horse could jump that fence
(b) not all horses could jump that fence
(c) not every horse could jump that fence
(d) not one horse could jump that fence
(e) some horses could not jump that fence
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In view of the fact that "no men" and "not any men" can
be regarded as referentially identical (cf. § 8.44), the
relationship between (lo:lo ii b) and (lo:ll a) is espec¬
ially suggestive. Whereas the former is arguably marked
(+cond) always — or only in epistemic contexts? — the
latter is many-ways ambiguous as between (lo:ll b-e). If
it can also be used instead of (lo:lo ii b) the implication
is that "any" is not invariably (+cond) when quantifying
singular countables. That is, it may be (-cond) in negative
contexts.
It emerges that although NP's introduced by "no" and
marked (+plur) or (-count) follow the derivation of ap-
positively serialized, non-definite NP's introduced by
"all", the availability of a singular marking on such
phrases must be explained along different lines. Here
(+cond) becomes indispensable. The historical explanation
of this, I believe, is the disappearance of the OE and
ME negative forms "naenig" and "nany", the function of
which has been taken over by modern English "no", not by
"not any" + singular.
The relationship between "kind" and "such" is often
recognized in grammars of English (e.g. Quirk et al.,
1972:§ lo.67); yet the status of "such" as a determin¬
ative is far from generally accepted (cf. again Quirk
et al., 1972:§ 13.68 where it is classified as a pronoun).
Here it is — by definition — a determinative since it




(b) *such of these men
— disregarding the relative constructions "such of these
Noun as which derive from complex structures.
Another factor which might count against regarding it
as a determinative is its co-occurrence with "a". The
noteworthy feature in this connection, however, is its
incapability of co-occurring with "the" — or any def¬
inite determinative. This suggests that "such" in itself
in some sense is "definite". Since definiteness depends
on lexical subjunction of to a functional node, and
since "such" is the determinative that suppletes "kind",
it suggests, in fact, that "such" derives from a struc¬
ture in which is lexically subjoined to gen. A first
approximation to the analysis of "such" is therefore to
note under what conditions may come to be subjoined
to gen.
There is only one way in which this is achieved by the
rules we have employed so far: by lexical subjunction of
Lind to :1"nc* un<*er observation of the Mi-convention. This





















This could be a plausible representation of "such a
In particular, it accounts nicely for the order between
"such" and "a", *a* being the usual, morphophonemicslly
weakened reflex of 'one* when it has undergone the MI-
convention. However, if this is the representation of
"such a (man)", then the representation of "such (men)"
should naturally be expected to be (lo:13) marked (+plur)
(-spec), i.e. the same representation without "one". But
this, as will be recalled, is the representation held to
underlie "the men" (cf. (8:lo)).
The derivation that will solve this problem — viz.
to prevent "some" from intervening between "kind" and
"there^* — is double application of the Mi-convention
during the first two steps of RP-subjunction. This gives















This will account satisfactorily for both "such a
(man)" and "such (men)". As usual in Standard English, sub-
junction under pres is optional. If it does not apply we
get "all such men", and, with pres marked (+neg), "no
such man/men".
However, phrases like (lo:15) will then require treat¬
ment which the framework so far developed will not cope





one such man (is Charlie Brown)
two such men


















One readjustment of the scheme is all that is needed to
enable us to generate strings like (lo:16), however. If we
allow lexical subjunction of to apply after RP-subjunc-
tion as well as before, provided that the Mi-convention has
applied during subjunction of part to gen, we can produce
a configuration like (lo:16) and thus account for (lo:15).
And not only that. We can also give a satisfactory account
of 'generic* NP's introduced by "the" and other special
properties of definite NP's.
In addition to the unmarked derivation of "such a
outlined above, we then also allow a marked derivation































^ man one such man
If ind is (+cond) we get from this "any such man", and
if ind remains adjoined to part, "?every such man".
lo.3 The influence of L, ,Ind.
In § 5.323 a preliminary and rather superficial account
was given of the indicating features — realized as deic¬
tic adverbs — on L. , so that we could avail ourselves
ind
of these features during the discussion of quantifiers
and E-classifiers. Their real significance, however, lies
in the r6le they play in the derivation of determinatives
and pronouns.
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Although the treatment of these phenomena here owes
much to Lyons' (1973) paper 'Deixis as a source of refers
ence', some departures from the exposition there have
been in evidence. Let me therefore begin this section by
defending and justifying these departures and additions.
lo.31 Justification for (±space) and (±time).
First of all, Lyons operates with a feature (ientity).
So do I. But whereas Lyons has it as one of the features
eventually realized by a demonstrative determinative
("that", "this", "these", "those", or "the"), I have it
as the basic denotative feature on L Lyons' approach
pires •
leads naturally to the appositive analysis he proposes
for such phrases as "that dog", which can be underlying-
ly represented by an appositive structure like "that en-
tity"-"that dog" (or a number of other possibilities due
to varying applications of appositivalization and adjec-
tivalization which need not concern us).
For a variety of reasons — some of which were dis¬
cussed in §§ 1.22 and 4.431-2 — the traditional concept
of apposition was found wanting in clarity. Instead the
notion of appositive serialization was introduced. The con¬
sequence of this which interests us in this connection is
that there is then no longer any need to incorporate (±en-
tity) in the demonstratives. We can see it rather as the
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feature which indicates what sort of thing (entity or
place) is being introduced into the universe of dis-
couxse which is the extension of pres-L (cf. (5:9)).
Secondly, Lyons does not operate with a feature
(±space). In fact, his feature (tentity) in a certain
sense covers not only my feature (tentity) but also
(tspace). That this is so will be clear from a closer
look at Lyons' need for introducing a feature (tdistal)
in addition to (iproximate). Lyons relates this need to
the Boolean conditions on binarism? I think the need
arises from something else.
The feature (tdistal) is introduced by (-proximate)
(p. 76) *. Its introduction is designed to account for the
distinction between the strong and the weak non-proximate
deictics, of which the weak adverb (there^) is later (p.
8o) associated with existence. Next Lyons states,
Just as the meaning of the weak demonstrative
pronoun that^ is derived by abstraction from
the gesture of pointing, so the weak demon¬
strative there^ is derived by abstraction from
the notion of location in the deictic context.
(p. 8o)
The phrase "the deictic context", it seems, must mean
"the physical, spatio(-temporal) context"; cf. p. 79:
"We begin by introducing the notion of deictic existence:
1 Unless otherwise stated, all page-references in the present section
aire to the edition of Lyons' paper printed in Keenan (1975) pp. 61-
83. An earlier version appeared (1973) in LAUT.
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location in a physical space, whose co-ordinates are
established by the utterance of sentences of a given
language-system."
The feature-specification lexicalized as there^ is
: there
— where (+D) is the deixis-indicator (p. 76).
Now, if we re-interpret Lyons' appeal to "the deictic
context" in terms of the feature (tspace), and incorporate
this in Lyons' original specification for there^ in (lo:
18) we get
(lo:19)
— at least if I have interpreted correctly the phrase
"by abstraction from the notion of location in the deic¬
tic context" from the passage quoted above (my emphasis).
To abstract from something is to imply that it is there.
This feature-specification — i.e. (lo:19) — is in
conflict with the view attributed to Lyons on the rel¬
ationship between location and existence in § 2.25. It
commits its proponents to the view attributed to Searle,
according to which existence is dependent upon location,
or 'abstracted from' it; cf. § 2.24.












use of (-entity) to specify the deictic adverbs. Put in
different terms, Lyons' feature-specification, it seems
to me, cannot account for the fact that entities may be
seen as places and vice versa (cf.§ 5.322, in particular
(5:12) and discussion).
These considerations constitute the justification for
introducing the feature (±space). It enables us to give
a specification of the 'existential' deictic adverb which
is unmarked for physical, spatial location, viz. (-space),
which may be part of a nominal subcategorization which in¬
volves, in addition, either (+entity) or (-entity). In
this way we maintain the fundamental equivalence between
existence and location.
The third and last point I shall comment on relative
to Lyons' paper concerns my introduction of (itime) as a
parallel to (tspace). Lyons does not discuss the temporal
fSeictics, but it is natural to try to accomodate them in
the same way as the spatial deictics, especially in view
of the fact that the feature (iproximate) is equally rel¬
evant to both. However, by introducing such a feature I
commit myself to demonstrating the validity of a set of
temporal deictic adverbs corresponding to the spatial ad¬
verbs; in particular, I commit myself to demonstrating the
presence of a weak and a strong non-proximate temporal
adverb, then^ and then^. The justification of (±time),
therefore, will take the form of justifying the presence
of these two adverbs.
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It has been mentioned several times throughout part III
that I consider definiteness to be a non-basic notion, de¬
pending on lexical subjunction of to ind or — latter¬
ly — to gen. In other words, I consider the sense of the
definite article (and other definite determinatives) to
incorporate the sense of the deictic adverbs generated
under Lind plus the sense of one or more of the function¬
al categories ind, part, and gen.
I shall now argue that the sense of the temporal deic-
tics is usually unexpressed, and that the dental phonologic¬
al feature common to the definite determinatives1 is the
expression of the archi-feature (aspace) which is involved
in every lexical subjunction of This opens the pos¬
sibility of analyzing the weak spatial deictic into (aspace
+ 0) and the strong spatial deictic into (aspace + aprox-
imate), where "0" is the existential component, (aproximate)
the locative component, and (aspace) the component which
is common to (+space) and (-space). We return to the im¬
plications of such an analysis later, where I shall re¬
fer to the common component as the a-component.
On the other hand, the sense of the temporal deictics
may be expressed. Consider
1
Synchronically this feature is manifest initially ("the", "that",
etc.), infixed ("either"), or suffixed ("both"); perhaps it is
also assimilated ("such", "same"). It is not manifest in the
pronouns.
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(lo:2o)(a) the Prime Minister
(b) the present Prime Minister
The referential potential of (b) is included in that of
(a), which is tantamount to saying that whatever accounts
for the superficial appearance of "present" may be left
unexpressed, yet is retrievable.
The feature that quite naturally could be regarded as
the central feature of "present" is (+time). Furthermore,
it expresses proximity in the temporal sense. Thus an ap¬
propriate if possibly incomplete, feature-specification
of "present" would be
(lo: 21) p-time '[+proxioate_j
Let us now see whether any candidates offer them¬
selves as possible lexicalizations of (+time -proximate).
In fact, several do:
(lo:22)(a) the former Prime Minister
(b) the then Prime Minister
(c) the late Prime Minister
The salient points for our discussion in respect of
these three — and there are others, e.g. "previous",
"recent", "past", etc. — can be expressed by means of
a time-line. Let PM stand for the predicate "be Prime
Minister", E for the physical existence of the person
who is the carrier of PM, and TU for "time of utterance":
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Rough paraphrases of (lo:22) corresponding to these
time-lines would be
(lo:24)(a) the x who has been Prime Minister
(b) the x who was Prime Minister at time t
(where t is prior to TU)
(c) the x, who was Prime Minister at (or before)
the time of his death
Whereas (a) and (b) carry only positive existential
presuppositions or implications, (c) carries both a pos¬
itive and a negative ones (c) implies (or presupposes)
that someone who was (recently) alive and a Prime Minister,
is now dead. But this, in fact, is the overriding implica¬
tion. The reference to time is only concomitant with that.
In contrast, (a) and (b) are primarily time-indicators.
I suggest that both "former" and "then" realize the tem¬
poral deictic features (+time -prox) — i.e. then,, —
whereas "late" realizes the temporal deictic feature (-time)
— i.e. then^. Then^ is a temporal existential.
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In addition to (-time), "late" embodies a number of
other (denotative) features at least one of which is neg¬
ative in some sense. As for the possibility of expressing
the temporal existential in its naked — or at least in a
positive — form, cf. the next paragraph.
The distinction between "former" and "then" correlates
with the distinction in the aspect-system of English be¬
tween non-perfective and perfective. A similar distinc¬
tion is embodied in the Danish equivalents of "former"







offdead "late", but with weaker as¬
sociation of "recently".
I shall not go into a more detailed discussion of these
phenomena here. Suffice it to say that the distinction be¬
tween three orders of entities is relevant to an assess¬
ment of the semantic properties of these and other lexemes
that embody (±time), probably supplemented by considera¬
tions of the distinction between essential and contingent
qualities.
Notice finally that by associating the adjectives
"former", "then", "late", etc. with Lind — rather than
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with Lpart — through (±time), a derivational criterion
is provided which may account for the (well-known) fact
that these adjectives in attributive position cannot be
derived from a predication by relative clause reduction
and adjective movement, and which correlates with their
intuitive relationship with adverbs (cf. e.g. Bach, 1968:
lol ff).
lo.32 Positive expression of (ttime).
I have hitherto assumed that the indefinite article is
derived from structures without lexical subjunction of
Lfnd (and with the Mi-convention applied during RP-sub-
junction) . I shall now present an alternative that re¬
cognizes lexical subjunction of Lin(q to ind, plus appli¬
cation of the Mi-convention. The derived structures which
arise from this alternative look like (lo:26):
(lo:26) N
I I I
I ^ I I i












The superficial expression of (lo:26), I suggest, is
"there are tigers", i.e. an 'absolute' existential sentence.
"Be" as an existential verb is arguably non-tensed, neutral,
as it were, to the question of temporal proximity; it real¬
izes the temporal existential in its naked form. This der¬
ivation goes some way towards showing, on linguistic
grounds, that existence is not a property: "there are
tigers" is derived from a non-predicational structure.
Moreover, it accounts naturally for the special proper¬
ties of number-concord displayed by such sentences.
However, we are left, as indicated, with the question
of deciding whether or not a case-specification is rel¬
evant, and if so, which. This question is no more dif¬
ficult to decide — in principle — than the comparable
question within a predicational derivation of existential
sentences. As long as pres is the case-preserving node
within the referential structure we can say that, unless
N is governed by a case, the potential of pres to carry
a case is actualized by the most neutral case-category,
i.e. nora.
From the basic configuration (lo:26) we can derive
other 'absolute' existential sentences like "tigers ex¬
ist" by appeal to a subordinate locative branch which gen¬
erates "in existence". By subjunction to Lind and normal¬
ization of the surface order of the ensuing string on the
pattern of the serialization of English predicational
structures we eventually get "tigers exist". (For a dif¬
ferent — predicational — derivation of such existential
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sentences which also invokes the concept of (lexical)
subjunction, see Anderson, 1974a; cf. also Allan, 1971).
As pointed out by Lyons (1968:§ 3.4.3; 1973:8o) sen¬
tences introduced by "there is ..." more often than not
involve an explicit locative phrase as well, in contrast
to what I called 'absolute' existential sentences. Ex¬
ploiting the timeless derivation and its possible ex¬
tension by a subordinate locative branch, we might sug¬
gest a parallel derivation for nominals marked (-plur)
and (ttime). Thus,"there is a fly in my eye" will derive
from a double — actually triple, because of "my"; cf.
§ lo.42 — branched tree, in which the superordinate gen¬
erates "there is a fly" along the lines of (lo:26), the
intermediate locative branch "in ... eye", which remains
unsubjoined (cf. "in"), and the lowest one "my", also
from a locative branch which, however, is subjoined to
L. . in the intermediate. The tense of "be" in such sen-
ina
tences will then reflect the feature (tproximate).
Whether or not such an analysis is justifiable and
plausible, the fact remains that it arises naturally
from the framework we have been developing. In particular,
of course, it focuses attention on (±time). Yet it should
be noted that the proposed derivation of existential sen¬
tences in this way is not the reason for postulating
(±time). It is rather the other way round.
343
lo.4 The definite determinatives.
The remaining determinatives in (lo:l) are all definite
in a sense to be precisely characterized below, as was
"such". However, due to derivational requirements we can
recognize two subtypes of definite determinative, one that
can be derived from a single-branch tree, and one that can
be derived from a double-branch tree. The determinatives
belonging to the former type are — besides "such", which
we have already looked at — "the", "this", "that", "these",
and "those".
The sense in which these determinatives are definite
can be stated as follows:
(lo:27) A referential functive is definite if and
only if it derives from a referential struc¬
ture in which Lind is lexically subjoined
to, and absorbed with, one or more of the
functional categories.
Not until I had shown the possibility of generating ex¬
istential sentences from a simple nominal structure have
I been able to state this, because the derivation of such
sentences involves lexical subjunction but not absorption
of L. , Hence there are no existential sentences of the
ma •
form "there is the ..." (although there are 'functional*
sentences of this form; Atkinson & Griffiths, 1973:51 ff).
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lo.41 "The" vs. "that'Vthis".
There seems to be nothing referentially odious in say¬
ing that "these" find "those" differ from "this" and "that"
with respect to the feature (+plur) and nothing else. The
fact that the plural forms may be used independently to
refer to people, in contrast to the singular forms, is
not capable of formulation within the bounds of the ref¬
erential theory, at least as far as I have been able to
determine. Furthermore, it seems not to be a common phen¬
omenon of the Germanic languages; cf. Danish
(lo:28) Den der ager med stude kommer ogsaa med
that who drives with oxen comes also with
(proverbial: "slow and steady wins the race")
Such usage is restricted to proverbial expressions in
Danish but not in German.
I shall therefore concentrate on the singular forms
while assuming that the derivational histories of these
will be the derivational histories of the plural forms,
except for the feature (iplural) and the features intro¬
duced by its two values, i.e. (tconditional) and (ispec-
ified).
It has already been suggested that "the" is the reflex
of a feature-specification involving the two weak deictics
and, conversely, that "this" and "that" lexicalize spec¬
ifications containing at least one strong deictic (§ 5.323).
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I want in this way to suggest that "the" primarily is
the definite determinative that is associated with cat-
egorial location, whereas "that" and "this" are primari¬
ly associated with spatio-temporal location. Consider now:
(lo:29)(i)(a) the house
(b) the house on the hill
(c) the house there
(ii) (a) that house
(b) that house on the hill
(c) that house there
The phrase of immediate interest is (i c). In contrast
to (ii c) it does not contain a tautologous element; in
contrast to (i a) it contains an indicating element.
There are two possibilities for deriving (i c), whereas
there is only one possibility for deriving each of the
other phrases in (lo:29). The (a)-phrases both derive
from single-branch trees which differ in the secondary
feature-specification of (two weak vs. at least one
strong deictic). The (b)-phrases and (ii c) all derive
from double-branch trees with "on the hill" originating
in the lower (locative) branch. "There" in (ii c) is the
result of full lexical subjunction of that branch and
subjunction of it to loc, with absorption of "on".
Obviously we could give the same interpretation to
"there" in (i c). Yet another possibility merits ex¬
ploration as well. Instead of assuming that (i b) and
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(i c) derive from the same underlying structure I want to
suggest that (i c) could in fact also derive from the
structure underlying (ii a). That is, I want to exploit
the possibility offered by analyzing the deictics into
two components (above, p. 336) in such a way that the
locative (proximity) component in the strong deictics
is 'left behind' during lexical subjunction, so that only
the a-component is realized in the determinative. Notice
that this derivation will be the marked one. Its serial¬
ization will have to be shaped on that ensuing from the
unmarked, two-branch derivation; there is no phrase
"*the there house" in English. It is therefore not the
same process that yields the dialectal variants mentioned
by Lyons (1973:71 fn 2):
(lo:3o) that there dog
— with enclitic stress-pattern on "there". Cf. with this
the Standard Colloquial Danish phrases
(lo:31)(a) den der hund
that there dog
(b) denne her hund
this here dog
In both (lo:3o) and (lo:31) the features realized in
the demonstrative determinatives are, presumably, lexical-
ized directly as well.
Except for the problem constituted by the serialization
of such phrases as (lo:29 i c) on the one-branch analysis,
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there is no reason not to include such a derivation in ad¬
dition to the unmarked one; on the contrary, there are
reasons to believe that both derivations are productive.
The one-branch derivation appears to be what is needed
for relativization, where the locative component left be¬
hind after lexical subjunction serves as the point of con¬
tact with the structure underlying the relative pronoun,
thus contributing to accounting for the fact that the un¬
marked determinative on the antecedent of a relative pro¬
noun in English is "the", rather than "that" or "this".
We shall touch upon relativization in the next chapter;
cf. also (lo:46) and the subsequent discussion.
Apart from the point just mentioned concerning relativ¬
ization, I assume that there are no differences of sub-
junction and adjunction which are due to different feature
-specifications on L^nd That is, all subjunctions of
specified by weak deictics also apply to it when specified
by strong deictics. If this assumption is true I shall
need to show that there are no derivations that produce
"the" which could not also produce "this" or "that", pro¬
vided that the feature-specification on is changed.
Two general areas are of interest in this connection,
one concerning uncountable numerals, and one concerning
so-called 'generic' NP's like the one in "the lion is a
dangerous animal". Furthermore, we shall also look at




(lo:32)(a) some whisky (was poured out)
(b) the whisky
(c) that whisky


















all 0 kind whisky some 0 0 there/here
then /now
Depending on the actual features on we can derive
each of (lo:32) from this structure: (a) by RP-subjunction
alone, (b) and (c) by initial lexical sub junction of
Since the structure is uncountable, ind is empty. By RP
-subjunction therefore comes to be conflated with
"some". What is being individuated is a quantity of whisky.
If a strong deictic is involved, the quantity in question
will be locatable categorially as well as in space/time,
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expressed by "that" (or "this"). If only weak deictics are
involved the quantity will only be categorially locatable:
the quantity of something which falls within the categor-
ial location "whisky". But, as we see, there are no der¬
ivational differences involved.
In § lo.22 I suggested that lexical subjunction of
Lind raa^ fact occur after RP-subjunction just in case





— that is, if the Mi-convention has applied at the stage
at which part is subjoined to gen. Such a readjustment of
the scheme was needed to account for "one such..." etc.
However, also other definite determinatives can be an¬
alyzed appropriately on the basis of this readjustment,
and only on the basis of this readjustment. Consider
(lo:35)(a) those houses are built in France, too
(b) you can get that camera cheaper in Japan
(c) he has her eyes
(cf. *he got a fly in her eye)
In each case we clearly have a marked derivation. There
are contextual indications to the effect that it cannot
— synthetically — be individuals that are being referred
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to. What is being referred to is one or more individuals
as representatives of the kind to which the individual(s)
belong(s) — and in (c) perhaps even qualities like colour,
size, shape, clarity, etc. are involved as well. The rel¬
ationship between "kind" and QUAL — which latter is a
cover term for the features available to Lpart — is
quite complex and we shall not go into it in the present
work although it is clearly relevant to RS-analysis. Suf¬
fice it to say that qualities may be interpreted as indi¬
cating "kind", as in "the blue whale", "the great cats",
'the little finger", etc. We may therefore look at (log35
c) as being of the same referential structure as (a) and
(b) although its exhaustive analysis would probably differ
from those of (a) and (b) in a number of respects which I
leave out of account. Apart from this, (c) involves one
of the definite determinatives which require analysis on
the basis of a double-branch tree, to which we come pres¬
ently. In the meantime we note that all of (lo:35) can be
accounted for by letting be subjoined to "kind" in
a configuration like (lo:34).
It will have been noticed, however, that no examples
are given in (lo:35) of a NP introduced by "the". Unless
we can find such examples, the hypothesis of uniform der¬
ivational possibilities for "the" and "that" is wrong.
Such examples abound. They are the so-called 'generic'
NP's like
(lo:36)(a) the lion is dangerous
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(b) the beaver builds dams
(c) the family-unit is the corner-stone of
society
etc.
It is by now commonplace to point out that true 'gen¬
eric' sentences involve not only a generic NP but also a
•generic' tense (Sjtfrensen, 1958:144; Anderson, 1973c:481;
Burton-Roberts, 1975:412; Dahl, 1975:99). The 'generic'
tense is the contextual element which ensures the feasibil-
ily of the marked derivation of "the", but other context¬
ual factors may play a part as well; cf.:
(lo:37)(a) the castle is a prominent feature of
Welsh scenery
(b) the castle is a prominent feature of
Edinburgh's scenery
In so far as these are both well-formed, (a) is likely
to be interpreted generically, (b) individually.
The difference between these generic NP's and phrases
like "one such ..." is then that the quantifier subjunction
is left unexpressed in the generic NP's, whereas it is ex¬
pressed in "one such ...". This latter kind of phrase in
a sense combines an individual with a generic interpre¬
tation. Generic NP's, on the other hand, quite naturally
invite an analysis in terms of universal and existential
quantification, as in Lawler (1973). Both the universal
and the existential quantifier is there, in the unexpressed
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quantifier subjunction.
Support for this analysis of traditionally generic, def¬
inite NP's presents itself from a rather unexpected quarter,
the expression of 'genericness' in uncountable structures
and plural countable structures. Both types lack "the". Cf.:
(los38)(i)(a) love is a many-splendoured thing
(b) whisky is nice
(ii)(a) cats hear well
(b) kestrels are for knaves
I relate the non-occurrence of "the" to lack of lexical
subjunction of ind-L in the structures underlying (lo:38),

























We see that the basic principle is the same: the quanti¬
fier subjunction remains unexpressed. What interests us is
therefore why, in particular, uncountable and plural count¬
able structures cannot be 'generic' when they are preceded
by "the". In order to answer this question we must look at
the derivation of the phrases "such love" and "such kestrels".
In both types of structure we end up with a — unmarked;











— which develops into "such love (she had never known)",
and "such kestrels (are not even fit for knaves)", paral¬
lel to the unmarked derivation of "such a ...".
Notice now that these have no marked counterparts;
there are no phrases in English that stand to "such love"
and "such kestrels" in the same way as "one such knave"
stands to "such a knave". Notice in particular that "some
such ..." requires a singular head noun and thus is the
non-specific counterpart to "such a ...". The implication
is that the marked derivation is not available to struc¬
tures specified as either (+count +plur) or (-count). And
since it is the marked derivation which is the source of
generic NP's introduced by "the", it follows that "the
whisky", "the love", "the cats", and "the kestrels" can¬
not be interpreted generically.
This leads to another comment on 'genericness'. As Col-
linson (1937:4o) remarks, "The most appropriate way of in¬
dicating the generic would appear to be zero-indication,
i.e. the omission of the indicater."
I believe English contains a very few expressions that
fulfil Collinson's criteria on genericness, notably "man",
"woman", and "mankind". Within the present framework "man¬
kind" can be regarded as the result of a lexical subjunc¬
tion of gen-L, involving the Mi-convention and expression
of the sense of gen; and "man" as the result of lexical
subjunction of gen-L with absorption of "kind". As men¬
tioned above (p. 322), such phrases as "(she was) all
woman" might be taken to indicate that we should allow
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N to be primarily subcategorized by only (universal elect¬
ive) . "Man" and "mankind" are yet other indications of
the same.
However, such a step would, I think, have to be dia-
chronically motivated. In a synchronic description these
expressions must be accomodated — possibly as the result
of derivations deviating to varying degrees from the norm
— within a system that accomodates expressions the anal¬
ysis of which requires reference to the underlying pres¬
ence of individuality despite their apparent universal
reference, as in "the wickedness of it all".
After this digression let us turn to structures in
which ind is specified as (-plur +cond). If in such struc¬
tures is lexically subjoined, the resultant NP will
be one that performs what Donnellan (1966) has called at¬
tributive function. The subject NP in
(lo:41) the holder of ticket no. 23456 has won a Fiat
— can be significantly paraphrased by
(lo:42) if there is a categorial location "holder of
ticket no. 23456", then the entity which is
located in it(Was won a Fiat).
It is clear that it is the categorial location that is
being conditioned: ticket no.23456 may not have been sold,
it may have been lost, etc., etc. Therefore it is by no
means certain that there is such a categorial location.
Incidentally, something more than merely "holding" the
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ticket is involved. A seller of tickets with the unsold
no. 23456 would not (pragmatically) qualify as being loc¬
ated in the categorial location "holder of ticket no.
23456". The transaction of buying the ticket is implicit,
even though someone who happened to have stolen or found
it might attempt to posture as one falling within the
category.
Donnellan discusses only NP's introduced by "the" and
one (central) example introduced by a genitive ("Smith's
murderer"). It is not certain that NP's introduced by
"that" can be conditional, although Lyons (1973:69) takes
the subject NP in "that fool won't do it" to be an example
of a demonstrative NP with attributive function. It is
not surprising if demonstrative NP's cannot be condition¬
al. Such NP's are primarily concerned with spatio-temporal
location, whereas the feature (tconditional) has for its
scope categorial location.
However, a NP like "that fool" in Lyons' example may be
analyzed as embodying primarily a causal relation over and
above a conditional. A paraphrase such as (lo:43) seems
to me to do justice to Lyons' example:
(lo:43) if there is a categorial location "fool", then
that entity is in it because he (or it) won't
do it
Thus structures marked (+cond) may constitute an ex-
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caption to the claim that strong and weak deictics on
Lind ma^ under9° precisely the same transformational pro¬
cesses, or, in the light of (lo:43), may differ in their
semantic interpretation in ways that are not solely ac¬
countable for by reference to the difference in the deic¬
tics.
Iq.42 The possessive determinatives.
Items like "my", "your", "her", etc. — usually referred
to as possessive pronouns — are definite determinatives
on the definitions of determinatives and definiteness em¬
ployed here. They differ from "the", "that", etc., in re¬
quiring a double-branch derivational structure. The lower
branch is governed by loc (cf. Anderson, 1971a:lo7 and
references there for the relationship between possessive
and locative); furthermore, it is subject to full lexical
subjunction, which accounts for the 'pronominal' status
of these items (cf. chapter 11 for the derivation of
pronouns).
The 'determinative' character of genitives like "the
man's" in "the man's hat" stems from the fact that such
phrases are derived from the same kind of two-branch
structure, only without full lexical subjunction of the
subordinate (locative) branch. We can therefore inquire
358
into the 'determinative' aspect of "my", "your", etc. by
investigating genitive constructions, while postponing
discussion of the 'pronominal' aspect of them to the next
chapter.
The — derived, but non-final — structure underlying















Loc may be adjoined and eventually subjoined to the
node in the superordinate with which it shares the cog¬
nitive content of "location", i.e. Thus a genitive
construction is formally distinct from a classifier con¬
struction in that it involves adjunction of a subordinate
to a superordinate L rather than to a superordinate DC.
In this respect it is like the derivation of "a stone wall"
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commented on in § 9.21. Whether or not this adjunction
takes place depends in modern English on the denotative
feature specification on the lower L If it is (+en-
prcs •
tity +person), adjunction takes place as a rule; lack of
adjunction in this instance is the marked derivation. If
it is subcategorized as (+entity -person) adjunction may
take place, but is in this case the marked derivation. If
it is subcategorized as (-entity), adjunction may likewise
take place. Such derivations, however, are highly marked:
cf. "in London's fair city". In contrast, "the City of
London" and "New York City" derive from non-subjunction
and subjunction, respectively, of a subordinate nominative
branch to ^gen in the superordinate.
(lo:44) is incorrect in one important respect. At the
point at which adjunction of loc to the upper takes
place, RP-subjunction has not yet applied to the super¬
ordinate. When loc is adjoined and subjoined to
Lind is obligatorily subjoined to ind: all genitives are
'definite*. The appropriate structure directly underlying























> hat $ ■+■ the man's hat
The subordinate is subjoined to loc in the usual manner
under observation of the Mi-convention — or perhaps ab¬
sorption morphologically marked by /-z/. The subcomponents
of the morphophonemic carriages have likewise undergone
the MI-convention. Notice in this connection Anderson's
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(1971a:lo7 fn 1) remark that in many languages the'pos-
sessor' is marked locative, whereas in others it is the
•possessed' which is so marked. He offers no explanation
for this, only suggests that the latter situation is a
phenomenon of surface structure. Even if the transforma¬
tional shift undergone by the morphophonemic carriages
hardly qualifies as an explanation of this, it certainly
highlights the crucial point, which is that the 'parts'
forming an NP which derives from a complex structure may
be functionally specified by a complex case-specification.
If the present account were to qualify as an explanation
it would have to be assessed on the background of pred¬
icative possessive constructions involving — pertinent
equivalents of — "have" in various languages. Like ex¬
istential sentences, such possessive predicational struc¬
tures may turn out to be capable of a purely nominal der¬
ivation, at least diachronically.
Although English possessive constructions are likely
to have a directly underlying structure like (lo:45), it
is not so certain, however, that (lo:45) is a derivation
of (lo:44). In particular, the origin of the subordinate
branch is in some doubt. Notice that I tacitly assumed a
feature-specification on the superordinate (lo:44)
which consists exclusively of weak deictics. What happens
if one of the deictics is strong? Is it possible to exclude
the strong deictics from under when a subordinate
branch is involved? Not, I think, along the lines proposed.
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There has been incorporated no determination relation be¬
tween the branches in a multi-branch tree; it appears
that precisely such a relation is required.
Various modifications could be made to the basic scheme
which would accomodate such a determination relation. We
could, for example, appeal to the notion of 'global' der¬
ivational constraint (G. Lakoff, 197ob; 1971), and let
adjunction of the subordinate depend on the secondary sub-
categorization-specification on a given categorial node
to which adjunction would apply. Or we might explore the
possibilities of letting a secondary subcategorization-
specification on a given categorial node insert directly
a subordinate case-phrase and — in the case of relativi-
zation — even an adnominal V.
Although these two possibilities to some extent are
equivalent — at least within the present framework — the
latter is susceptible of slightly easier formulation. We
shall therefore pursue this latter possibility.
I begin by distinguishing terminologically between the
kind of subordinate branch with which we have been operat¬
ing up till now, and a branch inserted by a secondary sub-
categorization-specification. The former kind I shall con¬
tinue to call subordinate; the latter I shall refer to as
secondary. It is to be understood that a subordinate branch
governed by a given case may still be subjoined to a par¬
ticular categorial node in the superordinate, provided
that the receiving node and the subjoined case-phrase are
363
cognitively similar. Since a secondary branch in a certain
sense is an extension of the superordinate, a subordinate
is subjoined before it in structures that contain both
types.
With this in mind let us look at what happens when a
locative subordinate branch occurs in a tree in which the
superordinate L^nd is subcategorized by a strong deictic.
(lo:46)(a) our friends here (came to visit us)
(b) these friends of ours (came to visit us)
(c) *these our friends (came to visit us)
Both appositive and delimitative serializations are rel¬
evant to the present topic, exemplified by (a) and (b),
respectively, (c) is considered unacceptable without a
sharp juncture between "these" and "our"; and even with
such a juncture this particular example would probably be
odd, although the type it represents is not: "this - my
trusty putter - let me down on the 13th". We concentrate
on (a) and (b).
Notice first that (lo:46 a) may have two intonation con¬
tours associated with different stress on "here". The strong¬
ly stressed variant represents a lexical subjunction of a
subordinate locative phrase like "in Edinburgh". It is not
a requirement on the correct usage of the strongly stressed
variant that the friends referred to are actually with the
speaker at the time of utterance. They need not even be in
the vicinity of the speaker. They may have gone to Mel¬
bourne the day after the visit, having paid their fare-
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well respects on the occasion temporally referred to by
"came".
The weakly stressed variant, on the other hand, can
only be correctly used if the friends referred to are
with the speaker at the time of utterance. We thus have
embodied in (lo:46 a) the two derivational possibilities
for deictic adverbials which were discussed above (pp.
345 ff).
We see now that if the derivation of possessive struc¬
tures outlined in (lo:44) and (lo:45) is correct, then we
must in fact operate with two subordinate locative branch¬
es in order to generate the strongly stressed version of
(lo:46 a), one underlying the possessive, and one under¬
lying "here". This, I fear, would be somewhat confusing.
I take it, therefore, that one of these two is a secondary
branch, in the sense of "secondary" just explained (p.362).
Moreover, I take the secondary branch to be the one under¬
lying "our".
Since the strongly-stressed version of (lo:46 a) derives
"here" from a subordinate, there is no evidence that the
superordinate is specified by a strong deictic. In
contrast, the weakly stressed version is an indication of
a strong (+proximate) spatial as well as temporal deictic.
However, since I assumed above that the strong deictics
can be analyzed into two components, of which the a-com-
ponent is the element involved in lexical subjunction,
leaving the locative component behind, there is no
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reason to suppose that the source of "our" differs for the
weakly-stressed version. It is still a secondary locative
branch, which generates "we". By subjunction to loc this
branch is turned into a possessive, and by subjunction to
— the lexically subjoined — Lind in the suPerordinate
it absorbs the a-component. The derived structure imme¬











friend 4 our friends here
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In this configuration "th-" is the expression of the
a-component, "our" the expression of the lexically sub¬
joined locative branch which absorbs the superorainate
subjunction of functional nodes# and "here"/"now" the ex¬
pression of the locative component left behind. I am
aware, as already mentioned, that this derivation creates
problems for the natural serialization. Short of ad hoc
proposals, all I can suggest is that — since it is a
marked derivation — it shapes itself on the unmarked one
which derives "here" from a subordinate; cf. further on
this point § lo.43.
Let us now turn to (lo:46 b). It is not referentially
identical to (a) on either interpretation of the latter;
it is a demonstrative variant of the type "a friend of
mine", the (historical) development of which has been
much discussed in the literature. Cf. Mustanoja (196o:
165 f) for a survey of the major positions. The common
feature in these discussions is that, somehow, a partitive
structure is involved: "a friend from the group of my
friends".
Whether or not a partitive structure is the historical
source of this type, it can be analyzed synchronically on
the basis of a subordinate ablative branch which develops

























these friends of the friends at we
The secondary (locative) branch is subjoined to loc,
and the loc-phrase to the subordinate as in (lo:47).
The whole subordinate (N2 + N^) is then lexically sub¬
joined under Nj. Such a full lexical subjunction is a
pronominal subjunction, which manifests itself in a morpho-
phonemic change from "our" to "ours".
lo,43 "Same".
The definite determinative "the" was considered by
Russell to be the most important word in the English
language. This judgment was reached from a philosophical
vantage-point from which language was seen as a means by
which to achieve metaphysical ends. From the vantage-
point offered by language itself overlooking the area of
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referential!ty, "same" is a strong rival of "the". It is
the linguistic means of expressing identity. When there¬
fore "the" and "same" occur together, they form a compos¬
ite determinative of not a little importance to a ling¬
uistic theory of reference.
In the preceding section I developed what I called a
secondary branch, introduced by the deictic features on
Lin^ It was argued that such a secondary branch was the
origin of genitives, and it was suggested that a second¬
ary V might be inserted in the same way to account for
relativization. With this in mind, consider the following:
(lo:49)(a) the same dog stole the bone
(b) the same dog that stole the bone chased the cat
(c) the dog that stole the bone also chased the cat
(d) *my same dog stole the bone
Of these, I submit, (a) and (c) are well-formed, normal
sentences of English; (d), on the other hand, is ill-
formed and abnormal. What about (b)? It is not ill-formed
in any received sense of this rather vague notion; yet it
is odd. I submit that its oddity stems from the arguable
fact that it is tautologous. It contains superfluous in¬
formation. I suggest that it does so because "same" and
"that stole the bone" originate at the same point in the
referential structure, and that "same" serves the same
referential purpose as a (restrictive) relative clause.
The common point of origin is a secondary branch inserted
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by Lind The reason why (lo:49 b) is tautologous — rather
than downright ill-formed — is of course that the relative
clause derives from an adnominal V one of whose dependent
N's turns up superficially as a relative pronoun, whereas
"same" derives from an adnominal N. This, in turn, ex¬
plains the ill-formedness of (lo:49 d);"my" and "same" are
both realizations of the same structure. But it cannot be
realized by both at the same time.
Our main task is now to assess what properties the
secondary branch underlying "same" may have; ana also what
feature-specifications on may introduce a secondary.
To that end we note first that the unmarked determinat¬
ive with which "same" co-occurs is "the"; (lo:5o) are
either marked or unacceptable:
(lo:5o)(a) that same night (she left home)
(b) ?these same trees (gave shade once to Keats)
(c) those scime people n<5w say that
(d) *the same dog here (chased the cat)
We next take note that there are alternatives to (lo:
5o a-c) — in particular to the somewhat pseudo-solemn (b)
— which involve "very" instead of "same". In § 5.323 it
was mentioned that a scalar feature (n degree) also sub-
categorizes I have not had occasion to go into the
workings of this feature, which is especially concerned
with adjectival comparison. Here, however, we see it real¬
ized as "very". "Very" cannot be a derivational variant
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of "same", since "the very same ..." is a perfectly nor¬
mal phrase.
It was said that "same" is the linguistic means of ex¬
pressing identity. To put it more precisely: "same" is
the linguistic means of expressing re-identification.
Re-identification presupposes individuation; and in¬
dividuation may be achieved either categorially or spatio
-temporally, or in both ways simultaneously. Re-identifi¬
cation then means that one is able to say of a given en¬
tity of a given kind appearing at a particular point in
space/time that it is 'the same' as one that appeared at
a different point in space/time. 'The same' may then mean
two things: (a) the same individual; or (b) an individual
of the same kind. Situation (a) involves one individual
which is related to itself in space/time. Position (b)
involves two individuals which are related to each other
in a categorial location1.
This inherent ambiguity in "the same car", for example,
is due to different subjunctional properties of the sec¬
ondary branch. The derivation of phrases expressing pos¬
ition (b) relies on the 'generic' subjunction (cf. § lo.22,
esp. (lo:17); also § lo.41 (lo:34) and discussion there),
1
This does not presume to be a philosophical account of identity, or
re-identification, although I believe that it correlates with Straw-
son's discussion of re-identification (1959:31 ff). The ■unificatory"
side of identity — i.e. situation (a) — is the main subject of
Heidegger (1957).
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whereas the derivation of phrases expressing situation
(a) relies on the 'individuative' subjunction. Moreover,
the 'generic* subjunction requires specification of the
secondary L.,A by weak deictics — since we are concerned
with categorial location — whereas the 'individuative'
subjunction requires specification of the secondary
by strong deictics — since we are concerned with different
points in space/time. As for the specification of the
superordinate both (a) and (b) require strong deic¬
tics : in both cases a spatio-temporally located entity is
related to something else. The secondary branch is sub¬
joined to, and absorbs, the locative component of the
strong deictics on the superordinate leaving only
the a-component free for lexical subjunction. Hence the
unmarked form is "the same".
The (lower part of the) representation underlying "the



















at all kind car some 4 one Ihere.
then.
As usual, this representation is somewhat simplified.
Notice in particular that the two morphophonemic carriages































The secondary branch is fully subjoined lexically and
subjoined to loc. The superordinate ind-L is lexically sub¬
joined, but the locative component is left behind for loc
to be subjoined to. Finally, by FP-subjunction of the
superordinate, we reach the structures do:51 b) and



















































































It should be noticed, relative to these derivations and
the unacceptability of (lo:5o d) that they reflect each
other. "Here" (weakly stressed) in (lo:5o d) is supposed
to be the reflex of the locative component left behind
after subjunction, despite the serialization problems ad-
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hering to such an analysis. In the derivations (lo:51)
and (lo:52) loc is considered to be subjoined to these
stranded locative components. This, evidently, leads to
natural serialization of "the same ...". If, however, the
secondary is further subjoined to the superordinate func¬
tional cluster we get simply "the car" — again with a
'generic' and an 'individuative' reading — but now with
inbuilt anaphoric reference.
In conclusion I should like to point out what to me ap¬
pears to be the main difficulty with these derivations, in
particular with (lo:51), i.e. the one underlying the indi¬
viduative reading of "the same car".
As will have have been noticed, (the features realised
as) "car" appear both in the superordinate and in the sec¬
ondary. It is by no means clear that this ought to be the
case. Is the acorn the oak, is the boy the man? The issue
is that the same entity is compared to itself at different
points in time (and space). In time, entities undergo
change, and with change they fall in different categorial
locations. Although superficially of purely philosophical
interest, this problem has clear linguistic (referential)
ramifications, even if they are most often glossed over in
linguistic discussions. It is the problem behind the con¬
cept of 'strictly identical nouns' as embodying not only
referential but also lexical identity. These two kinds of
identity do not necessarily go together. In fact, more
often than not they do not go together. It may well be,
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therefore, that a better representation than (lo:51)
would be one in which L in the secondary branch is
gen
empty — though lexicalizable — so that only the lex¬
ical reflexes of L are absorbed in"same", i.e.
pres
"thing", "person", and "place". Supporting evidence




11,1 The class of pronouns.
The last class of referential functives we shall be
concerned with is the class of pronouns. These, it will
be recalled, are defined by their incapability of occur¬
ring in either of the two referentially diagnostic frames
established in (8:2).
As was the case with the determinatives, the pronouns
may be further subdivided on the basis of the nature of
the minimal referential structure required for their an¬
alysis. Thus there are some pronouns which can be analyzed
on the basis of a single-branch tree (I), while others re¬
quire a double-branch tree (II). Moreover, within (I),
one pronoun (a) can be analysed on the basis of the min¬
imal primary subcategorization of N (universal individuat-
ive), a number of pronouns (b) on the basis of a primary
subcategorization of N which involves (selective) to the
exclusion of (elective restrictive), and some (c) that
379
require the full primary subcategorization of N, i.e. in¬
cluding (elective). The Roman numerals and the letters
here refer to the lay-out of the class of pronouns in

















A number of traditional pronouns are left out here, as
will be clear, especially "we", "you", and "them". These
may be eonsidered pronouns with occasional determinative
function. The reason for their capability of determinative
function will be gone into in § 11.32.
It should be made clear that the subclassification in
(11:1) is based on the minimal branch which is capable of
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generating the pronoun(s) in question. I do not thereby
commit myself to deriving all instances of a given pro¬
noun from the minimal branch.
11.2 The derivational characteristics of pronouns.
Throughout chapters 8 to lo we have been concerned with
quantifiers, E-classifiers, and determinatives. Before we
now go on to discuss pronouns one or two points which
have emerged during these chapters should be noticed.
Quantifiers were considered to be basic among the ref¬
erential functives. Two derivational characteristics that
reflect this basic status are that, in so far as a lex¬
ical subjunction is involved in their derivation, it is
only of ind-L. Some non-primitive quantifiers (e.g. "many",
"(a) few", etc.) are the superficial reflexes of diachronic
lexical subjunctions of a whole branch which, in particular,
contains a lexicalized Lpart Yet synchronically this sub¬
joined branch may be regarded as a fossilized structure
which absorbs part in a superordinate branch. The other
characteristic is that quantifiers do not (necessarily —
but cf. the discussion of "the guests all" in §§ 6.4-5;
8.42) involve the Mi-convention. They usually rely on ab¬
sorption.
In contrast, E-classifiers depend on lexical subjunc-
tion of gen-L in the subordinate of a complex structure,
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while determinatives generally involve lexical subjunc-
tion of ind-L and the working of the MI-convention at
various points.
The pronouns on their part are characterized by a
high degree of lexical subjunction within the branch
that generates them, notably of gen-L and ind-L. The
order in which I have discussed these subclasses re¬
flects a hierarchy of transformational complexity within
the major class of referential functives, with quanti¬
fiers as the least complex class, pronouns as the most
complex class.
The lexical subjunction of gen-L in the derivation
of pronouns is the reason for their incapability of ap-
positive serialization with a noun. Cf. in this connec¬
tion Hjelmslev (1937:196):
Leur base (viz. des pronoms) doit done etre con¬
stitute , non par des morphemes convertis, mais
par un syncretisms de tous lea pleremes nominaux
de la langue. C'est ainsi qu'il faut expliquer
leur role de nomina ulceria, e'est-a-dire le fait
qu'ils renferment toutes les significations nom-
inales possibles, pretes a surgir alternativement
a titre de variantes sematiques selon les exi¬
gences du contexte.
(my emphasis)
The "pl^rfemes nominaux" are the minimal, non-autonomous,





So far we have been occupied with the analysis of NP's
which are generated by N subcategorized as (universal els
ective restrictive individuative). It is only within the
class of pronouns that we have reason to operate with N
primarily subcategorized in terms of the other possible
specifications set out in § 4.3.
The minimal specification on N — at least synchron-
ically; cf. pp. 354-5 above — is (universal individua¬
tive) , and the only realization of a N subcategorized in
this way is "it". What Jespersen has called 'The Great
"It" of Nature*, as exemplified by "it i3 raining", what
is known as 'formal* (or 'preliminary subject') "it",
can be explained on the basis of the minimal branch en¬
suing from this primary subcategorization, at least if
it is desirable to consider such occurrences of "it"
noun phrases, which may, indeed, be doubtful.
Notice also the — in colloquial English — frequent
occurrence of the 'tag-like' "it all". This phrase, as
it were, expresses 'individualized universality', and
contrasts with the underlined part of "there he stood
— gumboots and all", which may suggest the possibility
of subcategorizing N by means of (universal) alone. This
point, however, is of minor importance.
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Of more intrinsic interest is the possibility of an
alternative derivation of such occurrences of "it" which
is offered by considering the structure of what Strawson
(1953-4:38) has called "feature-placing sentences", among
which we find "it is raining". These may contain a noun,
and hence derive from a structure that contains gen-L.
If we want to analyze all feature-placing sentences in a
uniform manner, then "it is raining" should also involve
gen-L. We might then explore further the possibility of
realizing the temporal deictics by "be", so that the en¬
tire feature-placing sentence will be derived from a nom¬
inal structure. "It" in "it is raining" will then realize
L
_ specified as (-entity): a common characteristic of
pres
feature-placing sentences is that they involve reference
to a place at which a 'feature' (like "rain") is 'located*.
"Rain", therefore, will originate under L but will be
gen,
converted into "raining" by subsequent rules pertaining
to predicational structure.
Which of these two derivational possibilities merits
the more attention cannot be decided just by considering
them vls-&-vis each other. I shall present evidence below
(§ 11.35), however, which suggests that in fact the latter
view is preferable. This in turn entails a simplification
of the theory, since we then only need to recognize two
primary subcategorizations of N, one including (elective
restrictive) and one involving (selective).
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11.32 "I".
"I" (and "you" (sg.)), like the definite article, are
sometimes considered to be semantic primitives of English1,
sometimes not (cf. e.g. Russell, 194o:ch. 7; Kurylowicz,
1972). As with the definite article, I shall consider "I"
to be non-primitive, for reasons to be gone into below.
Cf. also § 11.35.
I take my starting-point in Hjelmslev's (1937:198)
remark that "ego et tu ne sont que deux formes paradig-
matique d'un m6me pronom." This casual and simple sug¬
gestion has far-reaching implications when seen in con¬
nection with the deixis/denotative distinction, since by
accepting it we reduce what appears to be a three-scale
system of first, second, and third person in the personal
pronouns to a two-scale system.
My next observation is that the personal pronouns are
definite; they depend upon lexical sub junction of
These two points taken together direct our attention to
the indicating features on L^n(j. first/second person pro¬
nouns can only be associated with strong deictics, third
1
E.g. by Sffarensen (1963:95 ff). He 'proves* their primitive status
by disproving their substitutability by such phrases as "the person
who is speaking now" and "the person I am speaking to now", and by
suggesting that, since they are first and second person signs, re¬
spectively, they cannot be defined (away) by any sign in English,
because all other signs are third person signs — except "we" and
"you" (pi.), which can, however, be defined on the basis of "I"
and "you" (sg.). I shall return to the validity of this proof
later on.
385
person by either strong or weak deictics.
Lastly, first/second person pronouns are characterized
in (Indo-European) languages with gender-distinctions
(either in the system of personal pronouns, or in the
nominal system generally) by being insensitive to gender.
If we assume, as I do, that it is basically the same
gender-system that characterizes nouns and (personal)
pronouns in languages which have the distinction in both
categories, and that there is no special pronominal gender
-system1, the conclusion to be drawn is that the referen¬
tial category associated with gender is inapplicable to
derivations of first/second person pronouns. With these
preliminaries over, we can state the appropriate deriva¬
tion of "I":
1 This, of course, is a position that implies that the gender-system
which characterizes modem English personal pronouns is a remnant






























The remote structure of "you" is the same, except that
Lind i,s sPec^-^;'-ed as (+space -prox +time +prox). (11:2),
fully subjoined lexically, is expressed by 'I'.
Notice that Lpart empty. It usually is for the
derivation of pronouns, but there are phrases like "poor
you", "lucky me" — "me" being partly a case-determined
variant of "I" — which are evidence of the underlying
presence of the node that dominates adjectives.
(11:2) is the minimal branch which generates "I",
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"you", and "we" — for the latter with ind marked (+plur)
and either (+spec) or (-spec) — but it is only "I" that
does not have an alternative derivation from a larger
branch which involves gen-L. However, since the branch
without gen-L in itself generates "you" (sg. and pi.)
and "we", gen-L does not take part in the lexical sub-


















— where also Lpart need not be lexically subjoined: "you
stupid fool". This is the derivational source of such ' ap-
positive' phrases as "we men", "you guys", etc., and it
is the source of the determinative function of these items.
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11.33 "-thing", "-body", and "-one".
The large group of pronouns formed from these suffixes
constitute the pronominal suppletives to quantifiers and
— in the case of "no-" — determinatives. Like "I" they
derive from a branch without gen-L, "-thing" and "-body"
being reflexes of the feature-specification on L
pres,
"-one" of the specification of ind. Unlike "I" they do
not involve lexical subjunction of L. , If L is markedind. pres
(-entity) we get the 'proadverbs' in "-where".
Again, Lpart may be e^Pty or it may be non-subjoined.








-count > all thing there^ stupid
some then.
something stupid
— where the MI-convention has applied during RP-subjunc-
tion of part to Lpres_
The specification of this NP as uncountable may be de¬
batable. However, I assume that the distinction between
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"somebody" and "someone" — which may be stylistic rather
than referential — can be explicated on the basis of
countability, so that "someone" is explicitly countable,
whereas "somebody" is only implicitly countable, or
neutral1. Since "-body" and "-thing" both originate higher
up in the tree than the node (part) which is subcategorized
by (±count), I therefore attribute to "-thing" the same
neutrality. Cf. in this connection "I want something to
drink" vs. "I want something to drink from".
The origin of the first elements in these pronouns is
outlined during the preceding chapters.
11.34 "He", "she", and "they".
The main thing that distinguishes third person per¬
sonal pronouns from first/second person personal pronouns,
as indicated above, is gender. Another interesting fact in
this connection is that "*he man", "*him boy", etc. are un¬
acceptable, in contrast to "you fool". The reason for this,
1
The distinction between "-body" and "-one" is described by Schibsbye
(1961:§ 9.2.3) as a tendency to employ "-one" when reference is made
to entities considered to be members of a delimited group, whereas
"-body" is used when no such implicit delimitation is present. This
correlates with the present analysis in that "-body" is the reflex
of the node which constitutes the ultimate background group, on the
basis of which "-one" operates, but where part intervenes, further
to delimit that (ultimate) background group. It is the origin of
"-body" higher in the branch than part, and the origin of "-one"
lower in the branch than part which is the basis for Schibsbye's
explanation when it is converted into my terminology.
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I suggest, Is that the third person pronouns derive from
a branch that must contain gen-L, obligatorily.
"He" and "she" are similar to "I" and "you" in being
definite; they, too, involve lexical subjunction of Lind

























As will be clear presently, it is the presence of gen-L
in such structures which is of importance, rather than the
question of whether or not it is lexicalized. In contrast,
Lpart may be lexicalized: "poor him". The word-order in
such phrases indicates that subjunction and the Ml-conven-
tion have applied.
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"She" and "they" derive from the same kind of struc¬
ture, but they differ, of course, at various points in
the secondary subcategorization. "Them" is a special
case. It has a marked derivation in which L is non
gen
-empty and non-subjoined: "them fellers". This is un¬
conventional and, I believe, restricted to conversation¬
al and/or dialectal usage.
11.35 The single-branch pronouns reclassified.
"One"1, "some", and "all" can have pronominal function.
They are defined (as quantifiers) by their capability of
appearing in both the referentially diagnostic frames,
but this is not to say that they always appear in one of
these frames. When they do not, however, they do not alter
their derivation; that is, they do not, in their pronominal
use, derive from a branch which does not include gen-L. Cf.:
(11:5)(a) some suggest that the Concorde should be scrapped
(b) some noise-measures suggest that the Concorde
should be scrapped
To say that (a) derives from a branch without gen-L
would be to ignore the fact that it might have the same
referential content as (b). The interpretation of (a)
1
I take the 'prop-word* "one" to be a 'carrier1 of the number morpheme
as suggested by Sommerstein (1972s2oo), parallel to "do" as the car¬
rier of the tense-morpheme in certain constructions.
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as "some people ..." if "some" is not anaphoric relies on
the supposition that Lgen maY be empty, not that it may be
absent. Conversely, the interpretation of (a) = (b) relies
on the supposition that gen-L may be lexically subjoined.
It is this lexical subjunction that is the basis for the
pronominal use of "some" (and, generally, the other quan¬
tifiers). The same holds for some of the determinatives,
notably "this", "that", "these", and "those".
I shall now avail myself of the assumption that gen-L
may be present or absent from the branch which underlies
a given pronoun to say that a pronoun in the underlying
structure of which gen-L is present is a categorial pro¬
noun, whereas a pronoun in the underlying structure of
which gen-L is absent will be called a non-categorial
pronoun. Furthermore, I shall say that a pronoun which
in its derivation involves lexical subjunction of is
a definite pronoun, whereas a pronoun which does not in¬
volve this subjunction is an indefinite pronoun.
The single-branch pronouns, and the pronominally func¬
tioning single-branch quantifiers and determinatives lend
themselves to the following classification on the basis
of these distinctions (see (11:7) on the next page).
Within each box, the items on the left are the pronouns
proper, those that can only be pronouns. In the columns to
the right are those items which are primarily quantifiers,




























We are now in a position to see why Sjrfrensen's 'proof'
(above, p. 384 fn) of the primitive status of "I" and
"you" does not prove that they are primitives. It only
proves that they are something special. S^rensen confuses
cause and effect. He takes their property of being first
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and second person signs, respectively, as the reason why
they cannot be defined (away). He should rather have in¬
vestigated what makes them first and second person signs,
or — following Hjelmslev — paradigmatic variants of
a special pronoun, because it is the properties associat¬
ed with this special status that are the 'primitives' in
terms of which they can be defined.
Let us, just for the present purpose, say that this
special pronoun is a sign, Z, and that any sign that
shares the same special properties is also Z. We can then
say that a sign, s, is Z if and only if, s is both def¬
inite and non-categorial.
A sign which is both definite and non-categorial is a
purely deictic sign: it identifies an entity in space/time,
irrespective of the categorial location of that entity. It
so happens that "I" and "you" — plus their case-dependent
and numerus-dependent derivatives — form a closely knit
subgroup within the class of definite, non-categorial
signs in English. This makes them special; but it does
not make them semantic primitives.1
1 S^rensen might well argue that "I" and "you" cannot be defined
away in this fashion. We cannot say "all people some one here now"
instead of "I", This is true. In fact, the sign by which S^rensen
substitutes "I" — viz. "the person who is speaking now" — is
more likely to be understood to refer to what "I" refers to. Yet
of this S^rensen says (1963:96), "Either B (i.e. the hearer) will
take "the person who is speaking now" literally - that Is, he will
take it to be Intended to denote a person C (i.e. one distinct
from the speaker, A) - or he will consider it the result of an at¬
tempt to be funny. He will not accept it as a genuine equivalent of
"I"." (footnote continues, p. 395).
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We now also see why the alternative for the analysis
of "it" which was prompted by considering the derivational
status of Strawson's feature-placing sentences is pre¬
ferable. On this alternative "it" will be a definite,
categorial sign, and this, intuitively,is what it is.
At least it does not identify entities in space/time ir¬
respectively of their categorial location. Yet many pe¬
culiarities remain for the referential theory to explain
about "it", most of which, however, are likely to be
cleared up when the RS- and SS-analyses are integrated,
or so I should imagine. The question as to how this in¬
tegration is to be achieved is too complex for me to go
into in any great detail in the present work, which has
for its more modest scope just to try to establish the
validity of RS-analysis as (also) a linguistic discipline.
Cf., however, §§ 11.42-3 for a tentative and informal dis¬
cussion of some of the points at issue.
I shall refrain from going into an argument on this issue, and
instead simply quote an example of what Sirensan apparently thinks
is a sign which 'defines away* another sign. Thus, in S^rensen
(1958:36), the sign "(his) uncle" is held to be defined away by
the following:
"the male person who has, or who is married to the female
person who has (or to one of the female persons who have), the
same first-degree male ancestor and the same first-degree female
ancestor as the first-degree male ancestor or the first-degree
female ancestor he has has".
I leave it up to the reader to decide whether he, as hearer,
would be inclined to think that the utterer of this paraphrase
was trying to be funny, or whether he would be prepared to ac¬
cept it as "a genuine equivalent" of "(his) uncle".
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11.36 A note on proper names.
"I" and "you" (and their derivatives) are not the only
definite, non-categorial signs in English. Proper hames
("John", "London", etc.) are, I submit, also definite and
non-categorial. It is therefore not the properties of be¬
ing definite and non-categorial alone that ensure that a
sign is a first or a second person sign — unless, of
course, one is prepared to call proper names first and/or
second person signs, which I am not.
The distinguishing feature between "I" and "you" on the
one hand and "John", "London" on the other is (ttime).
Whereas the pronouns involve (+time tprox) always, proper
names involve either (+time -prox) ("John"), or (-time)
("London"): places are located in space essentially, in
time contingently.
In this light, "The City of the Angels", "Mont Blanc",
"Loch Tay" are pseudo-proper names in that they contain a
categorizing element, and so, too, for example, are the
Icelandic family-names, in which "-son" and "-dottir" are
still productive. Such cases as "Bridge of Allan" (the
name of a town) and Scottish and Irish family-names in
"Mc-" and "0'-", although presumably pseudo-proper names
historically, are now 'true* proper names.
Note the implications this analysis has for Linsky's
treatment of proper names and 'almost' proper names (cf.
above, § 2.22). It is not meaning that proper names do
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not have; if it were they would not be signs. It is a
categorizing element they lack — like "I" and "you".
Cf. further, for the best linguistic analysis of proper
names available, SjzJrensen (1958; 1963) who arrives at
the — in my view, erroneous — conclusion that proper
names constitute an autonomous class, also relative to
first and second person personal pronouns.
11.4 Double-branch pronouns.
The double-branch pronouns all derive from subjunction
of a secondary branch to a superordinate branch in the
manner outlined for the possessives and "same" above.
Three subgroups of double-branch pronouns may be dis¬
tinguished (cf. (11:1 (II))), depending on different
properties of the two branches involved.
11.41 The possessive pronouns.
The possessive pronouns — as well as the possessive
determinatives — originate in a secondary locative
branch which is introduced by Lin(3 in a categorial (i.e.
one containing gen-L) superordinate. The secondary branch
may be either categorial ("hers") or non-categorial ("mine").
In other words, I take it that underlying the possessive
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pronouns is the same structure which generates the cor¬
responding personal pronouns. Their possessive character
is acquired by subjunction to and absorption of loc. If
the superordinate branch is fully subjoined lexically,
the result is a possessive pronoun; if it is not fully
subjoined lexically — i.e. if gen-L is not lexically
subjoined — then the resultant NP is an appositive ser¬
ialization involving at least a noun and a possessive
determinative.
11.42 The reflexive pronouns.
Although I shall not generally attempt to integrate the
RS- and SS-analyses in the present work, the last two sec¬
tions of this chapter will take us into some of the issues
involved. The reflexive pronouns cannot be adequately de¬
scribed or analyzed without reference to certain aspects
of V, nor can relative pronouns be treated without refer¬
ence to clause-structure. I shall, however, restrict my¬
self to discussing one or two aspects of these areas in
an informal manner.
The relevant aspect of V into which we have to go when
dealing with reflexive pronouns is the general area of
transitivity. In the SS-framework we work with (Anderson's)
this is more or less equivalent with the area of ergativi-
ty. An ergative clause is a clause in which V is initial-
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ly subcategorized as (+ergative); this feature on V in¬
troduces the categorial (case-) symbol erg, which in turn
governs N. Thus erg is the case which governs the N under
which the NP is generated whose referent is the agent of
the action denoted by V. Nom — the 'neutral1 case —
governs the N under which the NP is generated whose ref¬
erent is the 'patient' of the action denoted by V. This
is not to say, however, that only ergative clauses cam
contain a reflexive pronoun, only that this type of
clause is the paradigmatic setting for reflexive pronouns.
In order (also) to account for conventionally 'reflex¬
ive verbs' (cf. e.g. Jespersen, 1927:8 16.2^? Schibsbye,
1961:883.3.1 ff; Lees & Klima, 1963:155), Anderson (1971a:
8 4.5) distinguishes clausal from phrasal reflexivity, the
former being characterized by a subcategorization-feature
(+reflexive) introduced by (+ergative) in the complex
symbol in terms of which V is subcategorized. Thus "John
moved" is a reflexive ergative clause, whereas "John
moved himself" is a non-reflexive ergative clause which
contains a reflexive nom. The formal characteristic of a
reflexive ergative clause is that the case-symbol erg is
superimposed on nom, just in case the complex symbol on V
includes (+ergative +reflexive). This analysis is a con¬
sequence of the unique status attributed to nom as always
present in the underlying structure of any clause (1971a:
5o). I shall argue below that it is in fact the other way
round, that nom is superimposed on erg.
4oo
The approach to reflexivity to be taken here, although
of a strictly synchronic nature, is inspired by the dia-
chronic fact that "same" — which is a loan from Norse
in English — came to supersede the vernacular "self"
in a number of cases (cf. Onions, Etym., artt. same and
self), thus suggesting an overlap between them that can
plausibly be associated with the referential property of
both items to indicate identity in a wide sense. Notice
in this connection the modern English — somewhat pleo¬
nastic — expression "the selfsame", which occurs in
Danish as well: "den selvsamme".
It is generally recognized that reflexivization —
supposing for the moment that there is such a process —
is a relation between coreferential NP's dominated (or
governed) by the same S (or V) (Lees & Klima, 1963:146 f?
Langacker, 1966:163 fn 5, 167) — or, in Langacker's terms,
between NP nodes within a command relation.
In Anderson's framework it is explicitly the case that
what turns up as a reflexive pronoun has at some stage been
dominated by N governed by nom. Taking note of this, the
first point I want to make about reflexive pronouns is
that they are generated ftnder a N which is governed by nom.
The next point to make has to do with the fact that the
typical function performed by a reflexive pronoun is as
superficial object in an ergative clause, and, moreover,
that it cannot occur as superficial subject in a passive
ergative clause:
4ol
(lis 8) (a) Bill shot himself
(b) ♦himself was shot by Bill
(c) Bill was shot by hiraself
I take it that (c) — possibly of marginal acceptabil¬
ity — may occur with contrastive stress on "-self".
Consider now the implications of the diachronic rel¬
ation between "self" and "same". I shall suggest that
(part of) the structure generating "himself" is the
structure underlying "same" on the individuative reading
(cf. (lo:51)), except that it is governed by nom rather
than by loc. Moreover, I shall consider the alternative
derivation of "same" advanced towards the end of § lo.43
more appropriate in that it does not commit us to a spe¬
cific categorial location in the"same"-branch.
If these points are accepted then it must also be ac¬
cepted that the branch which generates "same" cannot be
the superordinate; it has to be the same as something.
Yet on the other hand it cannot be a secondary branch,
since the secondary "same"-branch is governed by loc. It
must, therefore, be a subordinate branch, with the branch
governed by erg as its superordinate. The situation can be









The principle I am exploiting is the principle that
anything is identical to itself. Notice in this connec¬
tion that one of the cases in which "same" came to super¬
sede "self" was where "self" was 'coreferential' with a
noun, as in "on pat self ny3t" (» "on that same night")
(Mustanoja, 196o:176). Furthermore, "self" appeared as
an independent reflexive — without "my-" etc. — through¬
out Middle English, as in "ure Loverd sulf" (= "our Lord
(him)self") (Mustanoja, 196o:145).
This latter observation now naturally leads to the sug¬
gestion that the nom-branch in (11:9) in fact has a sec¬
ondary branch attached to it which generates the possessive
— or more correctly, the locative1 — element in the mod¬
ern English reflexive pronouns. In accord with this sug¬
gestion I expand (11:9) in the following fashion:
1
Historically, the locative is expressed by either the genitive or
the dative in English; hence the fluctuation in the reflexive pro¬
nouns between "him-" and "my-".
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This, in outline, is the structure underlying "Bill ..
.. himself". It depends for its further development on
the assumption that most verbs subcategorized as (+erga-
tive) require superficial expression of the object — i.e.
of nom — whereas others, like "move", "shave", etc.,
optionally subjoin the subordinate (nom) branch with its
dependents to the superordinate. In this way nom comes to
be superimposed on erg by the conflation of the morphophon-
emic carriages.
Is there any evidence for this analysis? I think there
is. Notice that 'reflexive' pronouns need not be reflexive;
they may be emphatic, as in "he did it himself". This em¬
phatic use of the 'reflexive* pronoun suggests that it is
in fact underlyingly present, even when nom governs a N
which is lexicalized by a NP which is not coreferential
4o4
with the subject NP. If this is correct then we cannot
have clauses which contain both a reflexive pronoun and
an emphatic instance of a 'reflexive' pronoun. This, in
fact, is the case. Cf.:
(11:11)(i)(a) the barber shaved himself
(b) the barber shaved him
(c) *the barber shaved himself himself
(d) the barber shaved him himself
(e) the barber himself shaved
(f) the barber himself shaved him
(g) *the barber himself shaved himself
(ii)(a) Bill shot himself
(b) *Bill shot himself himself
etc.
As predicted by the analysis, emphatic "self"-forms
are mutually exclusive with reflexive pronouns.
Consider once more (11:8). Why should it be that the
reflexive pronouns cannot be independent superficial sub¬
jects? The answer provided by the present analysis is
clear: because it derives from a subordinate branch which
is only realized under precisely stateable conditions:
(a) when an ergative V — whose case-frame is V erg,nam
— occurs in a clause in which nom is unrealized, the sub¬
ordinate nom is copied into the empty nom which is gov¬
erned by V, unless the verb is one of those which allow
subjunction of nom to erg; (b) when for stylistic reasons
4o5
emphasis is required on the participant referred to by
the NP generated under the N governed by erg, assuming
— counterfactually — that reflexive pronouns only arise
from a subordinate to an erg-phrase.
Lastly, the analysis offered here explains why reflex-
ivlzation is restricted by the scope of a single V, a
phenomenon which is not easy to explain on the assumption
that the reflexive pronouns are the reflexes of independ¬
ent N's in the clause-structure.
11.43 The relative pronouns.
Just as the reflexive pronouns can be analyzed as the
reflexes of a subordinate (complex) branch which is 'pro¬
moted' to superordinate status, the relative pronouns can
be analyzed as the reflexes of a superordinate branch
which is 'degraded' to secondary status, the main differ¬
ence between the two types of 'pronominal!zation' being
that only one V is involved in the analysis of reflexive
pronouns, whereas two V's of necessity are involved in the
analysis of relative pronouns.
The presence of the feature (±time) on in a ref¬
erential branch is the formal requirement on relativiza-
tion. It is the starting-point for a recursion of V in
the form of a 'secondary' branch. This secondary V is
developed normally except that its non-superordinate
4o6
status entails that one of the N's governed by it is a
"same"-branch, depending for its categorial location on









I take (11:12) to be the structure underlying "the maid
who the butler kissed (slapped his face)". The further de¬
velopment of (11:12) adjoins the "same"-branch to the
superordinate, and it may, as in this case it could, be
subjoined to it, yielding "the maid the butler kissed".
It should be noticed, however, that this can only be
the source of restrictive relative clauses. Non-restric¬
tive relative clauses presumably also involve a "same"
-branch, but their V is not secondary.
One of the reasons for deriving relative clauses in
this way is the fact that relative "which" may, at least
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in literary language, be an adjunct (in Jespersen's
terms), i.e. it may be in appositive serialization with
a noun. The interesting feature of such constructions
is that the noun with which relative "which" is in ap¬
positive serialization may — but need not — be the
same noun as the noun in the antecedent NP; cf.:
(11:13)(a) the butterfly lays an egg, which egg can
become a caterpillar, which caterpillar can
become a chrysalis, which chrysalis can be¬
come a butterfly (Butler)
(b) sure of nothing but the horses; as to which
cattle he could have taken his oath that
they were not fit for the journey (Dickens).
(Both quoted from Jespersen, 1927:127)
Constructions such as (b) pose a threat to the current
conception of relativization as depending on lexical as
well as referential identity, and they support the al¬
ternative derivation of the "same"-branch on which L_
gen
is empty but lexicalizable by either the same noun (11:
13 a) or by a noun which is superordinate to the ante¬
cedent noun in a hyponymical system (11:13 b).
It is not only reflexivization and relativization which
depend on the underlying presence of a "same"-branch. So,
too, do pronouns with anaphoric reference and 'pronominal'
epithets like "the bastard" in "I asked John to lend me
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his fishing rod, but the bastard wouldn't let me have it".
In this sense definite NP's are 'pronouns'. The relation¬
ship between anaphorically referring pronouns, personal,
reflexive, and relative, is intuitively a strong one.
This relationship can be put down to the same derivation¬
al characteristic of involving a "same"-branch. Further¬
more, the incapability of anaphoric accounts of pronouns
to accomodate "I" and "you" is now seen to stem from the
supposition that these two are non-categorial signs. Their
categorial counterparts are "myself" and "yourself". At
the same time we see why "I asked John to lend me his
fishing rod, but John wouldn't let me have it" is strange
if the same John is referred to by both tokens of the
name. As non-categorial signs proper names cannot be an¬
aphoric. Their categorial counterparts are the third
person personal pronouns and the corresponding reflexive
and relative pronouns.
I venture, therefore, to conclude that an anaphorical¬
ly referring sign is a categorial sign; but it is ana¬
phorically referring by virtue of being a referring
sign: anaphora depends on deixis.
4o9
Conclusion
Summary and Further Prospects
My main concern in this work has been to argue in fa¬
vour of recognizing a distinction between two equipollent
types of linguistic analysis. Of these, the syntactico
-semantic analysis is well established and has been through¬
out the history of linguistics. In contrast, the referential
-semantic analysis has only received sporadic and informal
treatment, more often than not by philosophers rather
than by linguists. Furthermore, when linguists have con¬
cerned themselves with the analysis of data that lend
themselves to RS-analysis, they have more often than not
conducted their inquiries within the framework which is
designed to account for SS-phenomena. This has led to a
certain amount of inconsistency within the SS-analysis
while at the same time complicating the issues unneces¬
sarily.
The area of English nominal composition which has pro¬
vided data for an empirical assessment of the validity of
the theoretical framework established in part II has been
restricted to the area in which the referential functives
play a major part. This area is at the same time one of
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the areas least satisfactorily dealt with by current SS
-practice.
Yet it is not only with respect to the referential
functives that the referential theory can contribute with
new insights into linguistic structure. Another general
area where this type of analysis can reasonably be ex¬
pected to yield felicitous results comprises many aspects
of adjectival constructions. The serialization of attri¬
butive adjectives is clearly bound by a system of rules
which the SS--analysis has no obvious way of accounting
for. The referential theory offers the immediate possibil¬
ity of subcategorizing the cover feature QUAL in various
ways which, a priori, would seem to involve reference to
such notions as essential vs. contingent properties. An
essential property is a property which an entity has out¬
side time, as it were. A dog is a carnivorous animal even
if it has lost all its teeth and cannot eat meat. A con¬
tingent property is a property which an entity has inside
time, either momentarily or permanently. Thus an eye may
be black either permanently — if it belongs to a beauty
queen from the south of Italy, for example — or momentar¬
ily — if it belongs to a boxer who has just lost (or won)
a fight. Along such tentative lines a hierarchy of proper¬
ties may be established, and it will turn out, I believe,
that the closer semantic affinity with "kind" a given
property may be interpreted to have, the closer it will
be to the noun in the superficial serialization.
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Adjectival comparison and reinforcement by elements
like "very" and "too" likewise fall within the scope of
the referential theory where they will be related to the
scalar feature (n degree) on and — possibly — a
secondary branch introduced by it.
The general area of nominal compounding is susceptible
of analysis in RS-terms, and the relationship between ap¬
position (in the conventional sense) and (phrasal) co¬
ordination is likely to be captured within the RS-analysis
rather than within the SS-analysis. Notice in this con¬
nection the relation of mutual exclusion that holds be¬
tween the NP-constructions in
(i) (a) Harry planted his garden with roses and other
flowers
(b) *Harry planted his garden with flowers and (other)
roses
(ii)(a) *Harry planted his garden with roses - flowers,
actually
(b) Harry planted his garden with flowers - roses,
actually
Quite obviously the hyponymical relations between lex'
ical nouns involved in compositions such as these impose
restrictions on the serialization-order allowed in co¬
ordination (i) and apposition (ii). Apposition implies
restriction; coordination implies generalization.
Finally, when sufficient insight in the referential
structure of NP's has been reached and a serious attempt
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can be made to integrate the RS-and the SS-analyses, I
suspect that even aspects of VP's will prove susceptible
of RS-analysis, in particular with respect to the deictic
category of tense, but also with respect to establishing
a principled basis for an inquiry into aspectual phenom¬
ena (cf. e.g. Schibsbye's (1969:98) parallelism between
countable/uncountable and perfective/imperfective.
Tentative considerations such as these invite us to
broaden the scope of RS-analysis beyond the restricted
area investigated in part III. More important than this,
they constitute sufficiently varied and interesting
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